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COUNTERING POPULIST AUTHORITARIANS

WHERE THEIR SUPPORT COMES FROM AND HOW TO REVERSE THEIR SUCCESS

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All mistakes remain my own.

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Executive summary

It is impossible to propose an effective solution to a problem, unless we understand that problem. Mainstream research on populist authoritarianism in Europe is dominated by political scientists. But political scientists have yet to come up with a convincing and consistent explanation of why populist authoritarians are gaining political ground across the European Union. People with authoritarian political attitudes tend to vote for populist authoritarian parties or causes. The most powerful predictor of how a person will vote in elections is a person's political attitudes. And the origins of people's political attitudes can best be explained by research from the field of social psychology. This book uses research from the field of social psychology to complement the analysis of political scientists. If mainstream scholars were to incorporate social psychology better into their research, it would greatly improve their ability to offer a coherent analysis of why populist authoritarians are becoming increasingly successful in Europe.

Who are populist authoritarians and what do they want?

Populist authoritarianism refers to a political ideology characterised by anti-elitism, ethno-nationalism or nativism, strongman politics, opposition to pluralist democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and support for ultra-conservative cultural norms. Populist authoritarian parties and candidates advance a coherent set of policies that aim to reverse or water down standards guaranteed under international and European law, including the protection of pluralist democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights.

People who hold authoritarian political attitudes are attracted to parties that reflect those attitudes in the policies they offer. People with authoritarian attitudes make up the biggest slice of the voter base for populist authoritarian parties or positions (such as Brexit). Although authoritarians have historically also voted for other political parties, recent elections across Europe and in the USA show that populist authoritarian parties and candidates are becoming more sophisticated at uniting authoritarian voters behind them to win elections and referendums. Furthermore, mainstream parties have a tendency to shift their policies to the right to retain or attract voters with authoritarian political attitudes, which is ultimately also damaging for continued respect for pluralist democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights.

Why is there a gap in our understanding about populist authoritarianism?

Political science scholars and others leading the mainstream debate on populism have identified many factors – particularly socio-demographic factors – that are relevant to understanding populist authoritarianism. Such factors include the role of education, age, gender, one's position on the employment market, one's degree of religiosity and one's degree of exposure to minority communities. They have used these socio-demographic factors to explain why particular

parts of the population are overrepresented among groups that vote for populist authoritarian parties or causes. In short, according to their analysis, it is these groups that are most vulnerable to the economic, migratory, cultural and security 'crises' that have struck Europe over the last decade.

However, this approach has two shortcomings. First, political scientists have difficulty explaining how these socio-demographic factors relate to each other, and why they seem to have an impact on support for populist authoritarians in some countries but not in others. Second, using socio-demographic factors is not the most accurate way of working out whether someone is likely to vote for an authoritarian populist party or cause. Ample research shows that the most accurate way of discovering whether someone will vote for a populist authoritarian party or cause is to look at their political attitudes. And our political attitudes are determined largely by our psychological worldview.

How does research from the field of social psychology help to fill the gap?

Social psychology research explains where authoritarian political attitudes come from. This allows us to understand what factors make people more likely to adopt authoritarian political attitudes in the first place. It also allows us to understand how people who are inclined to support authoritarian political attitudes can be triggered to act on those attitudes and then vote for authoritarian populists. Put otherwise, social psychology gives us the tools to understand why people support populist authoritarians. And consequently, it allows us to develop solutions that can prevent and counter growing support for populist authoritarians.

It is well established in social psychology research that authoritarian political attitudes are endorsed by individuals that subscribe to one of two psychological worldviews: right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Some political science scholars have tried to use social psychology research to improve their understanding of where political attitudes come from. But this has only achieved partial success, because they have only partially used, or they have misunderstood, research from the field of social psychology.

Evidence suggests that the majority of people who support populist authoritarian parties or causes embrace one of these psychological worldviews. People who adhere strongly to right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation endorse a range of policies designed to suppress outgroups such as women, ethnic minorities, LGBTI persons and others who are seen to disrupt traditional socio-economic hierarchies, compete for resources, or pose a threat to traditional cultural values, security or economic stability. They also endorse the restriction of rules (like human rights standards), institutions (like courts), and limiting forms of participation (like public protest or lobbying) that protect outgroups or promote progressive norms.

What is a psychological worldview?

A psychological worldview is an interrelated set of beliefs that operate at a subconscious level and determine our opinions on how the world is, how it should be and how the ideal should be achieved. It is likely that right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation have their roots in human evolution as a means of ensuring internal group cohesion and cooperation to survive against outside threats.

Those who adhere strongly to right-wing authoritarianism see the world as a dangerous place. They favour adherence to 'traditional' cultural norms, the use of harsh punishment to deter those who threaten these norms and desire strongman political leadership to enforce these norms. They are triggered to endorse authoritarian political attitudes by perceived threats to economic stability, security and cultural norms. This group endorses authoritarian political attitudes that would secure the status quo or return society to a prior situation of perceived stability.

Those who strongly adhere to social dominance orientation see the world as a competitive jungle. They favour the maintenance of traditional socio-economic hierarchies. They are triggered to endorse authoritarian political attitudes when they perceive competition to these hierarchies. This group endorses authoritarian political attitudes that would preserve traditional inequalities.

How are psychological worldviews formed and triggered?

We should distinguish between two stages when it comes to psychological worldviews: factors that make people more likely to embrace these worldviews, and factors that trigger people to act on them and endorse authoritarian political attitudes.

Whether individuals strongly adhere to right-wing authoritarianism or social dominance orientation will depend mostly on their development and their experiences. This can otherwise be referred to as 'socialisation'. Our upbringing, schooling, the media, government policies, peers and partners all have an impact on the beliefs, values and worldviews that we come to embrace. We are not born into a psychological worldview. Rather the environment transmits and reinforces ideas and ways of thinking, which are continually moulded during our lives. However, our worldviews and beliefs can become so entrenched that they are difficult or impossible to change. This is likely to be the case for those that strongly adhere to right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. But it is possible to change the values and attitudes of those people who endorse these worldviews less strongly.

When an individual strongly endorses one of these worldviews, they will not necessarily express or consciously hold authoritarian political attitudes constantly. Rather, they have to be triggered by a perception of threat to physical security, economic stability or cultural norms, or a perception of competition to traditional socio-economic hierarchies. Once triggered,

those strongly endorsing right-wing authoritarianism or social dominance orientation will then endorse authoritarian political attitudes.

Although right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are the strongest predictors of support for populist authoritarian parties and policies, this does not mean that the socio-demographic factors relied on by mainstream scholarship on populism are irrelevant. Socio-demographic factors like education, age, gender, religiosity, or geographic proximity to migrant communities are weaker predictors of support for populist authoritarian parties, but they do have an impact on whether individuals endorse one of the psychological worldviews discussed and whether these worldviews are triggered. For example, those with a university education are less likely to support populist authoritarians in Western Europe. One of the reasons for this it that the Western European university system socialises individuals into more progressive values. Equally, social psychology research does not dispute the central relevance of structural factors such as the economic crisis, increased migration flows, security threats posed by terrorism and rapid cultural changes. These background factors have either, by themselves, or through the manipulation of populist authoritarians, triggered a perception of threat and competition among those strongly endorsing right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation.

Progressives have limited time to respond

Populist authoritarian politicians are taking advantage of human psychology, which is hardwired to respond to crises by becoming more authoritarian to ensure group cohesion and stability. Populist authoritarian politicians are becoming extremely adept at creating the perception of threat and competition and associating these anxieties with outgroups such as ethnic minorities, feminists, LGBTI persons and activists. This accounts for their increasing success and for the shift of mainstream parties towards authoritarian positions.

Progressives have limited time to counter this phenomenon by reforming state institutions, public services, social security and the way that they communicate with the public. If mainstream parties instead continue to move to the right to absorb increasingly authoritarian voters, this is likely to entrench authoritarian attitudes among the public in the long-term.

Similarly, merely trying to tackle the crises that have provided the environment in which populist authoritarianism can thrive by reducing immigration, increasing security and improving economic stability is unlikely to be sufficient. First, because it is the perception of threat and competition that triggers authoritarians rather than objective reality. Perception of threat and competition can be manufactured, for example over migration, even in countries where there is very little immigration, such as in Hungary, Poland and Czechia. Second, because the measures commonly taken to increase security such as mass surveillance and ethnic profiling are ineffective and counter-productive and will increase public anxiety further in the long-term. Third, because even if these economic, migration and security questions are eventually 'resolved', in the meantime populist authoritarians

are coming to power and cementing their control over state institutions, media outlets and, consequently, public opinion. This makes authoritarianism difficult to reverse once populist authoritarians do come to power. First, because once in power, populist authoritarians control the principal means through which individuals are socialised into support for authoritarian political attitudes such as the media, education system and government policies and narratives. Second, because populist authoritarians are entrenching their retrogressive measures in laws and constitutions that are difficult to change unless large majorities of the population can be persuaded to support progressive values. However, creating sufficient public support for progressive values will prove difficult precisely because populist authoritarians control the principal means of socialisation, such as the education system and the media.

How can human rights counter rising populist authoritarianism?

It is possible to counter the endorsement of authoritarian political attitudes among the public in two ways. First, by addressing the factors that make people more likely to adopt the two aforementioned mentioned psychological worldviews in the first place. And second, by addressing the factors that lead to these worldviews being triggered. Human rights law offers a ready-made template for countering and diffusing authoritarian political attitudes. This is because human rights standards were designed not only to prohibit abuses by authoritarian regimes, they were also calibrated to prevent the creation of an environment in which authoritarians could even come to power. The human rights based recommendations summarised below can only be implemented fully in those countries that are not yet under populist authoritarian control. In this sense they should be viewed as a preventive measure. Nevertheless, governments and civil society organisations can also draw on these recommendations to support or implement activities in countries with populist authoritarian governments. The measures recommended in this book include the following, which concentrate on steps to prevent populist authoritarians from capturing public opinion and, consequently, electoral support.

Measures to reduce the likelihood that people will endorse right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation

- Implementing the right to education. The right to education includes an obligation to transmit progressive values through the education system and develop critical thinking, as well as educating individuals about the content of human rights law. These steps are proven to reduce the endorsement of authoritarian political attitudes.

- Promoting progressive values through political discourse, laws and policies. Human rights standards require governments to promote tolerance and equality for marginalised groups through the tools they have at their disposal. The laws, policies and narratives spread by politicians are proven to influence political attitudes among the public.

Measures to prevent populist authoritarians from creating or exaggerating the perception of threat and competition

- Human rights standards require governments to maintain and support an independent and plural media, and high quality journalism. Populist authoritarians and their allies in the media have helped to spread fear among the population through inflammatory and misleading reporting. Furthermore, the current economic difficulties in the media market incentivise sensationalist and superficial news coverage. Governments could create an environment conducive to balanced and well-informed public debate by implementing their human rights obligations as well as creating a financially sustainable media market.

- Human rights law requires governments to promote inclusion of marginalised ethnic and social groups in society. This includes through methods such as desegregation of housing, education and the workplace. Facilitating contact and mixing between the majority population and outgroups is proven to reduce the levels of prejudice towards these groups, as well as to reduce support for populist authoritarian parties or causes.

Measures to deal with genuine sources of threat and competition

- Human rights-based counter-terrorism measures are shown to be more effective in addressing security threats than commonly used rights-violating measures like mass surveillance and ethnic profiling. By implementing human rights-compliant counter-terrorism measures that actually work, governments could reduce security threats more effectively.

- Social and economic rights require governments to provide effective social safety nets, adequately funded public services, and to ensure that workers receive a standard of remuneration that affords them a decent standard of living. Implementing these rights would help shield the public from the consequences of economic shocks and reduce inequality, which are both factors that have helped to fuel the rise of populist authoritarianism.

Chapter 1: Introduction

A series of 'crises' has struck the EU during the past decade: economic, cultural and security. The weight of evidence suggests that these crises have facilitated the subsequent growth in support for parties and policies that can be characterised as populist authoritarian (PAn). The increased support for populist authoritarianism (PAm) threatens to undo the measures taken after the Second World War to protect human dignity, inhibit the resurgence of authoritarian regimes and minimise the risk of armed conflict among European countries. These preventive measures included the creation of international standards and institutions designed to protect and promote pluralist democracy, the rule of law and human rights. In Europe, the Council of Europe was created for this purpose, among others.[1] In parallel, the European Communities were created to stimulate economic development, provide energy security and prevent the re-emergence of conflict between France and Germany.[2] Over time, the European Union, which replaced the European Communities, has taken a more prominent role in promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law, in particular in preparing countries for EU membership. These have become the 'values' on which the EU is 'founded' (Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union), and the promotion of these values inside and outside the Union is one of the EU's overarching goals, together with improving the well-being of its peoples (Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union).[3]

This book is aimed at progressive decision-makers and activists as well as think-tanks and academics studying the rise of PAm. The aim of the book is to help this audience better understand why PAm is gaining strength in Europe and explain how better implementation of European and international standards protecting democratic pluralism, the rule of law and fundamental rights would diffuse support for PAm.

The book draws on research from the field of social psychology to explain why increasing numbers of voters favour PAn political parties and policies. This research offers new insights that complement the findings and analysis of mainstream contemporary debate on populism among political scientists, historians, philosophers and sociologists.[4] Social psychology research explains how political attitudes are formed. And mainstream scholarship studying PAm tends to agree that political attitudes are the single most important factor influencing the way that people vote. Social psychology research also goes a long way to clarifying the answers to questions that mainstream scholarship on populism still appears to struggle with, such as: why support for PAn parties or causes is over-represented among a particular socio-demographic group (white, lower educated, men with a vulnerable position on the job market); why certain phenomena (such as religiosity) can explain support for PAn parties in some countries but not others; why some factors (such as the presence of minority populations) produce seemingly opposite effects on support for PAn parties; why education seems to diminish support for PAn parties and policies to varying degrees in different countries; how authoritarian attitudes can be triggered in the

population, and how these can be diminished. Social psychology can help to explain what political scientists term 'demand-side' factors or 'grievance theory', i.e. what drives individuals to support PAm such as concerns over economic stability, cultural norms and physical safety and a loss of trust in institutions, elites and traditional parties. This discipline can also help explain some 'supply-side' factors, i.e. what makes PAn parties more attractive to voters, such as the political space left by mainstream parties, or the role of the media in facilitating the spread of PAns' messages.[5] By offering a deeper understanding of where support for PAm comes from, this book is then able to set out what kinds of measures would diffuse support for PAm.

Discussion of human rights in the context of PAm tends to focus on how PAn leaders dismantle human rights protection. This book presents an alternative angle: because human rights law was created in great part to prevent the recurrence of conditions under which authoritarianism could emerge, these standards are uniquely tailored towards creating an environment where PAm cannot flourish.

Mainstream scholarship is mostly focused on why voters support PAn political parties. This book adopts a slightly different focus. This book is more concerned about the growth in support for policies that run contrary to European and international standards that guarantee pluralist democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. There is growing evidence that mainstream parties are adopting far-right policies to retain or attract voters drawn to PAn parties. As such, although growth in support for PAn parties is highly pertinent, this is not synonymous with a growth in support for authoritarian policies, which can also be advanced by mainstream parties.

The book will first explain the term PAm as used here, outline how the phenomenon poses a threat to pluralist democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, and summarise how contemporary debate among political scientists, sociologists, historians and philosophers explains the factors behind the increase in support for PAn parties and policies. The book will then give an overview of the main findings from empirical research in the field of social psychology, which explains why support for PAn parties and policies gain support in times of crisis. In its final section, the book will outline how the implementation of European and international fundamental rights standards would diffuse the factors that are causing and facilitating the growth of PAm.

Chapter 2: Populist authoritarianism in mainstream literature

Key points

- Populist authoritarianism is characterised by ethno-nationalism/nativism, anti-elitism, authoritarianism and civilisationism, strongman politics and anti-pluralism.
- Populist authoritarianism threatens human rights protection by attacking substantive human rights standards and the institutions that protect them.
- Mainstream literature on populism in the fields of political science, history and philosophy explains that support for populist authoritarianism is due to public anxieties over economic, cultural and security crises that mainstream political parties are seen to have caused or failed to resolve.

A lot of ink has been spilled in contracted discussion over the definition of populism. Some authors prefer to use a 'thin' definition of populism that is characterised by anti-elitism, anti-establishment rhetoric and a claim to act in the name of 'the people'. The definition is 'thin' in that it does not include a description of the substance of the policies being advanced.[6] However, the reason behind the present research is to better understand the threat to pluralist democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. And this threat is not only grounded in the anti-elitist nature of populist authoritarians (PAns). It is also grounded in their authoritarian policies. This section will describe the main characteristics of populist authoritarianism (PAm) that is the focus of the book. Broadly speaking, the term PAm is used here to refer to a model of the state that undermines democratic pluralism, constrained by the rule of law built on respect for fundamental rights standards. The book does not opt for the term 'far-right' or 'radical right' populism because PAn parties do not necessarily neatly fit into traditional left-right political party divides. Support for authoritarian political attitudes can be found among voters who place themselves both on the left and the right of the political spectrum. And it appears that PAn parties and causes are getting better at attracting voters from left and right mainstream parties.[7] Furthermore, PAns can be found both among left (such as in Romania) and right wing (such as in Hungary and Poland) political parties. Because of this, these parties and positions will be described according to what characterises their political agendas: authoritarianism.

2.1 Populist authoritarianism: A description, not a definition

PAm is characterised by the following elements. First, ethno-nationalism, nativism and/or sovereigntism. PAns claim to represent a homogenous ingroup designated as 'the people' or 'the nation', and usually understood to be an 'ordinary' white majority population. Second, anti-elitism. PAns assert that this ingroup has been betrayed by a globalist, political, cultural, intellectual and business class who have failed to address (or have contributed to) the threats to security, cultural values and material well-being currently being experienced by the ingroup. Third, authoritarian and civilisationist.[8] PAns tend to promote recently dominant traditional norms (sometimes explicitly tied to a dogmatic ultra-conservative interpretation of Christianity) that tend to favour patriarchy, heterosexuality, promotion of the ingroup over other social and ethnic groups and opposition to progressive norms such as fundamental rights and environmental protection.[9] The EU and its supporters tend to find themselves cursed three times over for being members of the elite, for undermining national sovereignty and for promoting progressive norms on equality.[10] Fourth, PAns favour strongman politics. Once in power, PAns tend to draw political power towards the executive by weakening checks on the government provided by the judiciary, the constitution and other institutions and bodies responsible for protecting the rule of law, fundamental rights, equality and other progressive values such as environmental protection.[11] Fifth, anti-pluralist. When in power, PAns also tend to maintain and build public support by manipulating public opinion. This can occur through direct or indirect control and influence over public and private media or, in the case of Donald Trump in America, undermining public confidence in the media and establishing a direct line with the public through social media.[12] PAns in power also try to manipulate public opinion by closing off other avenues through which opposing views are aired, for example through non-governmental organisation (NGOs) and public protest.[13]

> ***Key characteristics of populist authoritarianism (PAm)***
>
> - Ethno-nationalism/nativism/sovereigntism
> - Anti-elitism
> - Authoritarianism and civilisationism
> - Strongman politics
> - Anti-pluralist

In its most accomplished form, PAm strips the rule of law, fundamental rights and democratic pluralism out of the state, leaving majoritarian, authoritarian regimes with autocratic leanings.[14] PAm may be characterised as democratic in the sense that it is based on the will of a relative majority of voters. However, the European governments that created and joined the Council of Europe and the EU have committed to promoting and protecting pluralist democracy and the rule of law. This requires minimum guarantees of protection and participation for all members of society, with decision-making based on the participation of and in the interests of all sections of society, as well as balanced and informed public debate through a free and plural media and civic participation through, for example, free and independent NGOs.[15]

PAm, however, rejects pluralism and the rule of law, because PAm tries to limit participation in governance by anyone other than the ingroup and those who purport to speak on its behalf. PAns do this by marginalising minorities, manipulating and misinforming public debate, limiting their own accountability to the law and closing avenues for expressing disagreement.[16] Accordingly, it is more accurate to characterise PAm as crude majoritarian rule, rather than democratic rule.

