As we have already pointed out, those theories that argue that we indeed have a moral obligation to obey the laws fall into two categories. So far we have discussed transactional theories. These are theories that suggest that your duty of obedience is established by some morally significant transaction between you and the state (or fellow citizens). Now let us introduce you to non-transactional theories. These are theories that say that no transaction is necessary - you may find yourself in a situation where you owe obedience, even though you did not do anything to put yourself under that obligation.
Duties through social roles
Perhaps the best-known non-transactional theories are the associative theories. Associative theorists believe that we are duty-bound to obey the laws of a political community simply by virtue of our membership in that community. This may sound odd. How could you be obliged to shoulder a significant burden (after all, respecting the laws means that you might have unpleasant responsibilities, such as paying your taxes, wearing clothes in public even when it is very hot outside, and so on) without agreeing to it or at least receiving something valuable in return?
Associative theorists believe that, actually, their theory is not odd at all. Instead, it squares very well with our everyday intuitions. We tend to accept that we all have duties attached to the social roles we are simply born into or grow into. We have duties as daughters and sons, we have duties as nieces and nephews, as grandparents, as neighbours, as friends. In many cultures, when we occupy the role of the “son”, we owe our parents honour and respect even though we never chose to be their sons. And this obligation exists independent of what sacrifices our parents made for us. Similarly, when we occupy the role of a “citizen” within a political community, we owe an obligation to obey the law independently of the benefits we may or may not have received from the state.
Critics argue that associative theories have two problems. First, that the analogy between state and family is false. Modern political communities are not similar enough to families. In families we are intimate, connected, emotionally close. That is definitely not true of political communities. Consequently, we may have obligations towards our family members that we never asked for, but we do not have unchosen political obligations. Other critics argue that we simply do not owe obligations to our family members irrespective of what they have done for us. You indeed do not owe your biological parents anything if they had abandoned you or had let you down in important ways. Similarly, you do not owe anything to your political community simply by virtue of being born there.
'Natural duty'
The other group of non-transactional theories are the referred to as natural duty theories. According to natural duty theories, our political obligations are grounded in a moral duty owed by each of us to everyone else, regardless of their transactional history. There are a number of proposals made on which of the natural duties grounds our duty to obey the laws. Some say that it is the Samaritan duty of easy rescue: if you can make a relatively small effort to help others in very significant ways, you ought to. Others argue there is a duty of justice: you ought to give everyone his or her due. Others believe that our natural duty flows from an obligation to respect each other as people with dignity, the ability to reason and make free choices. What natural duty theorists can all agree on is that wherever this natural duty comes from, you can only discharge it by submitting yourself to the authority of the law.
These natural duty theories are criticized because they could lead us to a rather odd result if we followed them to their conclusion. A duty to help those in need, to promote justice or rights might give people reason to obey the laws of their own state. But it gives a similarly strong reason to support other states too. And if, for example, justice would be better served by obeying the demands of a foreign state instead of submitting ourselves to the laws of our own country, then this is what a natural duty theory would require us to do. Or it may very well require us that we disobey the laws of our country for the greater good. To illustrate, our natural duty of justice may require us to evade your taxes and give our money to developing states in order to alleviate poverty there.
Exceptional cases
Both the associative and the natural duty theories can accommodate certain cases of non-law-abiding whistleblowing by acknowledging that the moral duty that grounds our general obligation for obedience is only one of the several moral duties we have. And although it is (allegedly) strong enough to require us to obey in most cases, in exceptional cases other moral duties that require us to break the law may apply.
If you are interested in associative theories, you will find some interesting material here. If you are sympathetic to natural duty theories, you will find material here. If you are interested to hear from theories that say we may not actually even have political obligations at all, come back for the last article of our series.