2.2 Let me count the ways: how populist authoritarianism threatens the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights

PAns attack pluralist democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in two ways. First, they attack the substance of particular fundamental rights standards as a way of building and maintaining public support. This occurs most notably in relation to the right to equal treatment. The right to equality guarantees all people, regardless of their characteristics, the same level of protection. PAns generate and maintain public support by attacking outgroups. That is, groups that do not belong to a homogenous ingroup ('the people'), whom PAn supporters regard as somehow threatening or undeserving of equal status. PAns create and retain public support by treating certain groups in society less favourably than the majority population or, in rights terms, by violating their right to equal treatment. For example: by preventing newly arrived migrants from accessing education or health services; by subjecting ethnic minorities to more stringent policing or by de facto segregation or the provision of inferior public services; by tightening access to abortion or not providing support for women who want to return to work after giving birth; or by inciting or tolerating hatred towards lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex persons (LGBTI). PAns also build public support by adopting a 'law and order' approach that undermines certain fundamental rights that are designed to protect everyone from the abuse of state power, on the grounds that these rights threaten the safety of the ingroup. For example: the threat of terrorism and crime is used to justify the use of mass surveillance or limitations on peaceful public protest, in violation of the right to privacy and freedom of assembly.

The second way that populists attack rights, pluralist democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights is structurally: that is, by trying to neutralise the bodies and institutions that play a role in upholding the rule of law, including fundamental rights rules. PAns target this fundamental rights infrastructure because it can prevent them from delivering the laws and policies they need to enact to build and maintain public support. Once the fundamental rights infrastructure actively begins to fight off threats to fundamental rights standards, neutralising these bodies becomes in itself a way of gaining and maintaining public support for PAns because these entities are portrayed by PAns as enemies of the people and anti-democratic.

The bodies and institutions responsible for upholding the rule of law and facilitating democratic participation include: the courts, which generally have the power to check the legality of laws and policies against fundamental rights standards; quasi-governmental bodies responsible for protecting fundamental rights like national human rights institutions or om-

budspersons, which may have power to inform the public about fundamental rights, investigate government activities, make formal recommendations to authorities about their conduct, and bring court cases; NGOs that may try to inform and mobilise the public to protect fundamental rights, carry out advocacy towards authorities to bring their behaviour into line with fundamental rights standards, or take state bodies to court; academics and scholars that provide informed commentary on public affairs; the public and private media, which is responsible for putting the right to freedom of expression and freedom of information into practice so that the public can exercise their right to democratic participation and have a well-informed and balanced debate about political, economic and social affairs.

2.3 How mainstream literature explains the growth of populist authoritarianism

The mainstream debate on PAm is mostly rooted in the academic disciplines of political science and sociology, with contributions from history and philosophy. Literature in this area broadly identifies three causes behind the increase in support for PAn parties and policies: globalisation (which itself includes austerity, free trade and the spread of progressive cultural values), terrorism and immigration.[17] According to this analysis, the financial crisis has resulted in a fall in the standard of living across Europe due to cuts in spending on public services, job losses and attendant economic hardships. Further, free trade has led to job losses or job insecurity in certain sectors of the economy, in particular for unskilled and low-skilled workers. Second, many societies have gone through, or feel they are threatened with, rapid cultural changes. Both because of migration into and within Europe, and because of progress towards equality especially for women, ethnic and racial minorities and lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and intersex (LGBTI) persons. Third, terrorist attacks in EU countries are seen as a new, real and tangible threat to public safety. Put otherwise, many Europeans feel that their physical safety, cultural values and economic stability are under threat from terrorism, migration, changes in cultural values and free trade.

Mainstream commentators explain that because these disruptive changes have occurred during a period when mainstream centre-left and centre-right political parties have held power, the political mainstream has lost the public's trust. This has allowed PAns to lay the blame with the political, business and cultural 'elite' for either causing or failing to stop or reverse to these developments. Put otherwise, PAns offer to unseat the incumbent elites, and look after the interests of the 'forgotten', 'left behind' white majority ingroup. Some scholars place particular emphasis on the fact that centre-left and centre-right mainstream parties are seen to have caused or failed to solve current problems as a significant reason behind growing support for populism. This has been described as a symptom of TINA ('there is no alternative') politics. That is, people vote for PAns because the centre left and centre right parties have become indistinguishable in their support for policies like multiculturalism, capitalism and free trade that are identified as the roots of public anxieties – thus creating a political gap for PAns to fill.[18] Recent research also explains

that the public has lost trust in the institutions of government and mainstream political parties to address the sources of their fears and insecurities (immigration, a drop in standard of living and terrorism), and have lost trust in the media to give them an accurate account of current affairs. Because of this a growing number of voters in many countries believe that the 'system' is broken and are therefore more prepared to vote for PAns seen to be outside the political establishment who are offering radical solutions that speak to their concerns.[19]

For the most part, contemporary debate on the rise of PAm maintains that support for PAns is particularly strong among those with a more vulnerable place on the labour market, those with lower levels of formal education, those who are older and men. The broadly accepted reasons for this are that this part of society is: most vulnerable to competition for jobs and access to public services from unskilled and low-skilled immigrants; has suffered a loss of social status due to measures to promote equality on the basis ethnicity, sexual orientation and gender; is most attached to ultra-conservative social values that preserve their social status and maintain traditional norms; has suffered most from jobs moving overseas due to free trade; is least well equipped (because of their education and/or lack of interaction with minorities) to reject nationalist, sexist and xenophobic explanations for current problems. There has been a difference of opinion among researchers over whether people are motivated to vote for PAns more because of economic concerns or more because of cultural concerns. The increasingly dominant view is that those who tend to vote for PAns do so because they promise to protect cultural values and national identity rather than because they promise to address economic problems. Put otherwise, the more popular interpretation in current mainstream literature is that those who support PAns are more motivated by the fact that they perceive certain groups, particularly migrants, to be a threat to their cultural values and national identity, than as a threat to their jobs and their access to public services. There is also some debate over how much and, if so, why, the level of education, religiosity and the presence of minority groups have an impact on support for PAm.

Even where PAns have not taken power, they have heavily influenced the policies of mainstream parties.[20] They have done so either by joining these parties as a minority coalition partner, such as in Austria, or by appearing to cause mainstream parties to shift to the right in their policies to retain or attract potential PAn voters. For example, both Rutte in the Netherlands and Kurz in Austria are considered to have adopted a harder line on immigration and integration to capture voters courted by PAn parties ahead of elections in 2017 and 2018, and the FPÖ as junior partner in the Austrian coalition government appears to have continued to pull the government in this direction.[21] Research covering several EU member states shows that liberal and centre-right parties tend to move to the right, while centre-left parties are more likely to stand their ground. As mainstream parties move right, PAn parties become even more radical, probably in an effort to maintain distance from the mainstream parties as they move to the right. And while mainstream parties might not adopt PAn positions wholeheartedly, they have moved towards the far-right

at least in their policies on immigration and integration.[22] Put otherwise, in some countries PAns have taken or share power, while in others, mainstream political parties have adopted PAn policies.

Some terms: progressives, authoritarians, democratic pluralism, human rights, fundamental rights

The book makes frequent reference to 'progressives' and 'authoritarians'. The term 'progressive' is used to refer to those that support the values set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, namely: democratic pluralism, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights standards (which include civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, equal treatment and environmental protection) as recognised in international and European law. All EU governments are bound by numerous international and European legal obligations, in addition to EU law, that protect these standards. In this sense, the post-Second World War norm in Europe is 'progressive' regardless of political colour. Respect for these guarantees is meant to be beyond the realm of politics. Thus, politically right and left parties should be expected to equally support these standards. Similarly, threats to these standards have also originated from politically left parties (such as in Romania) or right parties (such as in Hungary).[23]

PAns do not regard these values as non-negotiable foundations of modern European society. The term authoritarian refers to those who support limiting human rights standards (to benefit the ingroup but not outgroups such as minorities or activists challenging traditional cultural norms), favour the concentration of power in the executive and the subjugation of checks and balances such as independent courts, oppose democratic pluralism and endorse discrimination against 'outgroups' such as ethnic minorities, feminists or LGBTI persons. This does not easily translate into a traditional left-right political division.

The term 'democratic pluralism' as used here refers to the safeguards that ensure governments allow the interests of all elements of society, and not only the governing majority, to feed into the process of governing. These safeguards include: the existence of independent courts with power to protect the fundamental rights of all individuals; the right of individuals to give effect to participatory democracy by creating and organising themselves through non-governmental organisations and engaging in public protest; the obligation on governments to support the independence and plurality of the media.[24]

The book will use 'human rights' and 'fundamental rights' interchangeably as there is no difference in substance between the two concepts. Chapter 3: What insights can social psychology offer?

Chapter 3: What insights can social psychology offer?

Key points

- Social psychology offers an important insight into why people endorse authoritarian political attitudes.
- Those who hold authoritarian political attitudes subscribe to one of two psychological worldviews: right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation.
- A psychological worldview is an interrelated set of beliefs that operates at a subconscious level and determines our opinions on how the world is, how it should be and how the ideal should be achieved.
- Those who score highly on measures of right-wing authoritarianism see the world as a dangerous place. They favour adherence to 'traditional' cultural norms, the use of harsh punishment to deter those who threaten these norms and strongman leadership to enforce these norms. They react to perceived threats to economic stability, security and cultural norms by endorsing authoritarian political attitudes that would secure the status quo or return to society to a prior situation of perceived stability.
- Those who score highly on measures of social dominance orientation see the world as a competitive jungle. They favour the maintenance of traditional socio-economic hierarchies. They react to perceived competition to these hierarchies by endorsing authoritarian political attitudes that would preserve traditional inequalities.

The mainstream debate largely characterises the roots of populist authoritarianism (PAm) in cause-and-effect terms. That is, more immigration/terrorism/poorer economic conditions = heightened public concern for resources/culture/safety + failure of mainstream parties to resolve these 'crises' = support for PAm. But this literature is not able to answer certain questions satisfactorily, for example: if populist authoritarian (PAn) voters are worried about national identity and cultural values rather than economic questions, how come the rise in support for PAm coincides so strongly with economic downturns? Why do lower educated, lower skilled, older men care more about national identity and cultural values than other parts of the population? Why does the presence of minorities sometimes diminish support for PAns and sometimes raise it? Why does education seem to counteract support for PAns and

why does religiosity sometimes counteract and sometimes increase support for PAns? Why does PAm seem to thrive on disinformation? Why are simple answers to complicated issues attractive to PAn supporters? Why do PAn supporters seem keen to roll back guarantees protecting the rule of law, fundamental rights and pluralist democracy? Why do PAn supporters tend to dislike fundamental rights activists, environmentalists, cyclists and vegetarians?

Social psychology adds an extremely valuable layer of understanding as to why support for PAm has grown by explaining why people hold PAn attitudes. Extensive research shows that, for the most part, people who hold political attitudes that align with PAn policies or vote for PAn parties, subscribe to one of two psychological worldviews: right-wing authoritarianism or social dominance.

Psychological worldview

Social psychologists refer to right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation variously as social or ideological worldviews, cognitive-motivational processes, social-attitudinal constructs or ideological attitude dimensions. The term 'psychological worldview' is used here for the sake of simplicity.[25]

Despite the varied terminology, they are talking about the same thing: a subconscious decision-making process, that bases its decisions on a person's subconsciously held beliefs about how the world is, how it should be, and how the ideal can be achieved.

The subconscious decision-making process of right-wing authoritarians is based on their view of the world as a dangerous place. The subconscious decision-making process of social dominance orientation is based on a view of the world as a competitive jungle. It is these beliefs about society that 'motivate' the way that people behave and the political attitudes or ideologies they subscribe to.

This is not to say that PAn supporters are mindless zombies who do not actively make assessments based on reason and emotion. Rather, it is to say that most of the parameters on which humans base their decisions are rooted in psychological worldviews that operate in the background of the mind.

3.1 What are right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation?

Social psychologists use the term 'right-wing authoritarianism' (RWA) to describe an psychological worldview characterised by conventionalism, aggression and submission. Conventionalism refers to opposition to changes to the status quo – or more accurately the re-establishment of past rules – including traditional legal, social or cultural rules.[26] Aggression refers to favouring harsh punishment of people who deviate from these traditional social, cultural and legal rules. Submission refers to the tendency to embrace authority and a strong leader to enforce the rules.

Why do simplistic solutions appeal to populist authoritarians (PAns)?

Researchers have found that individuals high in RWA tend to have a particular way of thinking or 'cognitive style'. They tend to be closed-minded, have a low tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty and are cognitively rigid and dogmatic in their opinions. They tend to see the world in black and white, prefer categorical rather than qualified statements and explanations, resort to stereotyping and impose strict categories and inflexible conceptions in their understanding of the world. This helps to explain why PAn supporters seem to find simplistic solutions so appealing.

Researchers suggest that individuals who score highly on measures testing for levels of RWA (or high RWAs) see the world as an unsafe and threatening place and adopt RWA to satisfy their psychological need for certainty, order and security. High RWAs tend to justify negative attitudes towards outgroups by characterising them as 'immoral' threats to the ingroup's cultural values or as threats to their security.[27]

The second type of authoritarian is the 'social dominator'. Social psychologists use the term 'social dominance' to describe a psychological worldview that sees the world as naturally hierarchical and anti-egalitarian. Individuals with a high 'social dominance orientation' (SDO) tend to score low on tests that measure empathy and altruism and score high on tough-mindedness and callousness, and see the world as a competitive 'jungle' where survival depends on maintaining traditional socio-economic hierarchies.

People who strongly endorse the SDO worldview (high SDOs) hold 'zero-sum' beliefs according to which gains for an outgroup imply losses for the ingroup. It is thought that strong endorsement of the SDO worldview helps to serve a psychological need for social stability and the superiority of some groups over others by legitimating current hierarchies.

SDO functions throughout the socio-economic hierarchy. That is, it is not only high SDOs from high status groups that hold negative attitudes towards lower status groups. High SDOs in lower status groups also hold negative attitudes towards groups lower than them in the hierarchy, such as low-income citizens (whether from the majority population or with an immigrant background) towards newly arriving immigrants. The SDO mindset allows low status groups to accept that there are other groups above them in the social hierarchy. This acceptance eliminates the anxiety or pain that would otherwise result from being on the losing end of inequality. And this acceptance brings social stability by allowing a lower status group to cooperate with (rather than struggle against) and receive benefits from cooperating with higher status groups. The SDO worldview also allows those higher in the social hierarchy to maintain their position by legitimating their prejudices towards other groups in society who threaten the social and/or economic position of their ingroup.

High SDOs tend to justify their prejudice to others and to themselves by using 'legitimising myths'. The commonly held legitimising myth used by a member of a group that sees itself as higher in status (e.g. someone from the white

majority) to justify prejudice towards ethnic minorities, for example, is that a lower status group deserves its position due to dishonesty, lower intelligence, laziness and/or criminality, while the ingroup deserves its superior status because it is hardworking, thrifty and morally upright.[28]

In sum, high RWAs and high SDOs are two different types of authoritarian. In a word, high RWAs are oppressive traditionalists, while high SDOs are anti-egalitarians. These psychological worldviews determine people's attitudes to a broad range of issues, including their political opinions and the policies and parties they support. It is not argued here that terrorism, immigration, economic hardship, gender, religiosity, education, income, place in the employment market and ethnic segregation do not play an important role in explaining the growth of support for PAm. These factors remain of central importance. But they help to explain support for PAm much better once we understand that the role they play is mostly indirect. They are important because they determine the extent to which individuals subscribe to one of the psychological worldviews that are highly prominent among supporters of PAm.

The origins of research on authoritarian political attitudes[29]

Scholarship on authoritarianism originated in the 1950s among psychologists trying to understand why people support authoritarian regimes. Early research focused on Nazi Germany, and concentrated on uncovering factors that shape the 'authoritarian personality'.[30] This early research treated authoritarianism as a personality type, rather than a more comprehensive and far-reaching psychological construct or worldview capable of explaining an interrelated set of political opinions. Because of this, early research focused on explaining authoritarian attitudes as the product of human development, and parenting in particular. The theory of the 'authoritarian personality' fell out of favour as a way of explaining support for authoritarianism among psychologists. Its focus on personality development has probably also made this research unattractive to political scientists studying populist authoritarianism. In the 1980s a related theory on 'right-wing authoritarianism' that explained authoritarianism as a worldview was created and gathered considerably more empirical support.[31]

Scholarship on social dominance orientation originated in the 1990s among psychologists trying to understand why inequality and hierarchy is a feature of all societies, regardless of culture.[32] Research on RWA and SDO initially focused on testing how well these worldviews explained the origin of prejudice and discrimination, and later research explored how these worldviews explain political attitudes.

Like research on SDO, contemporary research on RWA focuses on explaining the broader factors that trigger and shape authoritarian attitudes, such as threats to cultural values, physical security and economic stability, and socio-economic competition. As research has deepened, scholarship has begun to provide support for the view that

> SDO and RWA are the product of socialisation into support for certain values transmitted through parenting, education, religion, government ideology, and cognitive styles, as well as broader economic, social and cultural factors that trigger individuals who are sensitive to threat (for RWA) and competition (for SDO).

3.2 Most populist authoritarian voters are probably a mix of people scoring highly on measures for right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation

As discussed in chapter 6, those scoring highly on measures for RWA and SDO (high RWAs and high SDOs) hold political attitudes that correspond to PAn policies. Those who hold PAn attitudes are highly likely to be either high RWAs or high SDOs, or both. Although high RWAs and high SDOs hold similar political attitudes, they do so for different reasons. Thus, it is not possible to explain the prevalence of authoritarian attitudes in society solely by reference to either RWA or SDO: you have to examine the impact of both worldviews side by side.

Sometimes PAn support is predicted better by high SDO and sometimes better by high RWA. This is due to different contexts at national level. Although both high SDO and high RWA correspond with support for PAn policies, they do so for different reasons and they do so independently of each other. RWA is triggered by perceptions of threat to cultural values, security and economic stability, while SDO is triggered by a perception of competition to socio-economic status.

Thus, for example, in countries where the PAn party successfully creates the perception that immigrants are a threat to economic stability, a cause of crime or a threat to cultural values, those high in RWA are more likely to express anti-immigrant attitudes. This is because those high in RWA are concerned about conformity with social, legal and cultural rules and security and are triggered by perceived threats. In this country, most PAn voters are probably high RWAs. It is not that high SDOs do not exist, but they will not have been triggered to express authoritarian views.

In contrast, in countries where PAn parties have successfully created the perception that immigrants are a source of competition for economic or social status, high SDOs are more likely to express anti-immigrant attitudes because those high in SDO are concerned with maintaining existing social hierarchies.[33] In this country, most PAn voters are probably high SDOs. Again, it is not that high RWAs do not exist, but they will not have been triggered to express authoritarian views.

Of course, in countries where a PAn party has successfully created the perception that immigrants are both threatening and competitive, then one would expect to see both high RWAs and high SDOs overrepresented in support for PAn parties or policies in roughly equal measure.

This has been confirmed by a number of experimental studies where researchers were able to manipulate the information received by participants to test prejudice towards real and fictitious outgroups. In experiments where the outgroup

was portrayed as lower status but potentially competitive, those high in SDO, but not those high in RWA, showed high levels of prejudice. Whereas in experiments where the outgroup was portrayed as a threat to national identity or cultural norms, those high in RWA, but not those high in SDO, showed higher levels of prejudice towards them.[34] Social psychologists have termed this the 'dual process model'.[35]

> ***The influence of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) beyond politics***
>
> High SDO and high RWA are not merely intertwined with political attitudes, but also influence choices in one's personal life that can have a broader impact on society. For example, high SDOs tend to opt for careers in professions and positions that generally perpetuate and maintain social hierarchies and inequality (such as law enforcement, management positions, the military, judges and lawyers working in certain fields, accountants and economists) and are more inclined to hire people whom they see as belonging to the dominant, rather than lower status, groups (e.g. preferring a man to a woman and a white person to an ethnic minority). In contrast, low SDOs are more likely to opt for careers and positions that combat hierarchy and inequality like human rights activists, public defender's office, social workers, teachers for persons with intellectual disabilities, artists, public intellectuals. Some research also suggests that institutions that maintain or perpetuate social hierarchies may also socialise their staff, causing levels of SDO to increase over time.[36] Similarly, women high in RWA are more likely to conform to traditional expectations in their career choices, family life, and even sexual behaviour.[37]

3.2 Explaining support for populist authoritarianism by explaining political attitudes

SDO and RWA explain where authoritarian political attitudes come from. Research on RWA and SDO is important for understanding support for PAn parties and policies, because people tend to vote for the political parties that offer policies matching their political attitudes. Put otherwise, understanding RWA and SDO is important because it helps to explain why people vote for PAn parties or support PAn policies.

Not all researchers agree that the most reliable way to predict how an individual will vote is to understand their political attitudes. That is, some researchers question whether individuals necessarily vote for parties or policies that reflect their political attitudes. One of the most dominant arguments is that people vote for PAn parties not because they agree with their policies but, rather, as a protest vote against mainstream political parties because they are disillusioned with the political establishment.

The weight of scholarship suggests, however, that PAn voters are primarily making a policy choice – they are choosing PAn parties because of the policies they advance. If PAn voters were protest voting against mainstream parties, researchers would not expect to find them

overrepresented among a certain socio-demographic group. Rather, one would expect them to be more evenly distributed among a cross section of the population. But as noted, mainstream scholarship has indeed found that men with lower levels of education, who have a vulnerable place on the job market, who are (in Central and Eastern Europe) or are not (in Western Europe) religious, usually living in ethnically segregated areas, are overrepresented among PAn voters. This suggests that there is a section of society with particular grievances that are attracted to PAn parties because of the policies they offer.[38] Data also suggests that voters supporting PAn parties have not simply switched their allegiance from mainstream parties to PAn parties between elections. Rather, it seems that a significant slice (around one third) of voters holding PAn attitudes abstain from voting altogether in the absence of a PAn party in their country. When PAn parties emerge, they attract these previously idle voters because they reflect their authoritarian attitudes, unlike mainstream parties.[39] Similarly, other research finds that those with populist attitudes are more likely to vote for PAn than other parties, or to abstain from voting altogether.[40] This is also supported by research in the field of social psychology that suggests that voters will vote for parties that represent their moral concerns and refrain from voting where they feel these are not represented by any party.[41]

A further argument in favour of the position that PAn voters are voting for PAn parties because of their policies, is that PAn voters tend to hold anti-immigration, anti-multicultural and xenophobic attitudes. And the central platform of PAn parties is anti-immigration. A large volume of mainstream scholarship has drawn the conclusion that PAn voters vote for PAn parties because these parties reflect their political attitudes (discussed further below), and in particular their anti-immigration attitudes.[42]

This is not to say that there is not an element of protest voting. Several of the studies cited also find that PAn voters are also often disillusioned with politics and mistrust state institutions, but that this is less important than holding anti-immigration, anti-multicultural and xenophobic attitudes. As will be discussed below, high RWAs and high SDOs not only subscribe to PAn parties' policies, they also share PAn parties' mistrust of the political establishment.

This book does not suggest that other 'supply side' factors are not relevant to the success of PAn parties, such as the media landscape, the role of religious institutions, electoral rules or the degree to which mainstream parties have moved to a common centre political ground. Certain of these factors will be explored later in the book as they are also relevant to explain how RWA and SDO are triggered. But this book focuses on political attitudes because they are the most important factor in explaining how people vote and because there is a large body of research on RWA and SDO that provides answers to how political attitudes are formed that remains untapped by mainstream scholarship. In turn, by understanding how political attitudes are shaped, it is possible to create policy measures to diffuse support for PAm.

Chapter 4: A brief aside: explaining the connection between right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and other factors measured by psychologists to explain political attitudes

Key points

- Research from related fields in psychology examining the origins of political attitudes complements the findings of social psychologists on right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation.
- Those who score highly on measures of right-wing authoritarianism place emphasis on values such as security, tradition and conformity. They also score low on measures of the personality trait of 'openness to change'. And they place greater importance on underlying moral concerns that prize obedience to authority, loyalty to the ingroup and purity.
- Those who score highly on measures of social dominance orientation place emphasis on values such as power and self-enhancement. They also score highly on measures of the personality trait of 'tough-mindedness' which means they lack empathy, compassion and altruism. And they also place greater importance on underlying moral concerns that prize obedience to authority, loyalty to the ingroup and purity.

Psychologists and neuroscientists have tried to explain the origins of political attitudes from several dimensions, not only through the worldviews of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). This chapter will give a brief snapshot of these related fields of research for three reasons. First, because these neighbouring disciplines lead to remarkably consistent and similar findings, which will be referred to when relevant. Second, because it offers the reader additional insight and pointers for further research. Third, because chapter 10 will return to some of this research when it sets out steps that progressives can take to diffuse support for populist authoritarianism (PAm).

4.1 Values

Academics have established that all humans are motivated by certain deeply seated values that subconsciously underpin our political attitudes. The full list of values cut across cultures and are universally held. Although these values are

universally present, each person tends to place priority on different configurations of closely related values. The values on which a person places emphasis is influenced predominantly by socialisation – that is, the values that have been emphasised and prioritised by culture, parenting, education, peer groups, the media and government policies.

Broadly speaking, these sets of values divide into four collections, which mirror each other: the priority a person attaches to the individual rather than to one's community, and the importance that an individual attaches to stability as opposed to change. The four broad areas of values are referred to as conservation (sub-values of security, tradition, and conformity), openness to change (sub-values of stimulation and self-direction), self-transcendence (sub-values of universalism and benevolence) and self-enhancement (sub-values of achievement, power and hedonism).[43]

Some research has examined the relationship between RWA, SDO and values. High RWAs tend to place greater importance on values falling under conservation rather than on values corresponding to openness. High SDOs tend to place greater importance on values falling under self-enhancement but not self-transcendence.[44]



Taken from Holmes, T., Blackmore, E., Hawkins, R. & Wakeford, T., 'The Common Cause Handbook', 2011, Public Interest Research Centre[356]

Thus, individuals who are opposed to fundamental rights have been found to prioritise values of security, power and hedonism, which are associated with high RWA and high SDO. As one would expect, high RWAs and SDOs also tend to be opposed to human rights protection. In contrast, those supportive of human rights tend to prioritise the exact opposite value clusters of benevolence and self-direction.[45] Similarly, high RWA and high SDO are also associated with greater levels of support for punitive criminal justice policies that emphasise incapacitation, deterrence, and opposition to rehabilitation as desired goals of the criminal justice system. These same attitudes have also been found to correlate highly with the values of self-enhancement and conservation, which are associated with high RWA and high SDO.[46] It seems eminently plausible that when individuals are socialised into values falling under the conservation and self-enhancement clusters, they are more likely to have or adopt or develop SDO or RWA as worldviews.

4.2 Personality traits

RWA and SDO are also linked to particular personality traits. Two commonly used personality inventories divide the human personality into a number of dimensions. The two most commonly used models are the 'Big Five' and the 'HEXACO' inventories, which divide human personality into either five or six traits, respectively.

Big Five and HEXACO

According to the Big Five inventory, there are five different types of personality trait: extraversion, openness to experience, conscientiousness, agreeableness and neuroticism. According to the HEXACO inventory, there are six: honesty-humility, emotionality, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness to experience. These models are fairly similar (neuroticism under the Big Five corresponds to emotionality under HEXACO), except that the HEXACO model includes a dimension of honesty-humility, which includes some characteristics contained within agreeableness in the Big Five model.

A large body of evidence shows that high RWAs score low on measures for the personality trait of openness and high SDOs are low on the personality trait of agreeableness (under the 'Big Five') or 'honesty-humility' (under the HEXACO model). Research also shows that these links are causal. Being low on openness, makes a person more likely to be high RWA, because low openness means that an individual prefers order, structure, stability and security. Similarly, being low on agreeableness or 'honesty-humility' makes a person more likely to be high SDO because being low on these personality traits translates to a lack of empathy, compassion and altruism (also referred to as 'tough-mindedness'). It has been shown at a physical level that high SDOs have lower levels of activity in parts of the brain associated with the perception of pain in others. There is also evidence from longitudinal studies to suggest that low levels of empathy drive people to be

high SDOs, and that over time, high levels of SDO in turn have a further negative effect on empathy.[47] If one considers that SDO is associated with low levels of empathy and altruism, this combination allows high SDOs to justify their desire to swat competitive outgroups who threaten their status and the social hierarchy on the basis that the world is a ruthless competitive jungle where the strong (deserve to) win and the weak lose.[48] As one might also expect, individuals with low levels of empathy (associated with high SDO) tend not to support human rights standards, which is also true of high SDOs.[49] Similarly, research examining why high SDOs were supportive of wars of aggression found that this was because of their low level of concern for innocent civilians in the target country, which is also consistent with a lack of empathy.[50]

4.3 Cognitive linguistics

RWA and SDO as a means of explaining authoritarian attitudes also seem remarkably consistent with research in the field of cognitive or neuro-linguistics, which explains how different political attitudes can be triggered and over time cemented through the use of language to activate either liberal or conservative frames of thinking, by engaging the values on which these two frames are built. This field of research has been popularised recently by George Lakoff. To summarise, Lakoff explains that individuals hold one of two coherent belief systems that cause them to adhere either to liberal or conservative ideology. Those with strong conservative beliefs think of the nation as a 'strict father' and favour strict discipline and individual responsibility, who value order, structure and closure, do not tolerate ambiguity, complexity or change, view the world as threatening and competitive and accept or favour social inequality. Those who follow 'strict father' morality subscribe to a hierarchy of God over man (which can translate into strict adherence to dogmatic Christianity), white heterosexual men over women and ethnic and sexual minorities, rich over poor and man over nature. Those with liberal beliefs think of the nation as a 'nurturing parent' whose job it is to provide the people with resources and freedom to develop in a world that is relatively safe and cooperative. The 'strict father' ideology seems to broadly correspond to the political attitudes of high RWAs and high SDOs and those who attach more importance to the value clusters of conservation and self-enhancement, referred to above.

In most people 'strict father' and 'nurturing parent' morality co-exist in the same person (these are referred to as 'biconceptuals' and equate to the idea of the 'moveable middle' of society).[51] For example, an individual might follow 'nurturing parent' morality at work, while following 'strict father' morality in their personal relations.[52]

4.4 Moral foundations theory

Research in the field of moral psychology on moral foundations theory, popularised by Jonathan Haidt, explains how modern political attitudes are rooted in human evolution. To summarise briefly, over the history of humanity, certain concerns have become instinctively hard-wired. Humans have six moral foundations: care, purity, loyalty, fairness, liberty and

authority. The care foundation gives rise to an impulse to prevent 'innocents' from coming to harm. The purity foundation is linked to the way we express disgust and drives us to reject potentially harmful substances or diseases. The loyalty foundation drives us to maintain the safety and coherence of our ingroup. The fairness foundation is the root of human concerns for proportionality in the way resources are distributed. The liberty foundation gives rise to the human drive to reject tyranny. The authority foundation makes us inclined to desire strong leadership.

Those with liberal political attitudes tend to have greater weight attached to the care and liberty foundations. These are collectively referred to as 'individualising foundations' because they place emphasis on individual freedom and protection of the vulnerable. Those with conservative political attitudes tend to attach weight more evenly to the entire range of moral foundations, though the purity foundation appears to be particularly important. These are referred to as 'binding foundations' because they place emphasis on the importance of group coherence and well-being.

Moral foundations theory maintains that it is the moral foundations that an individual attaches importance to that determine our political ideologies, and that our choice of moral foundations depends on socialisation, such as upbringing and education. But more recent research strongly suggests that the causal link is the other way around. According to this more recent evidence it is our political ideologies that determine which moral foundations we place emphasis on: either individualising (care and liberty) or binding (authority, purity and loyalty) foundations.[53] The book will refer on occasion to research on moral foundations theory to support discussion on the political attitudes held by high SDOs and high RWAs.

While there does not appear to be research assessing the links between SDO, RWA and moral foundations theory, the moral foundations of authority, loyalty and purity do seem to align with the SDO and RWA worldviews. The fact that high SDOs and high RWAs stress the importance of the ingroup (loyalty), favour strong leadership (authority) and are highly prejudicial towards outgroups – which is linked to the purity foundation, as well as RWA and SDO (discussed in chapter 6) – suggests that high SDOs and high RWAs probably place greater emphasis on these three moral foundations.[54] Indeed, research into political attitudes and moral foundations finds that people who attach more weight to the loyalty, authority and purity foundations support the same kinds of political attitudes found among high RWAs and high SDOs, such as severe punishment of criminals, lack of concern for the environment and victim blaming.[55]

Illustration of how the different ways of explaining the origins of political attitudes stack onto each other and relate to RWA and SDO.



Chapter 5: What is the connection between social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism and support for populist authoritarianism?

Key points

- People tend to vote for political parties or causes that reflect their political attitudes. Those with authoritarian political attitudes are more likely to vote for parties, causes or candidates that promote authoritarian policies.
- Those scoring highly on measures of right-wing authoritarianism (high RWAs) and social dominance orientation (high SDOs) hold authoritarian political attitudes and are more likely to vote for populist authoritarian parties, causes or candidates.
- Although some mainstream scholarship has used research on right-wing authoritarianism, many researchers have also misunderstood it, and no mainstream scholars have used research on social dominance orientation. This has prevented research on political attitudes having a greater impact on mainstream debate about populist authoritarianism.
- Populist authoritarian politicians have become increasingly successful at mobilising and uniting the reservoir of high SDOs and high RWAs to vote for them in sufficient numbers to win elections, referendums and political influence. Most of their voters are high SDOs or high RWAs.
- Unless research on right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation is incorporated into mainstream debate on populism it will be impossible to properly grasp its causes or find effective counter-measures.

Social psychologists have found a strong connection between right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and authoritarian political attitudes and social dominance orientation and authoritarian political attitudes. In brief, research strongly supports the conclusion that people who score highly on measures for RWA (high RWAs) and SDO (high SDOs) hold authoritarian political attitudes, support the kinds of policies favoured by populist authoritarian (PAn) parties and under the right conditions will vote for PAn parties or positions. Almost all the research that compares the predictive power of socio-demographic factors with the predictive power of

RWA and SDO, finds that RWA and SDO are the best predictors of support for PAn policies and parties. Put otherwise, if one were trying to predict whether an individual will support a PAn party or policy, knowing whether that person is a high RWA or high SDO would give a stronger indication than knowing their age, educational attainment, place on the employment market, religiosity, gender or even which political party they usually vote for.

As will be explained in chapter 7, because SDO and RWA are triggered by different contexts, in some countries high SDOs are more likely to vote for PAn parties than high RWAs, in some the reverse is true, and in others there may be little difference. In countries where RWA plays a bigger role in support for PAns, this is likely due to the fact that perceived threats to culture, security or the economy are more present in public debate. Whereas in countries where SDO plays a bigger role in support for PAns, this is likely due to the fact that perceived competition for economic or social status (from outgroups such as LGBTI, women or ethnic minorities) is more present in public debate. And where RWA and SDO play an equally strong role, it is likely that PAns have managed to inject public debate with narratives based both on threat and competition.

5.1 Direct evidence supporting the link between right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and support for populist authoritarian parties or policies

Most social psychology research on the connection between SDO and RWA and populist authoritarianism (PAm) does not examine whether high SDOs and high RWAs vote for PAn parties. Rather, researchers have tended to focus on the question of whether high SDOs and high RWAs hold political attitudes that can be described as authoritarian. Nevertheless, there is some social psychology research that does examine the entire relationship between RWA/SDO and actual voting or stated intention to vote for or support PAn parties, policies or candidates.

Correlations and coefficients

Research that examines the relationship between factors like RWA, SDO and support for certain policies or voting habits explains the strength of the relationship using coefficients, which is a statistical tool. The strength of a relationship tends to be measured at a point between 0 and 1, where 0 means there is no relationship and 1 means there is an absolute relationship. For the interested reader, the coefficients will feature in the footnotes. In the main text, the book will use more simple terminology: a moderate relationship (usually used for coefficients of between 0.2 and 0.4) or a strong relationship (used for coefficients above 0.4). The designation of 'moderate' and 'strong' is based on how the researchers themselves described the strength of the correlation. 0.4 may not appear high, since in theory correlations can go all the way to 1, and when measuring precise variables like physical objects, they do. But because human behaviour is harder to measure, this type of statistical method rarely delivers correlations higher than 0.6. So 0.4 is already pretty high. All of the relationships referred

to in the book are 'significant' in statistical terms, which means that they are considered to be sufficiently strong that they have an impact in practice and are not merely coincidental. Reference to 'high' RWA or 'high' SDO means someone who scores in the top 25% on measures that gauge one's level of RWA or SDO.

One piece of research concerning the Brexit referendum found that RWA and SDO were consistently robust predictors of support for the leave vote.[56] Both SDO and RWA, independently of each other, moderately predicted whether individuals saw immigration as a threat,[57] which in turn had a strong correlation with support for vote leave.[58] Importantly, both SDO and RWA were stronger predictors of the leave vote than socio-demographic factors like income, age and education.

Another study concerning support for the FPÖ in Austria examined the relationship between RWA, SDO, propensity to vote for the FPÖ and actual voting for the FPÖ in the 2008 parliamentary elections.[59] The researchers found a very strong correlation between RWA and the perception that immigration posed a threat, and in turn a strong correlation between the latter and actual voting for the FPÖ. SDO was found to have a moderate effect at predicting propensity to vote for the FPÖ.[60] Researchers also tested for age, gender and education and found that education and age had a moderate impact, but this was only because of the effect they have on RWA and SDO (more on this in chapter 8).

Another study examined the relationship between RWA, SDO, ethnic prejudice and support for the PVV in the Netherlands. This research found that SDO and RWA correlated moderately with racist attitudes, which in turn correlated with voting for the PVV. SDO was found to be a more powerful predictor than RWA in the Netherlands. The researchers also measured for age, gender and education. The impact of age and gender was not statistically significant. Education had a significant impact on support for the PVV and levels of racism, and the researchers found that this was probably due to the impact that education has on support for authoritarian values (see chapter 8).[61]

More recent studies have examined correlations between RWA, SDO and voters' intention to vote for Trump in the 2016 elections. One piece of research found strong correlations between RWA and pro-Trump attitudes and stated intention to vote for Trump and strong correlations between SDO and pro-Trump attitudes and stated intention to vote for Trump, and a moderate correlation between RWA and SDO and not voting for Clinton. The impact of socio-demographic factors was found to be statistically insignificant and even party affiliation (i.e. Republican or Democrat) had weaker predictive power than RWA and SDO.[62] Similar results were found in another two studies, with SDO and RWA again found to be more powerful predictors than political affiliation, ethnicity, gender, religion and education.[63] The fact that both high RWAs and high SDOs voted for Trump shows that he was able to create both a perception of threat and competition effectively, thus mobilising a sufficient mass of high RWAs and high SDOs to win the election.

5.2 Mainstream researchers using right-wing authoritarianism

More recently, a handful of political scientists have begun testing whether RWA can explain support for PAm. Unfortunately, these researchers have been testing political attitudes with RWA in isolation and not together with SDO, which means that they are missing a big piece of the picture. This is partly because they have followed the lead of political psychologists working on RWA and probably because of terminology: RWA has 'authoritarianism' in the title – a term familiar to political scientists – while SDO does not.[64] Even though the following studies do not test for SDO, they still provide support for the importance of RWA in explaining support for PAn parties.Why should political scientists test for social dominance orientation as well as right-wing authoritarianism?

> Political scientists testing for the connection between RWA and PAn voting are generally trying to prove that the best predictor of voting for PAn parties or policies is political attitudes. And, moreover, that it is possible to work out who holds authoritarian political attitudes by identifying who is high RWA – because high RWAs hold authoritarian political attitudes. They consider this to be very helpful, because it is possible to test levels of RWA without asking people directly about their opinions on specific political questions. For example, RWA scales include questions about attitudes towards parenting and criminal justice. The thing is, there are two kinds of authoritarian – high RWAs but also high SDOs. And while RWAs are triggered by threats to culture, safety and the economy, SDOs are triggered by competition to social and economic hierarchies.
>
> So if a researcher were to test for the link between RWA and PAn voting in a country where the dominant public debate paints migrants as taking jobs and public resources, but not so much as a threat to culture or security, they would probably find a disappointing connection between RWA and PAn voting (though, according to the research, one that is still stronger than socio-demographic factors). If they tested for the link between SDO and PAn voting, they would be likely to find a strong connection, because SDO is triggered by competition. But if researchers do not test for SDO as well as RWA, it could lead to the conclusion that authoritarian attitudes are not such impressive predictors of support for PAn parties or policies, which in turn would disincentivise researchers from looking at the origins and triggers of authoritarian attitudes.

It is worth examining a recent study was based on four YouGov polls in the UK, Sweden, France and Germany as well as a survey from the USA during the presidential primaries. This study included items from the RWA scale used to test levels of RWA and measured for correlations with stated voting intentions for Brexit in the UK and for PAn parties and candidates in the other countries.[65] The surveys also tested whether socio-demographic factors, such as age, gender, social class, education, income and ethnicity, correlated with support for PAn parties or policies. The researchers converted the correlations they found into 'predicted probabilities', which means that they have set out their

results as the likelihood of a high RWA voting in a particular way expressed as a percentage of certainty.

On Brexit, RWA was more powerful than any other factor in predicting support for leaving the EU, and was similar in predictive power to age. While the predicted probability of a low RWA supporting Brexit was just 31%, the likelihood of a high RWA supporting Brexit was 74%.[66]

On support for Marine le Pen's candidacy in the 2012 presidential elections, RWA was the only statistically significant factor, with socio-demographic factors having no statistically significant correlation with voting for Marine le Pen as presidential candidate. When asked about support for the Front National at the time of the survey in 2016, again RWA was by far the strongest predictor along with education. The research found that the probability of a low RWA supporting the Front National is 8.7%, while the likelihood of a high RWA supporting the Front National was 31.5%.

As regards current voting intentions in Sweden, only RWA and gender achieved statistical significance, and RWA was again the most accurate predictor of support for the Sweden Democrats. In the 2014 parliamentary elections, the likelihood of high RWAs supporting the Sweden Democrats was 14.2%, while the likelihood of low RWAs was around 5%. For (what were at the time of research, upcoming) elections in 2018, it was found that RWA and gender were the only statistically significant factors predicting support for the Sweden Democrats. The chances of a high RWA supporting the Sweden Democrats was 40.8%, compared to just 16.5% for low RWA.

In Germany, RWA was found to be the factor with the strongest predictive power for membership of the NPD or AfD. The likelihood of a low RWA in Germany supporting the NPD or AfD was 5.2%, compared to a 47.4% probability for high-RWA.

The same researchers examined support for Trump during the presidential primaries in the US and found that none of the socio-demographic factors (income, religiosity, education, race, age) tested for had statistical significance for predicting support for Trump as the Republican Party nominee. Someone high in RWA had a likelihood of over 45% of supporting Trump, while a high RWA had a likelihood of only around 10% of supporting any of the other Republican candidates. RWA had no statistical significance in predicting support for the other candidates.[67]

Other pieces of research examining the Brexit vote (also presenting their results as percentages) similarly suggest that RWA was the most powerful predictor of voting to leave the EU (around 70% accuracy), over socio-demographic factors such as income, social class, age and education.[68]

It should be noted that none of these studies tested for SDO. Had they done so, it is likely that their results would have shown further evidence of the ability of SDO and RWA cumulatively to predict support for PAns. The research discussed at the beginning of this chapter and later in chapter 7 shows that depending on the

national context, SDO can be just as powerful as RWA in predicting support for PAn parties or positions.

Other political science researchers appear to have misunderstood RWA. And for some, the failure to test for SDO at the same time as RWA has produced results that lead political science researchers to conclude that social psychology research on political attitudes has little to offer. A brief discussion of these studies strongly suggests that had they included tests for SDO – similarly to the social psychology studies noted above – then they may well have come to the opposite conclusion.

One recent analysis based on a survey of around 1,000 participants in the US, and published in the Washington Post, argued that high RWA was not as good a predictor of support for Trump as anti-elitism (a belief that rightful authority has been stolen by a small elite), national identity and mistrust of experts. However, these researchers seem to have been unaware that all three of these attitudes are actually attitudes held by high RWAs and high SDOs – which will be discussed further in chapter 6.[69]

A large-scale study by Dunn is often cited by political scientists dismissing the relevance of RWA to explain political attitudes and PAn voting. This study uses data from the 2008 European Values Survey to examine the correlation between RWA and PAn voting and support for 'exclusive-nationalism' (the idea that nationality should be based on ethnicity) and PAn voting. The study covered Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland.[70] Put simply, Dunn wanted to know whether RWA was the best predictor of support for PAn parties, or whether support for exclusive-nationalism was the best predictor. So, if we were to look at the voter base of PAn parties, do high RWA voters make up the biggest share, or do supporters of exclusive nationalism make up the biggest share? Dunn found that in Belgium, Denmark and Switzerland, the PAn parties had the largest proportion of high RWAs among their voters (43.64% of Flemish Interest voters, 40.7% of Danish People's Party voters and 50.43% of Swiss People's Party were high RWA). However, in Austria, it was the Social Democratic Party with the highest proportion of high RWAs and in the Netherlands it was the Christian Democratic Party.

Do these results mean that the biggest share of the vote for PAns is not made up of authoritarians? Probably not. Dunn was only testing for one type of authoritarian: RWAs. The study did not explicitly test for the other type of authoritarian (SDOs), but it probably did pick them up accidentally. There's evidence within the study that suggests that PAn parties did have a bigger base of authoritarian voters (i.e. the combination of high RWAs and high SDOs) than other parties in all five countries. This is because Dunn found that exclusive-nationalists made up the biggest slice of supporters for PAn parties in each of the five countries. And RWA and SDO both correlate strongly with ethnocentrism and blind nationalism.[71] So, it could well be that in testing for exclusive-nationalism, Dunn was indirectly picking up the accumulation of many high RWAs and high SDOs. Put otherwise, if the study had also tested for SDO, then it may well have found that high SDOs and high RWAs taken together would always make up

the biggest slice of voters for PAn parties in all of the countries examined.[72]

Another study by Bakker et al. dismisses RWA as predicting support for PAm, partly on the basis of Dunn's findings and partly on the grounds that one of the characteristics of RWA is submission to authority. Submission to authority, the authors argue is fundamentally incompatible with anti-elitism, which is one of the key features of PAn. The study finds that while high RWA and low scores on tests for the personality trait of 'agreeableness' are sometimes equally good predictors of PAn support, the trait of 'agreeableness' is generally a more accurate predictor of who will support PAns.[73]

The study did not test for SDO. However, as noted, high SDO is thought to be caused by low levels of empathy and altruism as personality traits – otherwise referred to as the personality trait of 'agreeableness' in the literature outlined above in chapter 4.[74] Thus, the study's results could be read as potentially supporting the predictive power of SDO together with RWA.

Furthermore, the study did not consider the fact that there is no inconsistency between PAns' anti-elitism and high RWA. As will be discussed in chapter 6, high RWAs are indeed anti-elitist because they tend to believe that political authority has been hijacked by an unrepresentative liberal elite. PAns oppose the incumbent elite but are happy to submit to a new strong leader who displaces this elite and reflects their political attitudes.[75] This is corroborated by other research which finds that once PAn parties are in power, anti-elitist sentiment tends to be directed away from the governing party and towards other targets, like the EU.[76] Thus, the results probably provide support for RWA as a strong predictor of support for PAm.

Another recent study by de Vries and Hoffmann compares how well three attitudinal factors predict support for certain policies advanced by PAn parties. Participants were tested for their a) fear of globalisation, b) anxiety about their personal economic position and c) their support for traditional values. The researchers then tested for correlations between a), b) and c) and support for certain policies that tend to be offered by PAn parties. Support for 'traditional values' were measured using an RWA scale.

The authors found that a) (fear of globalisation) best predicted support for PAn policies. Put otherwise, according to this study, if one wanted to work out who would support certain PAn policies, the most accurate of the three predictors was fear of globalisation. Those who viewed globalisation as a threat rather than an opportunity were rather more likely to support leaving the EU, less likely to support EU integration, had lower trust in politicians, were less satisfied with democracy, and were more likely to think that the country had too many foreigners, oppose gay marriage and think climate change is a hoax.

The authors found that b) (support for traditional values over progressive cultural values) had a weaker relationship with support for PAn policies. Those people who favoured traditional over progressive cultural values, were not more likely than the average person to have lower trust in politicians or oppose the EU. However, in common with those who fear globalisation,

they were more likely to think that the country had too many foreigners, oppose gay marriage and think climate change is a hoax. The authors found that c) (those who were anxious about their personal economic position), were about as likely as the average person to support PAn positions.[77]

This led the authors to conclude that it is fear of globalisation rather than support for traditional values (measured using RWA items) or anxiety for one's personal economic position that causes people to vote for PAn parties.

Despite its conclusions, this study does not undermine the argument that RWA and SDO are the best predictors of support for PAn policies. First, support for traditional values (measured using an RWA scale) did indeed coincide with policy positions held by PAn parties on multiculturalism, climate and marriage equality (which will be discussed in chapter 6). Second, respondents were asked whether they considered globalisation a threat or an opportunity without further specification of what was meant by globalisation or threat. As will be explained in chapter 7, RWA and SDO are triggered by the perception of threat (to economic stability, cultural values, physical safety) or competition (to socio-economic status or access to resources). And high RWAs and high SDOs are thought to be chronically sensitive to threat and competition. So it is entirely plausible that those people who were afraid of globalisation were the combination of high RWAs and high SDOs anyway. Which would mean that cumulatively, RWA and SDO best predict support for PAn parties or policies.

In light of this, it is fair to say that there is compelling evidence to support the position that RWA and SDO are the most powerful predictors of support for PAn parties and policies. Taken as a whole, the evidence concerning voting or intention to vote makes it highly plausible that high RWAs and high SDOs are more likely to vote for PAn parties, candidates and policies than for other parties.

One factor to consider is that some of the studies are based on data about political attitudes before the recession at the end of the 2000s, and before migration numbers jumped, both of which play a role in triggering high RWAs and high SDOs, as will be discussed in chapter 7.[78] The more recent studies covering Brexit and the election of Trump in the US, which are very compelling in their results, are probably a better indicator of where we stand now: a context of economic shock, concerns over terrorism and migration, with PAn politicians who are more sophisticated and better able to trigger high SDOs and high RWAs through narratives of competition and threat, often facilitated by an unhealthy media landscape, and produce election victories in places like Czechia, Hungary, Italy and Poland.

5.3 How many authoritarians are there anyway?

The above discussion shows that high RWAs and high SDOs are more likely to vote for PAn parties than for other parties. This is an important finding, but it is not the same as saying that all high RWAs and high SDOs vote for PAn parties. For example, Dunn's research shows

that high RWAs (and probably high SDOs) also vote for other political parties, even if they probably make up the biggest share of voters for PAn parties. Research taking a closer look at the UK shows that many people with authoritarian political attitudes voted for the centre-right Conservatives in the 2015 national elections in greater numbers than for UKIP: 55% of authoritarians voted for the Conservative party, making up 68% of the party's voter base, while 22% of authoritarians voted for UKIP, making up 97% of the party's voter base.[79] As noted, one's choice of party can be influenced by so-called 'supply-side' factors, such as the social acceptability and competence of a PAn party, electoral rules that can prevent vote share translating into parliamentary seats, and the political position of the church (the latter will be discussed in chapter 8). This said, we should consider high RWAs and high SDOs as a potential reservoir of support that is being increasingly tapped by PAn parties. But how big is the reservoir?

One study which tested only for levels of RWA (and not SDO), found that the percentage of the voting population in four EU countries that can be considered high RWA were as follows: 36% of the voting age population in the UK, almost 39% in France, 20.5% in Sweden and almost 32% in Germany.[80] As discussed in the previous section, this same study found that these high RWAs were much more likely to vote for PAns than low RWAs.

Another study for YouGov examined a larger group of countries. The study did not test for RWA and SDO, but it did test for four political attitudes that are held by high RWAs and high SDOs (to be discussed in chapter 6).[81] This can, therefore, serve as a very rough indication of what proportion of the electorate is high RWA or high SDO. The four political attitudes were: anti-fundamental rights, anti-EU, anti-immigrant, pro-strong (maintaining military power and taking a tough stance towards other countries) foreign policy. The research suggested that as a proportion of the electorate those holding these political attitudes stood at: 48% in the UK, 66% in France, 31% in Germany, 43% in Sweden, 49% in Denmark, 40% in Finland, 43% in Poland, 63% in Italy, 30% in the Netherlands. This shows that the potential reservoir of those with authoritarian political attitudes who could be drawn to vote for PAn parties, is large and certainly enough to secure election victories.[82]

As noted, this does not necessarily mean that all high RWAs and high SDOs vote for PAn parties or positions. The YouGov study examined the proportion of those with authoritarian political attitudes who said that they intended to vote for PAn parties in the next elections: one quarter of authoritarians in the UK (around 15% of the electorate), over one third of authoritarians in France (around 25% of the electorate), around three quarters of authoritarians in Germany (around 25% of the electorate), just under half of authoritarians in Sweden (around 25% of the electorate), almost half of authoritarians in Denmark (just over 20% of the electorate), just over one fifth of authoritarians in Finland (just over 10% of the electorate), around one quarter of authoritarians in Poland (just over 10% of the electorate) around one sixth in Italy (10% of the electorate), and over two-thirds of authoritarians in The Netherlands (just over 20% of the electorate). It should be taken into

account that experts believe there is a problem with so-called 'desirability bias' in surveys that ask voters whether they intend to vote for PAn parties. That is, because PAn parties and candidates in many countries are still seen as socially unacceptable, many voters are less likely to openly admit to voting for them, even in anonymous surveys. Which means that surveys tend to understate the true extent of people who will vote for a PAn party.[83]

Understanding the reservoir of authoritarians is important for three reasons. First, even though some of those with authoritarian political attitudes will vote for mainstream political parties, and some will refrain from voting at all,[84] recent election results in Czechia, Hungary, Italy, Poland, the USA and the Brexit referendum suggest that PAn parties are in fact becoming very successful in mobilising and uniting the reservoir of high RWAs and high SDOs behind them.[85] And PAns can be expected to improve on this as they become more sophisticated and emulate each other – it is possible to see evidence of this in the way that the rhetoric of Hungary's Fidesz on migration and international conspiracy theories has been copied by PAns in Austria, Czechia, Italy, Romania and Poland.[86] Second, even if PAn political parties are considered unpalatable in some countries when it comes to national elections, they can still attract voters in referenda. The Brexit referendum is a stark example of this. Researchers that found that 72% of voters holding authoritarian political attitudes voted to leave the EU (in contrast to 21% of authoritarians voting to remain). Similarly, another study found that around 80% of leave voters also regarded multiculturalism and immigration as 'forces for ill' (attitudes held by high RWAs and high SDOs, which will be discussed in the following chapter).[87] This is much larger than the proportion of authoritarians (22%) that voted for UKIP in the 2015 elections according to the YouGov study.[88] Third, as discussed, mainstream parties are increasingly adopting authoritarian positions in order to survive electorally, which ultimately is just as problematic as the rise of PAn parties for the continued protection of the rule of law, democratic pluralism and fundamental rights. And when the electoral system allows for proportional representation, PAns have the chance to exert more direct influence on centrist mainstream parties.[89] Thus, the UK's first past the post electoral system has kept UKIP out of the national parliament, meaning that the authoritarian vote on which UKIP relies cannot make itself so directly felt in government. But many countries in Europe have electoral systems based on proportional representation, which can make it easier for PAns to end up in coalition with centre-right governments, such as in Austria, if other parties have not agreed a 'cordon sanitaire'.[90] Ultimately, what is important is that there are a lot of authoritarians out there, they are probably predominantly high RWAs or high SDOs, PAn parties are becoming better at capturing their votes, and mainstream parties are also moving further to the right to attract or retain these voters.

Chapter 6: Support for populist authoritarian policies among those who strongly adhere to right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation

Key points

- Those who score highly on measures of right-wing authoritarianism (high RWAs) and social dominance orientation (high SDOs) hold a range of political attitudes that match the policies advanced by populist authoritarian politicians.

- High RWAs and high SDOs have been found to support a range of policies that are largely built on prejudice towards a range of outgroups perceived to challenge socio-economic hierarchies, economic stability, security or traditional cultural norms. This includes:

  - Opposition to equality for LGBTI persons and women;
  - Opposition to immigration, and support for welfare chauvinism;
  - Strict criminal laws with harsh physical punishment of criminals;
  - Opposition to fundamental rights standards;
  - Opposition to environmental protection;
  - Opposition to democratic pluralism, such as restrictions on activists and the concentration of power in a strong leaders.

The previous chapter considered the available research that shows a direct link between right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO) and voting for populist authoritarian (PAn) parties or positions. Studies like these that examine the entire relationship between RWA, SDO and voting patterns are very valuable, but they are relatively few in number. In contrast, there is a much larger body of research that examines the link between SDO, RWA and political attitudes (as opposed to actual voting). This research is also extremely valuable because it provides further evidence that SDO and RWA are key to understanding where PAn attitudes come from. If political attitudes are the single most important factor explaining how people vote, then evidence that high SDOs (those scoring highly on measures of social dominance orientation) and high RWAs (those scoring highly on measures of right-wing authoritarianism) support the kinds of policies advanced by PAn parties and candidates provides additional support for the argument that RWA and SDO help explain who will vote for PAn parties. Moreover, because researchers understand how RWA and

SDO are activated or increased, this also allows readers to understand why people develop PAn political attitudes to begin with, how they are triggered, and thereby how to diffuse support for these political attitudes.

Measuring right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation

Researchers measure levels of RWA and SDO using scales. These scales contain a list of statements with which individuals are asked to express the extent of their agreement or disagreement, and which capture the core components of each of the worldviews. RWA scales use statements that test for conventionalism, aggression and submission. SDO scales use statements that test for support of hierarchical relationships and inequality between groups. Standardised scales have been developed, tested and refined over time. They are adapted according to cultural contexts as well as according to what investigators are trying to find out. For example, when researchers are trying to identify a correlation between, for example, RWA and attitudes towards immigration, they will not include items (statements) relating to non-nationals on the scale, because they would be directly measuring the attitude in question twice and would not be able to produce conclusions about a correlation between RWA and attitudes on immigration. Rather, researchers would use some other measure, such as attitudes towards child rearing or toughness on crime to identify those high in RWA. They would then cross reference this with a separate set of responses designed to measure the attitude under examination. This way it is possible to determine whether there exist correlations (and how strong these are) between RWA, SDO and other attitudes, opinions or behaviour, like voting patterns or support for particular parties or policies.

More recent scholarship has distinguished two sub-dimensions of SDO: one that is motivated by dominance of the ingroup over lower status groups and another than is more subtly opposed to equality. This scholarship is still at an early stage. It confirms and gives added precision to (as opposed to contradicting) existing SDO research. Because it does not add much to the arguments advanced here, the author will not elaborate on the distinction further.[91]

The social psychology research referred to in this book is based on data collected through surveys and experiments. Some of these are cross-sectional, meaning that they test a theory at a particular point in time. Others are longitudinal, meaning psychologists can collect information over a period of time to show how reactions, attitudes and opinions can change in response to evolving situations or stage of human development. Surveys tend to allow psychologists to identify correlations but not necessarily causation. Some are experiments in laboratory conditions (which allows experimenters to set and vary conditions to test more easily for specific influences), others take place in real life conditions (like tracking children on a school trip to another country). The evidence discussed in this book includes several meta-analyses, which are analyses to test particular theories that are based on

a large collection of previous research. This allows the results to be more certain because they are based on a much larger pool of data. While a single study might involve a few hundred individuals, a meta-analysis tends to accumulate information collected from tens of thousands of people.

6.1 What policies do populist authoritarian parties tend to advance?

As discussed, it is well-established that anti-immigration forms a key part of PAn political platforms. Research suggests that PAn parties also share other policies in common. PAn parties often support policies that deny equal treatment to women (e.g. access to abortion, child care and equalising access to the employment market and combating domestic violence), LGBTI persons (e.g. allowing same-sex marriage, including understanding of sexual orientation in teaching on sex education, clamping down on hate speech and hate crime) and racial, ethnic and religious minorities (e.g. policies to improve access to public services like health care and housing or equal access to the employment market, promoting repatriation, addressing hate speech and hate crime, opposition to multiculturalism), and favour welfare chauvinism (restricting access to public services and social security to the ingroup).[92] PAn parties are also known to favour: a tough law and order approach, the restriction of fundamental rights, the centralisation of power in a strong leader, the weakening of guarantees to protect the rule of law and democratic pluralism, political violence, subordination of environmental protection to industrial development, reduction of foreign aid, and greater investment in military capacity which should be projected abroad only to defend the home nation and not for humanitarian reasons.[93]

There are variations between countries in the PAn policies mentioned. Some authors have argued that because of the differences in policies and the way that the ingroup is delineated is it not possible to analyse all PAns under the same lens. For example, for some PAns the ingroup is 'the nation' for others it is 'Christians'. Similarly, PAns in western and Central and Eastern European countries tend to have ostensibly different positions on equality for women and LGBTI persons.[94]

Some have argued, in contrast, that the differences are more a question of degree and rhetoric than of principle. PAn parties in some Western European countries seem prepared to accept that certain liberal laws have become too entrenched to challenge and so, for example, France's Front National may have accepted abortion while Poland's PiS has instead moved to further restrict access to abortion. Certain types of equality are better entrenched in Western Europe, and PAns in this region have framed the discriminatory treatment of women and LGBTI persons in some minority communities as a threat to ingroup values. But support for women and LGBTI equality among PAns in Western Europe is mostly rhetorical and used more to emphasise cultural differences and call for restrictions on immigration, cuts to foreign aid and bans on veils and headscarves. PAns do not try to address their 'concerns' by offering support to women or LGBTI persons in these communities. Rather, PAn parties in

Western Europe still tend to support traditional gender roles, promote the family as the primary organising unit of society and do not support measures to promote equality for women, such as the provision of public childcare. In Central and Eastern European countries, the attack on gender equality and LGBTI rights tends to be more open and aggressive. Because these progressive values are less entrenched, they are seen as a threat to traditional ultra-conservative interpretations of Christian morality.[95]

Even if it could be said that there are genuinely deep differences over the endorsement of equality for certain groups among PAn parties in different countries, there is no inconsistency between PAns from the perspective of RWA and SDO. High RWAs and high SDOs can support substantively different rules according to different social and cultural contexts. High SDOs will oppose challenges to incumbent social hierarchies. In a society where gender equality is well entrenched, high SDOs are less likely to see women exercising their freedoms as a challenge to the social order. Similarly, high RWAs will oppose threats to incumbent rules. Where LGBTI equality is well entrenched, high RWAs will view challenges to that rule as threatening. Accordingly, PAns in different countries have slightly different political agendas on equality because high SDOs and high RWAs support traditional or recently dominant rules and social hierarchies, which vary from country to country. The remainder of this section will set out how the PAn policy positions listed above correspond to the political attitudes held by high SDOs and high RWAs.

6.2 Prejudice-based policies

A core component of PAn parties' rhetoric and policies is prejudice, in particular xenophobia and, in some parts of Europe, homophobia and misogyny. This is down to the fact that PAns identify themselves as part of the ingroup, often defined by ethnicity, culture and/or religion, which faces threat or competition from an outgroup such as an 'elite', minority groups or activists. These prejudices are expressed as policies such as the detention of asylum seekers, deportations of non-nationals, limitations on access to public services, and benefits, opposition to same-sex marriage and opposition to policies that support women in the employment market.

It is well established in social psychology research that high RWA and high SDO correlate strongly with, and most probably cause, prejudice. They do so for different reasons. High RWAs have feelings of prejudice towards outgroups who are perceived to be a threat to physical safety, economic stability, social cohesion or national identity and cultural values. Whereas high SDOs have feelings of prejudice towards outgroups who are perceived to be a source of competition for social and economic status and resources.[96]

A meta-review examining data collected through 71 studies involving 22,000 participants examined the correlation between RWA and prejudice and SDO and prejudice. The 71 studies examining prejudice, RWA, and SDO tested attitudes towards various outgroups including ethnic minorities, women, the poor, the overweight, foreigners, immigrants, ref-

ugees and LGBTI persons. After controlling for overlap between RWA and SDO (the fact that some high SDOs are also high RWAs) the meta-review found that both SDO and RWA had a strong correlation with prejudice.[97] Other studies have found that RWA and SDO were found to predict over 50% of prejudice. That is, if one measured a group of prejudiced people on RWA and SDO, more than half of them would be high RWAs or SDOs.[98] Many other social psychology studies also suggest that RWA and SDO do not just correlate with, but actually cause prejudice.[99]

Another key finding into research on RWA and SDO is that individuals who hold prejudicial attitudes, do not hold them only in relation to one group. Rather, prejudice is, like tolerance, a generalised attitude. Put otherwise, people who are prejudiced towards one outgroup, tend to be prejudiced towards other outgroups, because they tend to be prejudiced in general. SDO and RWA predict prejudice towards any outgroup that is perceived either as threatening to (for high RWAs) or competing with (for high SDOs) the ingroup.[100] Recent research suggests a further qualification, which is that not all outgroups will be subject to prejudice from high RWAs and SDOs – rather only outgroups that are seen to be marginalised, stigmatised or otherwise be seen to have a lower social status.[101]

Why do populist authoritarians (PAns) claim western culture is being extinguished?

Interestingly, high SDO white people (i.e. members of the dominant social group in Europe) tend to feel that their group is being victimised and suffering discrimination from lower status groups as those groups progress (such as ethnic minorities or LGBTI people), even when, objectively, the dominant social group continues to hold its privileged status.[102]

Researchers examined perceptions among white and non-white participants concerning progress in the US towards racial equality. According to the results, when progress was framed as loss for whites, high SDOs thought progress towards equality had been greater than white low SDOs. But when progress was framed in a non-competitive way, by highlighting the benefits of greater equality to the majority population, high SDOs were less likely to think that progress towards equality had been so great. The authors found that two factors are at play. In general, framing progress as a 'loss' for any kind of group (whether along ethnic lines or not) tends to exaggerate the majority group's perception of outgroup progress. However, the effect is even stronger for SDOs who are anxious about status and are triggered by the idea that they have 'lost' privileges.[103] This also goes to show the importance of how attitudes can be manipulated by the way that debates are framed.

As is discussed in chapter 7, high SDOs are thought to be chronically sensitive to threats to social hierarchy. This probably helps explain the rhetoric among the extreme right over so-called white genocide or reverse discrimination.

6.3 Immigration and integration

Social psychologists have found that high RWA and high SDO correlate with anti-immigrant attitudes and support for restrictive immigration policies.[104] A recent large scale survey with 8,000 participants from eight EU countries found a very strong correlation in all but one of the countries between being high SDO and holding anti-immigrant attitudes.[105] The researchers also found that anti-immigrant attitudes correlated extremely highly with an intention to put those attitudes into effect by: not sending their children to a majority immigrant school, not moving into a neighbourhood with many immigrants, voting for a party that would reduce immigration and supporting the right of an employer to employ only non-immigrants.[106] This particular study did not test for the correlation between RWA and anti-immigrant attitudes.

Other researchers carried out a meta-review, where they looked at the results of 155 separate samples from 17 countries involving around 40,000 participants and found a strong correlation between RWA and anti-immigrant attitudes and SDO and anti-immigrant attitudes.[107]

High SDOs are also opposed to social welfare and redistributive social policies, such as public health care, public or affordable housing, early education programmes, unemployment benefits, giving assistance to the poor or increasing taxes on the wealthy. This opposition extends to a range of outgroups, including opposition to welfare for immigrants, or welfare chauvinism.[108]

High SDOs are ethnocentric in a chauvinistic way, in that they feel ethnically superior to outgroups. This has been termed "intergroup ethnocentrism", and is motivated by the desire to maintain the superior status of the ingroup. Whereas high RWAs are ethnocentric in a defensive way, expressing more pro-ingroup than anti-outgroup attitudes. This has been termed "intragroup ethnocentrism" and is motivated by a desire to preserve ingroup cohesion.[109]

High SDOs are also opposed to measures that protect ethnic or religious minorities as well as affirmative action to improve the status of minorities.[110] High SDO and high RWA are associated with willingness to assist and participate in state-sponsored persecution of and violence against immigrants. For high RWAs this appears to be motivated by a perception that the group in question poses a danger to security or to cultural norms by refusing to assimilate. For high SDOs this appears to be motivated by a desire to maintain the low status of the group in question. Paradoxically, if the group in question does try to assimilate, this will mean it escapes aggression from high RWAs for no longer being a threat to cultural values. However, the assimilating group is likely to incur aggression from high SDOs because assimilation is seen to break down the social barriers that help to maintain their inferior status.[111]

6.4 Criminal justice

PAn parties have been found to advocate a 'law and order' approach, favouring strict laws and punishment of law-breakers, rather than rehabilitation or alternatives that might address

the root socio-economic causes of crime. High SDOs and high RWAs also support such a 'law and order' approach. Both high RWAs and high SDOs support retribution as the goal of the criminal justice system, and both support the denial of procedural fairness to offenders.[112] One study found that high RWAs were more likely to endorse incapacitation and deterrence as the goals of criminal sentencing, and high SDOs were more likely to oppose rehabilitation.[113] High RWAs and high SDOs are also shown to support mandatory detention of asylum seekers arriving without prior authorisation.[114]

Other research on high SDOs has found greater support for the death penalty, longer prison sentences, fewer rights for prisoners, more painful forms of execution and more punitive criminal justice policies. Researchers think that high SDOs hold these attitudes either because marginalised groups tend to be those who are disproportionately negatively affected by the criminal justice system, and/or because 'criminals' themselves are regarded as a marginalised outgroup. Thus, the criminal justice system acts as a mechanism for keeping lower status groups in their place.[115] One might also expect endorsement of painful forms of punishment to be related to the fact that high SDOs are low on empathy.

High RWA has also been found to predict support for strict regulation and harsh punishment of those seen to break social rules or pose a threat to society. For example, high RWAs were more likely to support the quarantine of people with HIV and the exclusion of children with HIV from schools, and to support comprehensive drugs testing, prohibition of drugs and punishment of users and sellers. They were less likely to support using promotional or protective measures like education, legalisation or treatment as a way of dealing with drug abuse or to support a compassionate or caring approach to dealing with people with HIV.[116] High RWAs were also more likely to support harsh punishment of criminals, including use of the death penalty.[117] In testament to their fixation on using punishment to ensure obedience to the rules, researchers also found that high RWAs tend to deliver more powerful shocks when playing the teacher in Milgram experiments.[118]

Populist authoritarians (PAns), morality and political violence

Recent research has developed a theory of 'moral attribution'.[119] Researchers point to how PAn political figures have purposely framed subjects such as same-sex marriage, abortion and environmental protection as moral issues, when they were once regarded as more practical questions. It is argued that this is a deliberate tactic. Evidence shows that attitudes are much harder to change when they are based on morality (a belief that such attitudes are fundamentally right or wrong) rather than whether they are based on effectiveness (a belief that such attitudes are justified on the basis that they fulfil certain practical or rational goals). Thus by converting issues into moral questions, PAns are able to entrench attitudes and polarise political debate: mere disagreement over political issues has been replaced by moral outrage. Researchers also argue that this is likely to fuel political violence. This is

> because evidence shows that individuals are more likely to support violence as a means of achieving moral goals. Thus experimenters found that individuals who were convinced that war was justified on moral grounds (e.g. to save hostages from their country from death or torture) were impervious to arguments that military intervention would not be effective. Other research has also found that the more that individuals display loyalty to their ingroup, the more likely they are to accept violence towards outgroups that they perceive pose a threat.

6.5 Fundamental rights

PAn parties are largely opposed to human rights standards that ensure minimum standards of protection, including equality, for everyone. Some research shows that high RWAs express agreement with human rights in the abstract, though other research shows that high RWAs and high SDOs find human rights unimportant. Both high RWAs and high SDOs when faced with tangible scenarios are more likely to support restrictions, particularly in times of crisis. Aside from the studies cited above that show support for harsh criminal punishments like the death penalty and torture, as well as discriminatory treatment towards marginalised groups, researchers have found that high RWAs and high SDOs are more likely to support restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression, association, equality before the law, the presumption of innocence or the right to nationality especially in times of crisis.[120] As noted, high RWAs favour strict conformity to traditional rules to preserve group cohesion as a means of promoting group security. Studies examining the relationship between RWA, SDO and attitudes towards human rights during the so-called war on terror have also found that high RWAs and high SDOs are more likely to endorse restrictions on a broad range of rights as part of counter-terrorism policy, including the use of torture on terrorist suspects, limitations on free speech and the use of mass surveillance.[121]

High RWAs seem to support restrictions on fundamental rights because the latter give individuals the right to express disagreement with and to break social convention, limit the circumstances in which individuals can be punished and also the severity of punishment.[122] Additionally, high RWAs may also associate human rights more directly with threats to security insofar as rights are seen to provide protection for those who are perceived as threats by high RWAs, such as terrorists, immigrants and criminals.

Research suggests that high SDOs endorse restrictions on fundamental rights because such restrictions tend to disproportionately affect marginalised groups, helping to maintain their low status in the social hierarchy.[123] This probably explains why high SDOs are less likely to be supportive of civil rights activists whose work is to challenge social inequality.[124] Furthermore, because high SDOs are low on empathy as a personality trait and low on universalism and benevolence as values, they tend not to agree with the general concept of protecting the dignity of all individuals (i.e. the universal application of fundamental rights standards).[125]

6.6 Gender equality

As noted, while there is some variation between Western European and Central and Eastern European PAns, their opposition to gender equality is more a question of degree. High RWAs and SDOs both hold sexist attitudes, though slightly different in nature. High RWAs are said to exhibit 'benevolent' sexism (support for traditional gender roles and resistance to changing social roles). High SDOs tended to exhibit 'hostile' sexism (a desire to maintain the dominance of men over women).[126]

High RWAs are more likely to support traditional gender roles, consider political events relating to women as less important and overestimate the amount of power and influence that feminists and women have in society. High RWA was also associated with opposition to abortion, support for strict punishment of women seeking abortions, lower likelihood to reject violence against those seeking abortions and higher likelihood to participate in pro-life, but not pro-choice rallies and meetings. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the correlation between high RWA and these attitudes tended to be stronger in women than in men. Put otherwise, the rational self-interest that one might expect to push women to challenge gender roles that deny them equality is not really what matters to women high in RWA. Their political attitudes on gender are rooted in their endorsement of traditional cultural norms.[127]

High SDOs are also more likely to oppose women in leadership positions, such as the judiciary or to oppose stiffer punishment of perpetrators of domestic abuse against women, and are less likely to favour policies to help women gain an equal footing in the work place, such as equal pay or job security following maternity leave.[128]

High RWAs and high SDOs also tend to be supportive of rape myths. For High RWAs this is a moral question – women who dress and behave provocatively are breaking conservative social norms and are thus 'asking for trouble' and are said to deserve what they get. For high SDOs this is a question of power – women are to blame for allowing themselves to fall into the power of their attacker, for example by accepting a lift from or going home with a stranger.[129] It would seem likely that high SDOs simply view the unpunished rape of women as a tool to perpetuate their traditionally lower status in the social hierarchy, in the same way as a criminal justice system that maintains the social hierarchy by disproportionately punishing already marginalised groups.

6.7 Environmental policy

High RWAs and high SDOs tend to have less concern for the environment. High SDOs view nature as something to be used and exploited to serve the needs of humans, disagree with the idea that climate change is caused by human activity and are less likely to see intrinsic worth in the natural environment. This appears to stem from the fact that high SDO expresses a desire for dominance over others, and the environment appears to be something that can be made subservient.[130] Research suggests that high RWA does not motivate anti-environmental attitudes of itself. Rather, because RWA expresses a desire to maintain traditional norms, high RWAs will generally oppose environmentalist concerns because these are viewed as attempts to change the tradition of human exploitation over nature. That is, in most industrialised countries, the dominant norm has been to prioritise economic development through industrialisation and food production over environmental protection and conservation.[131] For example, in a study from the USA, high RWAs were inclined to punish environmentalists, whom they saw as weakening their country's power and influence, exaggerating their environmental concerns and disrupting legitimate businesses. But they did not support punishment of companies that damage the environment, even where such damage was deliberate.[132] In contrast, recent research in Germany (where protection of the environment has emerged as the dominant rule, backed by law and policy) high RWAs are more likely to favour pro-environmental policies.[133]

Why do authoritarians dislike vegetarians and vegans?

In 2016, the foreign Minister of Poland, of the Law and Justice party, described progressives as a 'new mixture of cultures and races, a world made up of cyclists and vegetarians, who only use renewable energy and who battle all signs of religion'.[134] This statement is calculated to appeal to high RWAs and high SDOs.

High RWAs and high SDOs are more likely to be meat eaters and less likely to be vegetarians. High RWAs seem to consume meat as a means of supporting the tradition of meat eating and resisting change to this traditional cultural norm from vegetarians and vegans. High SDOs seem driven by the fact that animals are seen as inferior beings with little or no intelligence or sense of pain. Eating animals is a means through which high SDO assert and cement this hierarchical relationship.[135] In most cultures, high RWAs and high SDOs are also unlikely to support environmentalist policies or the activists that promote them. And in Central and Eastern Europe, PAns tend to define the in-group along religious lines and attract church-goers more than in Western Europe (more on these two points below and in chapter 8).

6.8 Foreign policy

In the field of foreign policy, high RWAs and high SDOs support the waging wars of dominance (e.g. to defeat a threat, defend economic interests, exert political influence), but not military intervention for humanitarian reasons (e.g. to protect unarmed civilians, end genocide, protect fundamental rights standards or deliver emergency food supplies).[136] High SDOs are more likely to support increased military spending in general, and high RWAs are more likely to support more aggressive measures like the use of nuclear weapons,[137] and less likely to support or take part in anti-war protests.[138] High RWAs and high SDOs hold strong feelings of blind nationalism, that is, aggressive assertion of the superiority of one's country, reflecting a desire to dominate other countries.[139] High RWAs and high SDOs do not tend to support the promotion or protection of human rights in foreign policy. Researchers suggest that this is in part because both RWA and SDO result in ethnocentrism (rejection of all outgroups) and because SDO is built on a lack of empathy, which allows an individual to ignore human suffering and the needs of others.[140] One study found that high RWAs were also more likely to support cracking down on a foreign country's trade practices to cut a trade deficit, rather than placing the blame on their own country.[141]

6.9 Democratic pluralism

As noted, PAn parties and politicians oppose democratic pluralism. They attempt to draw power to the executive and away from institutions that exert a check on government power. They also support limiting rights that allow critical voices to participate in public debate, such as freedom of assembly. Political science research also suggests that PAn voters are not generally politically engaged or interested in being more involved in political affairs. Rather, they just want their political leaders to get on with the job of implementing policies in line with their own authoritarian political attitudes.[142]

Why are authoritarians uninterested in politics?

Research suggests that high RWAs tend to be high in 'political cynicism', that is, they have a low regard for politicians and politics. Political cynics were also reportedly more likely to feel estranged from the political system and feel powerless to bring about political change.[143] Research in a related sub-discipline of social psychology also suggests that voters will vote for parties that represent their moral concerns and refrain from voting where they feel these are not represented by any party.[144] Further research has found that high RWAs tend to have lower interest in, and understanding of, political affairs. That is, they are less likely to know about the political issues of the day or how government works.[145] As noted above, those with authoritarian political attitudes are more likely to abstain from voting until a PAn party emerges with whose policies they agree, and even then other research finds that those with PAn attitudes are still more likely to abstain from voting than those who do not hold these attitudes.[146]

> This is consistent with other research that, although it did not test for direct links with SDO and RWA, found that those who are less interested in politics and those who feel politically powerless are more likely to hold prejudices towards minority groups.[147]
>
> As discussed above, high RWAs also favour the concentration of political power in a strong political leader able to deal with perceived threats to society. High SDOs also have lower interest in politics and tend to consider that both direct and indirect democracy are less fair as a system of government than rule by an oligarchy that represents the interests of the dominant cultural or religious social group.[148]
>
> This research on RWA and SDO helps to explain why PAns are not particularly interested in political affairs: their primary preoccupation is that there is someone in power who will implement their political attitudes.

As seen from the above discussion, high RWAs and high SDOs clearly have strong anti-democratic tendencies in that they are prepared to exclude and oppress marginalised groups. They are also prepared to restrict a range of rights that allow dissenting voices to mobilise and express their opinions.

Other research clarifies that high RWAs and high SDOs will support restricting political rights (right to protest, distribute literature, make public speeches, lobby or otherwise organise to apply political pressure) for activists that they perceive as a threat to cultural values, security or socio-economic hierarchies. The experiments carried out manipulated the conditions so that for some participants these groups were portrayed as threatening cultural norms and physical safety, and sometimes they were portrayed as competing with the ingroup for social and economic status. When activists were portrayed as threatening cultural values (for advocating for gay rights, abortion rights and separation of church and state), high RWAs endorsed restricting their political rights, but not high SDOs. The same was true when activists fighting for migrants' rights were portrayed as a threat to public safety (through demonstrations that resulted in violence). Conversely, when activists were portrayed as threatening socio-economic hierarchies (for advocating affirmative action, universal health care and social welfare) high SDOs were triggered to endorse restriction of their political rights rather than high RWAs. Similarly, when activists fighting for migrants' rights were portrayed as competing for status – because they had sound financial resources, enjoyed support among voters and political elites – high SDOs, rather than high RWAs were triggered to endorse restrictions on their political rights.[149]

Although high RWAs are submissive to authority, research suggests that high RWAs and SDOs tend to believe that legitimate political and economic power has been 'usurped' by left-wingers, Jews, feminists, homosexuals and atheists who control government, the business world, financial institutions, the media and film industry.[150] As noted above, once PAns

gain power, the anti-elitism element of RWA is directed at other objects, like the EU.

Why do populist authoritarians (PAns) prefer one-sided media?

High RWAs have been found to be more likely to trust television and the internet over newspapers, family or university courses as a source of information.[151] Research also suggests that the higher one is in RWA or SDO the more likely one is to believe that objective evidence contradicting one's worldview is biased.[152] Some academics have found that it is only in conditions of perceived threat that high RWAs will reject information that conflicts with their beliefs, and become biased towards information that confirms their beliefs, probably as a way of reducing anxiety that would be caused by uncertainty resulting from acknowledging evidence that contradicts their views. The authors suggest that one-sided right-wing media appeals disproportionately to high RWAs who have been triggered by a perceived threat to culture, the economy or security.[153]

Unfortunately, social media has made it easier to create fora where individuals can either select, or are pushed by algorithms, into an environment where they are exposed only to like-minded views. Free from challenge by opposing opinions, these echo chambers serve to entrench opinions among the group, which then become extremely difficult to change.[154] This contributes towards the polarisation of political attitudes among the public.

Chapter 7: Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are triggered by perceived threat and competition

Key points

- Those scoring highly on measures of right-wing authoritarianism (high RWAs) and social dominance orientation (high SDOs) need to be 'triggered' before they express strong support for authoritarian political attitudes.
- High RWAs are triggered by the perception of threat to economic stability, cultural values and physical safety.
- High SDOs are triggered by the perception of competition to socio-economic hierarchies.
- Populist authoritarian politicians are making a calculated effort to trigger high RWAs and high SDOs, for example, by associating immigrants with competition for jobs and economic resources and as threats to cultural values and physical security. They also associate other outgroups such as activists, feminists, LGBTI persons with threats to culture and security or challenges to socio-economic hierarchies.

Simply knowing that the majority of populist authoritarian (PAn) voters are most probably high RWAs or high SDOs already helps us to understand better that supporters of populist authoritarianism (PAm) hold a coherent set of beliefs and opinions. But if scholarship in this area is to help progressives determine how to counter growing support for PAm, we must also be able to understand what factors either trigger or increase RWA and SDO in the first place.

Recap: who are high RWAs and high SDOs?

Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are psychological worldviews. Psychological worldviews are subconscious decision-making processes that base decision-making on a person's subconsciously held beliefs about how the world is, how it should be, and how the ideal can be achieved.

People scoring high on measures of right-wing authoritarianism are referred to as 'high

RWAs'. High RWAs see the world as a dangerous place and endorse conventionalism (adherence to 'traditional' norms), submission (concentrating power in a strong leader who can put traditional norms into effect), and aggression (strong punishment of those who deviate from traditional norms). High RWAs are 'triggered' to endorse authoritarian political attitudes by perceived threats to the group such as threats to physical safety, economic stability and cultural values. People scoring high on measures of social dominance orientation are referred to as 'high SDOs'. High SDOs see the world as a competitive jungle and endorse traditional anti-egalitarian, hierarchical socio-economic structures. High SDOs are 'triggered' to endorse authoritarian political attitudes by perceived competition from marginalised groups that threaten traditional socio-economic hierarchies. For high RWAs and high SDOs authoritarian policies are a means of containing perceived sources of threat and competition.

As discussed earlier, mainstream literature has addressed the question of what motivates PAn voters by examining their 'grievances', or the 'demand-side' of support for PAn parties. In this research, the main question has been over whether PAn voters are motivated more by economic concerns or by cultural concerns. Scholars generally seem to agree that low-skilled and unskilled workers tend to be over-represented among PAn voters and that they vote for PAn parties, in great part, because they agree with their anti-immigration policies. A small minority of scholars has argued that it may be difficult to distinguish between economic and cultural concerns and that anti-immigrant attitudes are probably based on both.[155] But most literature seems to favour one cause over the other.

Some mainstream scholarship argues that PAn voters are motivated by economic concerns and should be characterised as the 'losers' of globalisation who support PAm because they oppose immigration and favour economic nationalism, since free trade and immigration have meant that jobs in their sector have moved or are in danger of moving to countries where labour is cheaper and newly arrived migrants are competing for the remaining unskilled and low-skilled positions. Researchers have also argued that this situation has been exacerbated by austerity measures because cuts in public spending have their gravest impact on those who are more economically vulnerable. The fact that low-skilled and unskilled male workers from vulnerable parts of the economy with lower levels of education are overrepresented among PAn voters is taken as support for the view that PAn voters are motivated by economic concerns.[156]

Other mainstream scholarship, relying on information from surveys of public opinion, maintains that voters support PAn parties not because of economic concerns, but because of the perceived threat to cultural values posed by migrants.[157] There is also evidence to suggest that PAn voters are motivated by concern for their safety, probably because of the links made by PAn parties and parts of the media between immigration and terrorism. Furthermore, PAn voters are said to be motivated by their opposition to cultural liberalisation in general, which has taken place over the last 60 years, for example on the rights of women and LGBTI persons, the growth of secularism, en-

vironmentalism and a more general embrace of cultural diversity.[158]

The weight of recent scholarship favours cultural grievances as the main motivation for anti-immigration attitudes. But this would appear to relegate the link between economic shocks and the rise of PAm to mere coincidence. It also doesn't convincingly explain why a particular socio-demographic is overrepresented among PAn voters.

Social psychology research provides an insight that can reconcile these potentially divergent findings about the motivations of PAn voters. The answer provided by social psychology also helps to explain why PAn voters are over-represented among a certain socio-demographic group. In brief, RWA and SDO can be triggered by perceived threats to the economy and competition for resources and status – which are economic triggers. But they can also be triggered by perceived threat to cultural values and physical safety. However, once RWA and SDO are triggered, they give rise to or strengthen attitudes such as xenophobia, which is largely expressed as negative attitudes towards the culture and values of the outgroup.[159]

When high RWAs and high SDOs express their disapproval of outgroups they try to rationalise and justify their prejudicial attitudes, rather than suppress them. One might think here of statements beginning with 'I'm not racist but' and ending with a practical explanation of why a particular ethnic outgroup is undesirable.[160] Rationalisations of prejudice are better documented in research on SDOs, which has examined the variety of 'legitimising myths' used by high SDOs to explain why they favour denying equality to outgroups. As set out in chapter 3, common legitimising myths for high SDOs towards ethnic minorities include that the lower status group deserves its position due to dishonesty, lower intelligence, laziness and/or criminality, while the ingroup deserves its superior status because it is hardworking, thrifty and morally upright. For high RWAs prejudice is often rationalised as a reaction to the threat posed by the outgroup to the cultural values, safety or stability of the ingroup. Surveys of public opinion tend reveal these conscious rationalisations of negative attitudes towards outgroups. But surveys of public attitudes towards outgroups are unlikely to reveal the background causes that triggered the psychological worldviews that gave rise to these negative attitudes because this is an unconscious process (unless such surveys are looking for correlations between anti-outgroup attitudes and background factors, which mainstream surveys usually are not). This can explain why cultural concerns are reported as more prominent than economic concerns among PAn supporters: the most popular legitimating myths that people use to consciously rationalise their attitudes seem to relate to cultural values. But it also underlines that revealing what PAn voters are consciously worried about (a symptom of high RWA and high SDO) will not give a complete picture as to why they are supporting PAn parties. This can only come to light by examining the underlying causes and triggers of RWA and SDO.

7.1 Competition and threat

Social psychology research shows that SDO and RWA are triggered or elevated by perceived competition and threat, respectively.[161] As noted in chapter 3, this is referred to as the 'dual process model': different triggers that activate different psychological worldviews that lead to similar political attitudes but for different reasons. Even though these two worldviews lead individuals to endorse similar attitudes and policies, they are triggered by different phenomena.

Research on SDO and RWA is largely corroborated by a related body of scholarship exploring 'intergroup threat' theories, which examine the impact of various forms of perceived threats and competition on majority population attitudes towards immigrants but do not analyse this through the lens of RWA or SDO. This scholarship will be referred to when relevant.[162] Neuro-biological research also provides some corroboration about how RWA and SDO are triggered. Experimenters have found that the parts of the brain associated with fear, threat and risk-aversion are larger among those with politically conservative attitudes.[163]

As noted, high SDOs see the world as a competitive jungle and are concerned about maintaining existing social and economic statuses in society. As such, situations of social or economic competition – that is, where an outgroup is seen to be improving its status – will raise the level of and/or trigger high SDOs. In contrast, high RWAs see the world as an unsafe place and wish to preserve group cohesion by maintaining and strictly enforcing traditional rules and empowering a strong leader. As such, situations of threat to economic stability, physical security or cultural norms either trigger high RWA and/or cause levels of RWA to rise.

Researchers have confirmed this in numerous studies, both in real life situations and in experiments where experimenters manipulate the levels of perceived threat and perceived competition to examine how high RWAs and SDOs react. For example, many studies have found that while both high SDOs and high RWAs support strict immigration policies, high RWAs are triggered by the perceived cultural, security or economic threat of immigration, while high SDOs are triggered by perceived competition for jobs or social status from immigration.[164] Understanding how SDO and RWA worldviews are triggered also allows us to accommodate variations between countries. For example, a meta-analysis of research from a number of countries found that in some countries, such as Germany, anti-immigrant attitudes were more prevalent among high RWAs than high SDOs. Whereas in Canada, anti-immigrant attitudes were more prevalent among high SDOs than high RWAs. In countries where anti-immigrant attitudes are being picked up among high RWAs and not high SDOs this was because immigrants were more strongly associated with criminality and as being a drain on the economy – that is, they were seen as threats to economic stability and physical security. In these countries, it is not that there are no high SDOs. It is rather that they haven't been triggered to endorse authoritarian political attitudes. Whereas in countries where anti-immigrant attitudes are being picked up among high SDOs but not high RWAs, this was because immigrants were seen as being so-

cially and economically disadvantaged (because they had relatively high unemployment rates), which gave rise to a perception of competition and a desire to make sure that they were 'kept in their place'.[165] Again, it is not that in these countries there are no high RWAs, it is just that they are not being triggered. Of course, if PAns manage to create a perception of both threat and competition, anti-immigrant attitudes are likely to be picked up among both high SDOs and high RWAs – which is probably what the most successful PAn parties are now managing to achieve.

> ***Perception matters more than objective reality***
>
> The reader should keep in mind that it is perception that is of importance, rather than the reality of threat or competition.[166] To test for triggers of RWA and SDO experimenters sometimes used longitudinal studies based on real life events (such as terrorist attacks). However, often experimenters created situations to induce perceptions of threat or competition, for example, by requiring participants to read certain texts designed to portray particular groups as threatening or competitive. This helps to highlight how easy it can be for the media or political figures to trigger these same perceptions through their coverage of events and statements to the public.

Research suggests that the threats and competition that have the greatest impact on levels of RWA and SDO are on a societal or system-wide, rather than an individual, scale. That is, it is the perception of threat or competition towards the ingroup, rather than the perception of threat or competition towards a particular individual that counts.[167] For example, threats to an individual's personal economic outlook are less likely to activate or increase RWA than a perceived threat to the national economy.[168]

> ***Chronically sensitive to threat and competition***
>
> Researchers seem to agree that high RWAs are extremely sensitive to threat and that high SDOs are very sensitive to competition. Most research also seems to agree that RWAs and SDOs need to be triggered by threat or competition before they start to endorse authoritarian political attitudes. Furthermore, it looks like even low RWAs and low SDOs react to threat and competition by moving up the RWA and SDO scale. Once triggered, high RWAs and high SDOs will support a more extreme response to the threat while low RWAs and low SDOs will support more moderate responses.

The greater the perceived threat or competition, the stronger RWA or SDO express themselves.[169] Threat and competition can take various forms: economic, social, cultural, physical and political. Greater levels of perceived threat to safety, stability, cultural norms, social or economic status will cause those high as well as those low in RWA and SDO to become more extreme in their attitudes and the policies they endorse. High RWAs and high SDOs tend to support more extreme responses to threat and competition than low RWAs and low SDOs.[170]

However, there is research showing that those lower in RWA will move higher up the scale in reaction to threat, eliminating the difference between low and high RWAs.[171] By implication, it appears that removing the perception of threat and competition can 'untrigger' high RWAs and high SDOs or allow previously low RWAs and low SDOs who moved further up the scale in reaction to threat and competition to move down the scale again. However, there is evidence that when a society has experienced prolonged, sustained periods of perceived threat and competition, it may take the passage of a generation living in perceived stability and safety to tip the scales back towards broader support for progressive, rather than authoritarian policies. More on this below.

Is society divided into pure authoritarians and pure progressives?

No, there is a moveable middle, but it is shrinking. Research from a number of different fields suggests that it might be more accurate to divide people in society roughly into three. At one end, those who entirely endorse progressive political attitudes or 'pure' progressives. At the other margin, those who entirely endorse authoritarian political attitudes, or 'pure authoritarians'. This latter groups is probably made up of high RWAs and high SDOs.

But the larger group in society tends to lie somewhere in the middle, and this group in the middle can be moved in either direction, depending on the circumstances and political messaging they are exposed to. For example, research into public attitudes towards human rights in the UK found that 22% of people were supportive, 26% opposed, 41% undecided and 11% uninterested.[172] Similarly, research into where Europeans placed themselves on the political spectrum found that most thought of themselves as being in the centre-left or centre-right, with smaller numbers on the far-left and far-right.[173]

This group can be referred to as the 'moveable middle' or 'biconceptuals', to use the term applied by cognitive linguist, Lakoff. Biconceptuals are people who are more conservative in some aspects of their lives and opinions and more liberal in others. This group probably corresponds to low RWAs and low SDOs, who under conditions of threat and competition move up the RWA and SDO scale to endorse more authoritarian political attitudes. Research from the field of cognitive linguistics and values (discussed in chapter 4.1 and 4.3) suggests that these biconceptuals, or moveable middle, can equally be moved towards endorsing more progressive political attitudes. And that this can be done by exposing this group to messages and frames of communication that reinforce the values underlying progressive political attitudes.

Most research suggests that even low RWAs will react to threat by moving further up the RWA scale and thereby endorse more authoritarian political attitudes. But some research on RWAs also supports the idea of a moveable middle. According to this evidence, not all low RWAs will move up the scale when exposed to threat and competition – rather some appear to go the other way and endorse

more progressive policies.[174] If crises can also serve to trigger some people to endorse more progressive rules, this could help to explain why politics is becoming so polarised with people moving out of the moveable middle and over to teams of authoritarians or progressives.

Some research also indicates that the moveable may be shrinking. In recent years political attitudes have become increasingly polarised, with those on the centre left and centre right sharing less common ground and moving further to the extremes. This is most pronounced in the USA, but the trend has reached parts of Europe.[175] It seems that the moveable middle is getting smaller as perceptions of threat and competition induced by fear- and hate-based politics is pushing increasing numbers of low RWAs and low SDOs into one of two camps.

7.2 Threat and right-wing authoritarianism

Threats may take a real or a symbolic form. Examples of real threats include the threat to physical security from terrorism or crime, which will activate or increase RWA. For example, experimenters found increases in levels of RWA when participants were told that there was a high rate of burglaries, assaults and robberies from armed gangs in their country.[176] Probably the more common source of physical insecurity advanced by PAn politicians is the threat of terrorism. As noted, those high in RWA are more likely to support restrictions on civil liberties in general. But as the level of perceived threat posed by terrorism increases, this increases support for restrictions even further.[177] This is corroborated by research that, although it did not measure for RWA specifically, examined the impact of support for restrictions on civil liberties among political conservatives, moderates and liberals. The study found that the greater the perceived threat of terrorism, the greater the support for restrictions on civil liberties, among all three groups. As RWA is most closely associated with political conservatism, these findings suggest that those lower in RWA (moderates and liberals) increase their levels of RWA in response to terrorist threat, causing them to endorse restrictive measures.[178] It seems likely that high RWAs are chronically more sensitive to threat because they believe the world is a dangerous place.

Threats activating or increasing levels of RWA can also take an economic form. Researchers found that the perception that the national economy is deteriorating triggers or raises levels of RWA. In contrast, the perception of personal economic hardship, such as actual or expected fall in household income, losing one's job or (if unemployed) being pessimistic about future employment, of themselves do not have an impact on one's level of RWA.[179] The fact that a negative perception of the country's economic situation, rather than one's personal economic situation, is more strongly connected to racial prejudice is confirmed in research in a related academic field testing intergroup ethnic threat theory.[180]

Historical research also confirms the impact of economic shocks on RWA. The general consensus among historians is that the Great Depression played a key role in the rise of pop-

ular nationalism, and that the fascists who rose to power presented themselves as 'protectors of the people' against scapegoated outgroups who were responsible for economic problems.[181] The idea that economic shocks can create support for authoritarian political attitudes is supported by research based on analysis of historical archives that track social and political trends from the 1920s to 1980s. Researchers found that RWA and other measures of authoritarianism increased during periods of history in line with serious system-level threats, such as economic depression, high unemployment or the likelihood of armed conflict abroad.[182] Authoritarian attitudes rose among the public during periods where these threats were considered high, and attitudes liberalised when these threats were considered low.[183] Other research based on successive world values surveys examines how different societies across the world have changed the emphasis they place on different clusters of values discussed in chapter 4.1. This research also provides strong evidence that social instability and economic hardship cause societies to become more authoritarian, while periods of economic prosperity and stability coincide with liberalisation of political attitudes.[184]

Threats also take symbolic form. For example, outgroups that are seen to hold different cultural values that are thought incompatible with ingroup values will be perceived as a threat that heightens or activates RWA.[185] The reason that different cultures can be perceived as threatening is thought to be because communities are held together by commonly shared moral codes, and challenging these shared moral codes is instinctively perceived to threaten group cohesion.[186] Researchers have found that both those low and high in RWA expressed heightened levels of negative emotions towards Turkish people when they were portrayed in a culturally threatening way (with emphasis placed on Turkish and Muslim identity which would be promoted aggressively in public, organised around mosques, male-dominated and violence-prone). However, rather lower levels of hostility were expressed when this group was described in other terms, such as well-integrated, or socially weak (i.e. with a low social status), or as hard-working (i.e. potentially competitive).[187] Similar results have been found for other ethnic minority groups when portrayed to high RWAs as having diverging cultural traditions and values from the host population.[188] The attachment of high RWAs to traditional cultural norms could go some way to explain the strong sense of "nostalgia" reported among some PAn voters.[189]

The gravitation of mainstream parties to the political centre may have a compounding impact on high RWAs

Threats may also take a political form. One study found that the further that individuals with authoritarian personalities perceived established political parties to be from their beliefs, the more intense their authoritarian attitudes became.[190] This would provide some support for Mudde's suggestion that political 'TINA' (there is no alternative) plays a role in explaining support for PAn parties. That is, when mainstream parties move towards a common central political ground and do not advance authoritarian policies this will itself act as a threat that triggers high RWAs who

feel their political attitudes are not represented. In practice, this phenomenon might work like this: in periods when there is a higher perception of security, cultural or economic threat, this will trigger high RWAs and probably move low RWAs further up the scale. If these people in addition then see that mainstream parties do not reflect their newly endorsed authoritarian political attitudes, this acts as a factor intensifying their perception of threat, giving rise to endorsement of more authoritarian political attitudes.

Political science research also suggests that cultural threats may emerge not from particular outgroups, but in a more diffuse form. The 'losers of globalisation' thesis posits that globalisation has promoted a cultural evolution which favours a 'cosmopolitan identity', characterised by 'open-mindedness, a fascination for new and different experiences, [and] individualism'. This cosmopolitan identity tends to diminish the importance placed on community and a sense of belonging, which is stronger among the working-class.[191] Researchers maintain that this cultural threat is an additional factor turning the lesser educated, less affluent, working class, to support PAm.[192]

When RWA is triggered or increased, its effects are not necessarily limited to particular outgroups, such as migrants, who have been identified as the cause of the threat. Put otherwise, if migrants are perceived to be a threat because they have been portrayed as a cause of terrorism or crime, high RWAs will endorse more restrictive economic and security measures against migrants.[193] But the activation or increase in RWA probably has broader effects. For example, research into attitudes in Spain following the 2004 Madrid bombings found RWA levels increased, and along with it, anti-Muslim prejudice, but also anti-Semitic prejudice and broader political conservatism.[194] Similarly, as noted above, high RWAs become more willing to endorse counter-terrorism measures, such as mass surveillance of communications, which affect everyone and not just particular outgroups. Other research finds that when high RWAs were triggered by the threat of terrorism, a broader range of authoritarian attitudes were expressed such as support for strict parenting and harsh punishment for criminals.[195] Other research from the field of psychology that did not expressly measure for RWA found that the higher that individuals perceived the threat of terrorism to be, the more likely they were to endorse more punitive criminal law measures for crimes unrelated to terrorism such as car theft and rape.[196] These findings underline the fact that RWA is a worldview the supports a coherent set of interrelated attitudes about a range of issues.

Do not use fear-based communications to promote progressive causes

Experimenters found that increasing the perception of threat from climate change triggered stronger authoritarian attitudes among participants, such as endorsing harsher punishment of criminals, hostility towards 'dissident' groups such as environmentalists (ironically), vegans, feminists and punks, and greater submission to leaders.[197] This is a valuable insight for activists trying to mobilise public support for fundamental rights or

> environmental protection: using fear-based messages may well be counter-productive in the long-run, because it is likely not only to trigger high RWAs, but also move low RWAs (who potentially form part of the 'moveable middle') higher up the RWA scale.

7.3 Competition and social dominance orientation

Most researchers seem to agree that high SDOs do not constantly exhibit negative attitudes towards outgroups. The weight of research suggests that high SDOs are highly sensitive to competition, but still need to be triggered by a perception of competition before they will manifest hostile attitudes towards outgroups.[198]

High SDOs tend to perceive societal resources as zero-sum, meaning that gains for one group will mean losses for another. Put otherwise, when a group is seen as potentially improving its social or economic status, this will trigger or increase negative attitudes of high and low SDOs towards that group. And this is because high, and to a lesser extent low, SDOs see one group's gain and their loss. For example, research shows that high SDOs from the white majority population are much more likely to believe that immigrants take jobs and resources away from the white majority.[199]

Competition may take an economic form. A recent large scale study of 8,000 participants in eight EU countries showed that while native high SDOs are more likely to hold and act on prejudicial and negative attitudes towards immigrants, levels of SDO were higher among those with a lower income – who are the main socio-economic competitors of low and unskilled migration.[200] This research on SDO is consistent with research on intergroup ethnic competition theory.[201] As discussed below, despite its shortcomings, this research shows that support for PAn parties or positions rises among economically vulnerable elements of the majority ingroup when ethnic minorities are perceived as competing for resources and jobs.

Competition may also take a social form. One study showed that high SDOs show less favourable attitudes towards LGBT persons when they are perceived to be making progress in their social status. In contrast when they perceived LGBT people to be in a non-competing, socially disadvantaged position, high SDOs were more likely to be tolerant.[202] Similarly, high SDOs were less likely to favour policies that empower migrants to integrate into the host society, though they did not hold such opposition to assistance in kind (such as housing or aid). This suggests that high SDOs are more concerned with migrants improving their social status, rather than about state resources as such. When experimenters portrayed migrants as competing with the host population economically, the reluctance to endorse policies to empower migrants increased further.[203] This does not necessarily contradict the evidence that high SDOs are welfare chauvinists since giving shelter and financial aid merely allows a marginalised group to survive in its inferior position, rather than improve its social standing. Other research confirms that high SDOs express negative attitudes towards various ethnic minorities when they were presented as competing for influence and status in society.[204]

To sum up

Both economic and cultural factors are important causes in the growth in support for PAm. The perception that migrants compete for jobs and resources, the economic shock of the global recession that has threatened national economic prosperity, perceived threats to cultural values and public safety that is perceived to be posed by migrants and the evolution in cultural values, as well as the absence of policies among the political mainstream that would reflect growing authoritarian values all trigger and/or raise levels of RWA and SDO. High RWAs and high SDOs in turn express prejudicial attitudes towards outgroups, like migrants, and justify these on the basis of 'legitimising myths' and rationalisations that tend to concentrate on cultural differences. But, as seen in chapter 6, they also endorse a range of other authoritarian political attitudes that match the types of policies advanced by PAn parties on immigration and integration, criminal justice, fundamental rights, equality, democratic pluralism, environmental policy and foreign policy. Both economic and cultural concerns explain the rise of PAm, but in attitude surveys, people are more likely to report the legitimising myths relating to cultural concerns of which they are conscious, rather than the economic factors that unconsciously helped to trigger the mindset behind those attitudes.

When PAn political figures use fear-based politics, they are increasing levels of perceived threat and competition among the public, thus activating high and low RWAs and SDOs. They then attract these voters with policies that favour the ingroup over outgroups (migrants, women, the poor, criminals, rights and environmental activists), that favour a 'return' to 'tradition', that are punitive, that maintain or increase inequalities, and that draw power to the executive and away from institutions that protect minorities, civil liberties and democratic pluralism.

The research in section 7.2 of this chapter on historical analysis of authoritarian attitudes in periods of crisis and on the world values survey suggest that long-term increases in perceptions of threat and competition can cause a shift towards authoritarianism in society as a whole that can take an entire generation living in a period of perceived stability and safety to reverse. There are two possible explanations for this. One is that long-term, sustained threat and competition will permanently trigger existing high RWAs and high SDOs who can then be united by PAns in a critical mass sufficient to take political control. Put otherwise, it is not that more people become high RWA and high SDO. It is rather that high RWAs and high SDOs are triggered and are then brought into a coherent voting force by PAns who can enact authoritarian policies. In support of this, some research suggests that sustained anti-immigrant messaging in the media in recent years has not, on average over societies, created higher numbers of people with anti-immigrant attitudes. Rather, it has merely succeeded in triggering those who are predisposed to authoritarian attitudes by increasing the salience of the issue, and PAn parties have then mobilised these people to vote in sufficient numbers to bring them into government or to influence mainstream parties.[205] The alternative explanation is that sustained and long-term conditions of threat and

competition will actually increase the number of high RWAs and high SDOs because low RWAs and low SDOs will move up the scale and then stay there. This is supported by much of the research discussed above in chapter 7.2, which shows that low SDOs and low RWAs can be moved up the scale by threat and competition. According to this alternative explanation, sustained threat and competition can, in the long-term, create new high RWAs and high SDOs. Whichever of these explanations is correct, the fact remains that even though support for progressive attitudes can return to dominance after a period of decline, this seems to require a sustained period of safety and stability to counteract a preceding prolonged period of perceived threat and competition.

Chapter 8: How do socio-demographic factors fit in?

Key points

- Mainstream scholarship on populism has focused on using socio-demographic factors to identify the causes of growing support for populist authoritarian parties. These factors sometimes offer contradictory evidence and researchers have not been able to use them to form a consistent explanation for growing populist authoritarian support.

- Research on right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation helps to explain the roles that these socio-demographic factors play and fit them into a consisten narrative. And it explains why in different countries, socio-demographic factors sometimes explain support for populist authoritarians and sometimes do not.

- Those in a vulnerable position on the employment market are overrepresented among populist authoritarian voters. This is because people in this position feel more vulnerable to competition from migration, which will trigger high SDOs among this group.

- Religiosity sometimes predicts more support for populist authoritarians and sometimes less support. This is partly down to how dogmatic and conservative the church is in a given country and partly due to whether the church is politically closer to centre-right or PAn parties.

- The presence of ethnic minorities can have contradictory impacts on predicting support for populist authoritarians. This is because under normal conditions, when an ingroup mixes with outgroups, this diminishes levels of RWA and SDO. But under conditions of perceived competition and threat or where there is no mixing, this has the reverse effect and triggers RWA and SDO.

- University graduates are less likely to support populist authoritarians in Western Europe, but not necessarily in Central and Eastern Europe. This is because education is a powerful vehicle for socialisation. Western universities tend to socialise people into more progressive values, which then diminishes the likelihood that they will adhere to RWA and SDO.

- In Western Europe, younger people are underrepresented among populist authoritarian voters, while the same appears not to be true in parts of Central and Eastern Europe. This is because socialisation plays a large role in determining our attitudes and successive cohorts in different countries grow up in different conditions, that sometimes induce support for progressive values and sometimes do not.

- Women are underrepresented among populist authoritarian voters, but are still a large minority. This is because women are just as likely to be high RWA than men, but there are fewer women among high SDOs than men.

Mainstream scholarship on populism has identified a number of socio-demographic factors that seem to explain why parts of the population with certain characteristics are drawn to or put off populist authoritarian (PAn) parties. There appears to be agreement around some of these factors, particularly position in the employment market, education and gender. At the same time there are other factors that appear to help explain voting for PAn parties in some countries but not in others such as age, religiosity and the degree of proximity to or presence of minority groups. The following section will examine these factors and set out how social psychology research on right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) explains the role they play.

8.1 Position in the employment market

Sociology and political science scholars seem to accept that the 'second-to-last' fifth layer in society – unskilled and low-skilled workers and those from the old (self-employed) middle class – are overrepresented among PAn supporters to a greater extent than the bottom fifth – the unemployed. This is in line with how SDO works. Researchers have found that those with higher income had lower SDO and, consequently, lower anti-immigrant attitudes. Whereas low income and lesser educated members of the ingroup are more likely to perceive competition for jobs and resources from lower skilled, unskilled, economically poor migrants.[206] High SDOs are triggered by competition for their socio-economic status and migrants tend to be competitors to those who are in vulnerable positions on the job market. These are people who feel they have something to lose: they perceive their socio-economic status to be under challenge from a competing outgroup. The unemployed may be more likely to feel that they do not have much of a status to defend, while low-skilled workers and the lower middle class (the 'losers of globalisation') can be made to feel vulnerable to competition for their livelihoods and social status from migrants, automation and offshoring of jobs.[207]

This analysis is supported by research from other fields of study. A recent large-scale survey

in the US found that Trump supporters were less likely than others to be unemployed or employed part-time and had an income above those who did not support Trump, but that they often suffered from declining intergenerational mobility. Put otherwise, it was people who felt that their group's socio-economic status was being challenged who were overrepresented among Trump voters, rather than those who were objectively less well off than this group. [208] Research from the field of intergroup ethnic conflict theory also found that countries where the level of perceived threat from immigration was highest were those where per capita GDP was greatest but economic growth had declined most strongly.[209] Put crudely, people in richer countries that experienced a big downturn in the economy seemed to perceive competition to their socio-economic status and threat to economic stability more intensely than people in poorer countries. This again supports the conclusion that it is perceived competition for socio-economic status among those who feel that they have something to lose that motivates some PAn voters. This could help to explain why recent Eurostat figures show that the top ten EU countries with the lowest unemployment rates include those countries with PAn governments in power such as Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Czech Republic.[210] What counts is less whether you're unemployed and more whether you feel vulnerable to competition from outgroups such as low-skilled migrants or whether you experience relative deprivation due to declines in economic growth. And this is consistent with the way that SDO is triggered, suggesting that those with a vulnerable position on the job market are overrepresented among PAn voters because perceived competition activates the high SDOs among this group.

8.2 The role of education

There is a significant body of evidence showing that education has an impact on support for PAns. In particular, those with a university degree are underrepresented among people voting for PAn parties and are more likely to hold progressive views. Those with a lower level of education are overrepresented among PAn voters and more likely to hold authoritarian attitudes.[211]

Various explanations for this have been put forward. First, that education's impact on support for PAns is indirect because people with a higher level of education tend to enjoy greater economic security and are insulated from competition for jobs from unskilled and low-skilled migration. Second, that education equips individuals with knowledge and critical thinking skills that make them more likely to reject simplistic and inaccurate arguments advanced by PAns. Third, that education socialises individuals into liberal and cosmopolitan values.[212] It appears that there is a degree of truth in each of these.

Research suggests that high RWAs or high SDOs are less likely to have a high level of education – more particularly, the equivalent of a bachelor's university degree or higher.[213] Put otherwise, someone who has a university degree is less likely to be high RWA or high SDO. One explanation, at least when it comes to SDO could be that those with a university education score lower on SDO measures be-

cause their level of education gives them a level of socio-economic security that is not easily challenged by the trigger of unskilled immigration, discussed in chapter 7.[214] This appears to be borne out by research in related academic fields that shows that when university graduates do experience direct competition for high skilled jobs from immigrants, they show higher levels of intolerance for immigration. Thus, a university education may lead to lower levels of prejudice to the extent that it shields individuals from competition, thereby preventing SDO being triggered or raised.[215] However, researchers have found that one's level of education has an impact on one's political attitudes independently of income, class or socio-economic status. That is, even after one strips out the impact of these other socio-demographic factors on attitudes from the data, it remains the case that education by itself still plays an important role in shaping political attitudes.[216] Which means that education plays a role beyond merely insulating potentially high SDOs from the perception of competition.

Evidence suggests two deeper reasons for the divide in political attitudes between high and lower educated persons. First, the impact of education on values and attitudes. Research from the field of sociology finds that a full university education appears to socialise its recipients into supporting progressive values of freedom, tolerance and equality, which translates into support for progressive political attitudes. In contrast, those with lower levels of education tend towards more authoritarian values such as endorsement of social hierarchies, strict conformity to rules and cognitive rigidity, which translates into greater endorsement authoritarian attitudes.[217]

> ***Socialisation***
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> Socialisation refers to the process through which individuals adhere to certain sets of values. Socialisation can occur through the education system, through the workplace, organised religion, through peers and partners, the narratives promoted in the media and through the policies and narratives promoted by governments. The education system can socialise individuals into progressive or authoritarian values that make them more or less pre-disposed towards being high RWA and high SDO.[218]

The likelihood that there is a process of socialisation into certain values at work is supported by further research that examines the impact of subjects studied. Researchers have found that levels of SDO change while at university, and that this depends on the degree studied. For example, law students and commerce students saw their levels of SDO rise over the course of their degree. While psychology and social science students saw their levels of SDO fall. There is also evidence that there is variation in levels of SDO within academic disciplines. For example, those who study subjects with more benevolent, universalist values (discussed in chatper 4.1) like human rights law versus those who specialise in profit-oriented subjects like commercial law. This has led researchers to conclude that education has a socialising effect on individuals and that the values transmitted by particular subjects has an impact on levels of

SDO. They suggest that the difference is caused by the fact that some subjects promote a view of the world that legitimises socio-economic inequalities and hierarchies while others challenge these hierarchies by promoting equality, tolerance and perspective-taking.[219]

While there is less research on the impact of socialisation through the education system on RWA, it seems highly likely that the impact is the same as for SDO. This is because we know that values can be transmitted through socialisation and people that place greater emphasis on values under the 'conservation' cluster (see chapter 4.1) tend also to be high RWAs. The effect of socialisation is confirmed by other research in the field of sociology that finds a difference in support for authoritarian or progressive attitudes linked to subjects studied, both at school and in university. Those who study subjects that concentrate on the welfare and perspectives of other people held more progressive views, while those whose education focused on people as things to be regulated or used for profit or whose education focused on the manipulation of objects, tended more towards authoritarian views.[220]

The increase in support for progressive values does not simply increase gradually as one progresses through the education system. Rather, there is a jump in attitudes between those only completing high school or a shorter course in tertiary education, and those staying in higher education for longer. [221] Put otherwise, the move towards progressive views is not gradual during high school, changing year by year, but occurs more suddenly at university. This has led researchers to conclude that it is not only the substance of subjects studied that has a socialising effect, but also the study environment itself. Western university environments tend to promote values like tolerance and equality and ways of thinking like open-mindedness, enquiry, tolerance of ambiguity and flexible thinking.[222] This may help to explain research that finds that individuals showing higher levels of support for human rights, such as donating, signing petitions and taking part in demonstrations usually have higher levels of education and more knowledge about the content of human rights.[223]

The impact of education on attitudes is variable and will depend on the values that underpin the education system. For example, research has found that the effect of education on diminishing support for ethnic exclusionist attitudes is smaller among former communist countries compared to older European democracies.[224] This means that education could also become a vehicle for transmitting authoritarian values. Some commentators have argued that Hungarian history graduates are particularly supportive of Hungary's (other) far-right party Jobbik, because the history-teaching curricula encourages nationalism and intolerance.[225] Another study compares civic education in Hungary and Poland. Polish students scored well above the EU average on civic participation, civic skills and liberal and democratic values in contrast to their Hungarian counterparts. According to the authors, Hungary also had a poor quality of civic education (often left in the hands of history teachers untrained in civics) following the fall of communism. In contrast, civic education was taught in Poland by specially trained teachers designed to impart liberal-democratic values.

The research then points to data showing that these attitudes have been reflected in voting patterns, with Hungarian youth more likely to vote for the far right than older Hungarians, while Polish youth were less likely to vote for the far right than older Poles.[226]

There is also evidence, however, that the jump in progressive attitudes made at university is not just down to the effect of socialisation. There is some evidence of self-selection among those who choose to go to university. Researchers tracked attitudes held by individuals from childhood to after university graduation and found that those individuals who went to university did not actually radically change their attitudes along the way. This means that people who chose to go to university were already less prejudiced and more tolerant while at school, and (for some reason) these people are more likely to go to university.[227]

The research showing that a university education can liberalise political attitudes is pretty solid. But this doesn't mean that there isn't something in the suggestion that it is less common to find authoritarians among people who decide to go to university than those who do not. It has been suggested that this may be due to social and political attitudes learnt from parents (those with higher educated parents held more progressive views) and the values transmitted by the school environment, including the degree of contact with people of different social and ethnic backgrounds.[228] But these explanations do not really help explain why individuals with more progressive attitudes go to university, if one considers that universities tend to admit students on the basis of their academic performance rather than their political attitudes. This begs the question: is there a link between academic performance and social and political attitudes?

A significant body of research suggests that some self-selection could be occurring and that this is down to cognitive ability. Cognitive ability refers to the capacity for problem-solving, acquiring new knowledge and logical reasoning. Those with lower cognitive ability in childhood are more likely to be high RWAs as adults. As discussed, high RWAs are intolerant of ambiguity, tend to be dogmatic and think in rigid, black and white terms.[229] Researchers argue that this is because lower cognitive ability seems to make individuals more sensitive to threat. Higher cognitive abilities are required to understand and make sense of the complicated dynamics of the world around us. Challenges to the status quo create a sense of uncertainty and ambiguity that those with lower cognitive ability are unable to resolve and therefore perceive as threatening. To resolve this threat, individuals resort to an RWA worldview which brings a sense of certainty, safety and closure. High RWAs respond to new ideas, practices, peoples and cultures with the reassertion of traditional social rules, the rejection of outgroups seen to challenge to the status quo and the punishment of deviants. Those with lower cognitive ability are probably inclined to become high RWA because this worldview gives them the means to make sense of the world (the ingroup is being threatened by outgroups) and a means of neutralising the source of the threat (adherence to existing rules and punishment of rule breakers with a strong leader).[230] RWA allows individuals to replace anxiety and insecurity with certainty and safety because it allows them to impose

order on their environment and make sense of events. As noted above, the connection between low cognitive ability, closed-mindedness and high RWA probably helps to explain why these individuals are attracted to the relatively simple, black and white ('cognitively rigid') policy solutions that are typical of PAns.[231]

> ***Why do populist authoritarians (PAns) benefit from disinformation and "fake news"?***
>
> Disinformation tends to contradict mainstream news services, creating confusion and uncertainty, with which some high RWAs are unable to cope given their intolerance of ambiguity, closed-mindedness and cognitive rigidity. This means that regardless of whether the content of disinformation is of itself threatening, its very existence is threatening to those who struggle to make sense of the world. It is likely that disinformation of itself helps to push political attitudes towards authoritarianism for those high RWAs with lower cognitive abilities. If one adds to this the fear-based content that is common of disinformation, it constitutes a potent tool for PAns.

There is less research examining the relationship between cognitive ability and SDO, though the research that does exist shows a correlation between lower cognitive ability, high need for cognitive closure and SDO. However, the correlation is weaker than for high RWA and low cognitive ability.

It has been suggested that lower cognitive abilities result in greater reliance on stereotypes, which are a cognitive 'shortcut' because deeper evaluation is too complicated and takes too many mental resources. This in turn then facilitates poor treatment of outgroups.[232] However, other research has suggested that high SDOs have lower cognitive ability in relation only to verbal reasoning and not in relation to mathematical reasoning, and that the latter helps high SDOs devise ways to maintain social hierarchies.[233]

If one considers that higher cognitive ability is required to enter and complete a university education, those with lower cognitive abilities – who are more likely to be high RWA and maybe also SDO – are less likely to go to university. Put otherwise, those who go to university are inherently more likely to have higher cognitive ability, and therefore are less likely to be high RWA or high SDO.[234] And this may well explain some self-selection among those who go to university and are then further socialised into (for now and at least in Western Europe) more progressive values.

This is not to say that people with authoritarian attitudes lack intelligence. Rather, that if one were to take a group of high RWAs, there would be more people with lower cognitive abilities than in a group of low RWAs. And the same would apply, though probably to a lesser extent, with a group of high SDOs. It would be a grave mistake to underestimate PAns or patronise their supporters. Readers should keep in mind that socialisation, gender, age, religiosity, as well as triggers of threat and competition play roles in shaping and triggering RWA and SDO. So it is clear that not all high RWAs and

high SDOs adopt these worldviews because of their cognitive abilities. There will still be plenty of high RWAs and high SDOs with high cognitive abilities and with a university degree. They're just outnumbered by progressives among those with degrees (at least in Western Europe) and high cognitive abilities.

8.3 The role of age

Some political science research about the role of age in PAn voting has found it to be a largely irrelevant factor, while other research has identified the youngest, the youngest and oldest voters, or just the oldest, to be the most supportive of PAn parties or positions.[235] It is the more recent research on the Brexit vote and the 2016 US presidential elections that very much favours the view that PAn voters tend to be older and younger voters tend to be more liberal.[236] Conversely, there is evidence that in Central and Eastern Europe it is younger voters who are drawn to PAn parties.[237]

Social psychology does not appear to have paid much attention to the question of age and how it relates to RWA or SDO. Some studies have found RWA is higher in older adults compared to younger persons in the west.[238] Given the variation between countries, it seems sensible to conclude that the connection between support for authoritarian attitudes and age is probably more a question of socialisation into certain values – either progressive or authoritarian. As discussed, individuals are socialised into supporting particular values through their environment, such as the education system, peer group, working environment and prevailing political policies and rhetoric and media narratives. In Western Europe there has been a progressive entrenchment of liberal values over several decades. Older generations were socialised into more traditional, restrictive values that endorsed racism, misogyny, homophobia, and rejected multiculturalism. According to this view, it is not really the case that as people age they revert to more authoritarian values (though some research suggests that becoming a parent can nudge people up the RWA scale due to an increased sensitivity to threat to offspring).[239] It is, rather, that as successive generations emerge, they adopt the values (in the sense discussed in chapter 4.1) of their time. In Western Europe over the past 60 years, these happen to be progressive values. This means, of course, that societies can produce new generations of younger people who hold more authoritarian values, if those are the prevailing values that emerge at that time. Researchers explain that prevailing values seem to be related to whether there is a period of stability and prosperity, in which case liberal values seem to prevail, which occurred in Western Europe in the decades following the Second World War. Or whether there is economic hardship and instability, such as that encountered by Central and Eastern European countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union, where more authoritarian values prevail.[240] Accordingly, researchers argue that parts of Central and Eastern Europe are witnessing a cultural backlash against the rapid (compared to Western Europe) implementation of progressive values that has accompanied democratisation and membership of the EU.[241] This could suggest a kind of feedback loop between RWA, SDO and prevailing values in society. As discussed, in times of crisis it seems that

RWA and SDO levels in society rise. And this may in turn have a knock-on effect on the kinds of prevailing values (more authoritarian) which seem to underlie the development of RWA and SDO in the first place.

If older voters (in Western Europe) and younger voters (in some Central and Eastern European countries) have been socialised into more restrictive values, then people in these age groups will have a higher pre-disposition towards being high RWA and high SDO. This would help explain why different age cohorts (sometimes younger, sometimes older) are overrepresented among PAn supporters in different countries.

8.4 The role of gender

Women tend to be lower represented among PAn party voters than men. A study based on 2015 voter data from nine EU countries found that on average women made up 51% of voters for mainstream parties and 43% of voters for PAn parties.[242] Even if women are less likely to support PAn parties or policies than men, the election of President Trump confirmed that women will vote for PAns in significant numbers, even when their policies are overtly against gender equality.[243]

Political scientists advance two explanations for the gender gap. First, that more women than men are employed in the public service sector, making them less vulnerable to competition for low-skilled manual jobs from immigrants. Second, that women do not hold PAn attitudes (on the economy, on law and order and on immigration) to the same extent as men and that this is likely to be down to socialisation, i.e. social pressures that mould the identities of men and women. It has been argued that women are socialised to be less aggressive, more consensus-seeking and friendlier than men and as a result tend to be more politically tolerant than men, and less interested in politics.[244] This in turn makes women less likely to favour the conflictual approach of PAns, the policies of PAns or to be familiar with (and therefore voting for) a new PAn over a known mainstream party.

Social psychology research casts further light on why there is a gender gap, but why women still form a sizeable minority of supporters for PAns. Research on SDO repeatedly confirms that men are more highly represented among high SDOs than women. This is not to say that there are no women high SDOs; rather, that among high SDOs there are more men than women. This goes some way towards explaining why men are overrepresented among PAn voters compared to women. A further explanation for why women vote for PAns in lower numbers may be linked to religion, discussed further below. To state briefly, if high RWAs are also highly religious, they are more likely to vote for centre-right parties in Western Europe, and women tend to be more religious (at least in terms of church attendance) than men.[245]

But why do women continue to form such a large minority of PAn voters – or rather, why do women vote for PAns at all when they tend to pursue anti-egalitarian agendas? First, high SDO women still want to maintain the socio-economic status quo, even if this means that on balance women are on the losing end. Second, research into RWA shows that high

RWAs are not more likely to be men or women. There are just as many high RWA men as women and high RWAs want to maintain and enforce traditional cultural norms.[246] This helps to explain why large numbers of women still support PAns even if this appears to be against their self-interest: high RWA women support traditional rules (even if they are sexist).

There are various theories as to why SDO is stronger in men than women. In part, it appears that this is contextual: SDO will be triggered or heightened in men by socio-economic competition when they perceive women to be making progress towards greater gender equality. It may also be that men tend to be in jobs that are more vulnerable to competition from low-skilled migrants, meaning more men will be triggered by perceived socio-economic competition. Some have suggested that the difference is purely due to socialisation into social roles. However, the difference in SDO levels between men and women is constant even without the presence of a context of competition and across cultures with different social roles. This suggests that there are deeper-rooted reasons for the difference in SDO between men and women. There is evidence to suggest that there may be evolutionary reasons for this, related to historic male and female behaviour around reproduction that has become hardwired in men and women.[247]

8.5 The role of religion

Religion is considered a relevant factor in explaining support for populist parties by political scientists. High religiosity often correlates with high RWA. So, one would expect that highly religious voters tend to support PAn parties. But this is not borne out by evidence. In some countries highly religious voters are more attracted to PAns, while in others highly religious voters are more attracted to traditional centre-right Christian democrat parties. The relationship between religiosity and support for PAns is easier to understand if one makes two distinctions. First, between different styles of, or motivations for, religiosity. Second, between the moral and political position of religious institutions in a given country.

Scholars have identified three religious styles or motivations: fundamentalist, extrinsic, and quest-based.[248] As noted, research into the origins of prejudice has established that high SDO and high RWA probably cause most prejudice. Research has also found that fundamentalist and extrinsically motivated religiosity is highly correlated with prejudice. Because religiosity highly correlates with prejudice and high RWA and high SDO seem to cause prejudice, scholars have gone on to examine whether there is a relationship between RWA, SDO and religiosity.

Religious fundamentalism refers to an approach where individuals are closed-minded and absolutely certain about the truth and correctness of their beliefs. Research shows that religious fundamentalism strongly correlates with high RWA, which one would expect given that they have in common dogmatism, low tolerance of ambiguity and attachment to traditional rules. Some authors have suggested that the effect is causal, because religious fundamentalism socialises people into a set of beliefs that fit the RWA worldview. According to their argument, religious fundamentalists tend to emphasise that

the world is becoming a more dangerous and threatening place and this results in: a chronic sensitivity to threat, challenges to religious values being perceived as threatening and a tendency to cling to religious doctrine as the source of answers to any uncertainties. Because RWA is based on a view of the world as dangerous and threatening, religious fundamentalists naturally tend towards RWA.[249] Religious fundamentalism, like the RWA mindset, provides security and certainty in the face of changes that may be difficult to process and are perceived as threatening.

In contrast to high RWAs, research suggests that high SDOs are not particularly religious – perhaps because religions commonly advocate charity towards lower status groups and outsiders. However, some authors have suggested that high SDOs might find themselves among those who are religious for extrinsic reasons – that is, because being religious brings them a feeling of superiority and higher status.

The third category, those who approach religion as a 'quest' for truth and meaning, see religious teachings as a guide rather than a prescriptive set of do's and don'ts and tend to be less prejudiced. Questers are higher on personality traits associated with low RWA, in particular open-mindedness, questioning, tolerance of different peoples, values and perspectives. Thus, it is entirely possible to be highly religious and progressive in one's values.

Based on this research, one would expect religious fundamentalists and those who are religious for extrinsic reasons to be overrepresented among PAn voters. The evidence is not so straightforward, however. Research finds that in Austria, highly religious voters (measured as regular church attendance) are over-represented among voters for the centre-right OVP, while voters for the PAn party (the FPÖ) are not particularly religious.[250] Analysis of PAn voters in Western European countries finds that PAn voters tend to be those with authoritarian attitudes, except for people with authoritarian attitudes who are also religious – in which case they vote for Christian democrat parties.[251] In contrast, in Central and Eastern European countries, highly religious voters are more likely to vote PAn than for a centre-right party.[252]

What is it that makes high RWAs who are highly religious support far right parties in some countries, and centre-right parties in others? It seems likely that this is due to the moral and political positions of the religious institution in question. First, even in the case of religious fundamentalists, certain religious teachings or practices can constrain prejudices.[253] Thus, it has been found that high RWAs who are also religious fundamentalists may experience a 'suppression' effect that mitigates their endorsement of punishment of criminals and terrorists depending on whether the tenets of their religion is more punitive (an 'eye for an eye') or more reconciliatory and compassionate ('do unto others').[254] Similarly, Christians that actively engage in work to help disadvantaged social groups tended to be more supportive of human rights rules (compared to Christians who did not engage in such volunteering) which are not generally supported by high RWAs.[255] If the interpretation of Christian doctrine supported by churches in Western Europe is more progressive, then this may well moderate the at-

titudes of highly religious high RWAs, making centre-right Christian democrat parties more acceptable to them than far right PAn parties. This conclusion is supported by a meta-analysis of the relationship between fundamentalist and extrinsic religiosity and acceptance of racial discrimination in the US. Researchers found that overt racism among these groups has decreased in recent years because overt racism has become less socially acceptable, rather than because of humanitarian values transmitted by fundamentalist or extrinsic religiosity.[256] Second, some authors have noted that in Western Europe, the church tends to be more aligned with Christian democrat parties. Whereas in Central and Eastern Europe, the church tends to more openly support PAn parties, and this endorsement also has an impact on voters who are highly religious.[257]

Thus, the impact of religiosity on support for PAns varies depending on whether the moral and political stance of the dominant religious institution in a given country supports far right attitudes and policies. In some countries, it may well be that more progressive versions of Christianity mitigate the attitudes of high RWAs and pull them towards centre-right parties, while in other countries, more hard-line interpretations of Christianity confirm high RWAs' attitudes and allow them to embrace PAn parties. Having said this, it might be sensible not to overestimate the impact of religiosity on the rate at which high RWAs vote for PAn parties. As just discussed, highly religious voters in Austria were found to be more likely to vote for the centrist Christian democrat party rather than for a PAn party. But other research shows that high RWAs were still very likely to vote for the FPÖ.[258] Researchers examining the situation in Belgium found that even though high SDOs and high RWAs support similar policies, high SDOs tended not to support Christian democrat parties, instead supporting PAn parties. In contrast, high RWAs were attracted to Christian democrat parties rather than PAn parties.[259] This suggests that even if religiosity bites a chunk out of the high RWA group that would vote for PAns, there is still a large proportion of RWAs left over who are not highly religious and who will still vote for the PAn party. And in addition, PAns in Western Europe can still rely on high SDOs, who are not more likely than average to be religious. Furthermore, if church attendance in Europe continues to fall, religiosity's ability to suppress high RWAs and pull them to centre right parties will also fall.[260]

8.6 The role of contact between different groups

There is some inconsistency among political science scholars over the impact of immigration and the presence of ethnic minorities on voting for PAn parties.[261] Much political science scholarship favours the 'ethnic competition' or 'ethnic threat' theory. According to this position, as immigration into a country rises, so too does support for PAn parties. This has been taken as proof that voters view inflows of migrants as a threat to the economy, cultural values, or as competing for jobs and access to public services and therefore vote for PAn parties because they favour their anti-immigration stance.[262]

However, this analysis is inconsistent with other research (based on a study of over 30,000

people from 20 European countries drawn from the European Social Survey), which found that in countries with low refugee rates, the level of perceived threat posed by immigrants and support for greater restrictions on immigration were higher than in countries with higher refugee rates.[263] An attempt has been made to explain why countries with low levels of immigration may experience more support for PAn parties than countries with lower levels of migration. According to this position, it is necessary to look at the numbers of migrants entering the EU as a whole, rather than particular countries. These researchers suggest that as more migrants enter the EU, support for PAn parties will rise in all EU countries. According to these researchers, the extent of support for PAn parties will not depend merely on the numbers arriving in the country, but also on a given country's 'tipping point', which varies, explaining why some countries absorb higher numbers of migrants before it has an impact on support for PAns.[264] However, this research is largely theoretical and does not produce a solid empirical base for the notion that different countries have different tipping points.

Other political scientists have argued that a more accurate picture can be gained by looking at what happens at the local level. They point to evidence that levels of PAn voting are not evenly distributed at national level. Rather, support for PAns is more pronounced in areas close to minority communities, which is taken to support ethnic competition/threat theory (with the refinement that competition/threat manifests itself at local, rather than national, level).[265]

Other scholars contradict this. One piece of research found that although perception of ethnic threat was higher overall in countries with higher numbers of migrants, those who live in cities – which is where migrants tend to concentrate and therefore find themselves in more direct competition for jobs and resources – were actually less likely than people living elsewhere to oppose the granting of equal rights to legally resident non-EU migrants.[266] More recent analysis by political scientists of voting in the Brexit referendum of 2016 and the US presidential election of 2017, show that more rural areas, which do not have minority or immigrant communities, were more likely to vote in favour of anti-immigrant or PAn positions, while urban areas with higher numbers of minorities and migrants were more likely to vote against such positions.[267]

Some researchers have suggested that the key factor is the speed at which migrants arrive in an area rather than a question of absolute numbers. Analyses looking at the 2016 US presidential elections and the Brexit vote show that where the number of migrants in a given city has risen rapidly over a short space of time, these cities were much more likely to support Trump or vote leave in the Brexit referendum.[268]

Some scholarship has engaged in a more focused analysis looking at physical proximity of minority or immigrant communities and the majority population within cities. A study of voting for Geert Wilders' PVV party across 50 cities in the Netherlands showed that the higher the degree of ethnic segregation (i.e. spatial separation of the majority population from ethnic minorities) in a city, the larger the vote

for the PVV.[269] This does not seem to support ethnic competition/threat theory.

A study examining voting within cities during the Brexit vote looked at voting patterns in sub-city voting districts and found that the key was not proximity between minorities and the majority, but rather whether the majority community receiving migrants was suffering from relative deprivation. It found that districts with higher concentrations of people with low levels of education, higher levels of unemployment, low wages and lower quality public services were more likely to vote leave. The research found that where there were higher levels of migration from the newer EU countries into these areas, this further increased the propensity to vote leave. In contrast, in areas with affluent, well-serviced, well-educated populations, increased migration from new EU countries had no impact. The researchers suggest that on balance London voted to remain in the EU because on average the city enjoys better levels of employment, education and public services.[270] Other researchers suggest that communities suffering from relative deprivation were more likely to support Brexit if they experienced no immigration. They found that the leave vote was stronger in areas characterised by lower median earnings, low-skilled workers with lower rates of university graduates, who were predominantly white British. These authors argue that it was the absence of migrants that allowed immigration to be blamed for deep seated economic difficulties.[271]

It is apparent from the above that political science has yet to offer a coherent explanation able to reconcile these apparent contradictions about the impact of proximity between majority and minority communities. Furthermore, ethnic threat/competition theory cannot help to explain support for PAns in some Central and Eastern European countries, such as Hungary, Czechia and Poland, which have enjoyed electoral success or popularity while campaigning on anti-immigrant platforms, despite having very low levels of immigration.[272] This phenomenon has been referred to as 'platonic xenophobia'.[273]

Some political science scholarship has begun to question the accuracy of ethnic threat/competition theory and started looking to contact theory developed by social psychologists for answers that could help to reconcile seemingly contradictory analyses.[274] For example, a recent political science study found that those who perceived immigrants as a threat to jobs, culture and public safety were more likely to vote to end immigration. In contrast, those who reported having positive relationships with immigrants were less likely to vote to support an end to immigration. This suggests that contact can diffuse the anxieties people may have towards inflows of migrants.[275] However, there does not yet appear to be an in-depth exploration by political scientists of how contact theory can help to explain, and potentially reverse, rising support for PAns.[276]

As discussed above, SDO and RWA can be triggered by threat and competition which can be economic, social, security or cultural in nature. This means that ethnic threat/competition theory is not entirely incorrect. But as noted, feelings of competition and threat can be manipulated, and what is important is perception,

rather than reality. Accordingly, the actual numbers of migrants entering a country or the concentration of migrants in one geographic area is not the only relevant factor. The question of whether migrants are perceived by locals (in no small part due to their presentation by the media and by politicians) as threatening or competing is much more important.[277] And while the physical presence of migrants in a community has an impact on perception, it is clear (from Hungary, Poland and Czechia) that migrants can be perceived as a threat or competing for resources when they are entirely absent as well.

Scholarship on RWA, SDO and contact theory explains three phenomena that ostensibly contradict ethnic threat/competition theory. First, it explains how PAns in Central and Eastern Europe have been able to increase or maintain their popularity based on an anti-immigration platform in the absence of significant numbers of migrants. Second, it explains why rural areas can show more support for anti-immigration policies when they are not in direct competition at the local level for jobs and resources. Third, it explains why urban areas with populations more vulnerable to competition may show more support for PAns, but do not always do so.

According to research on contact theory, under the right conditions, when members of the outgroup and ingroup are brought into contact with each other, this will lower levels of prejudice towards the outgroup over time. Ideal conditions involve bringing the groups together on an equal footing rather than one group appearing subordinate to the other, placing them in scenarios where they cooperate to achieve a common goal, rather than compete for resources, and having pursuit of the common goal endorsed by a higher authority, such as a government body or a teacher.[278] Contact of the best 'quality' – i.e. which produces the most beneficial effects – is the development of friendships. In addition, the more frequent contact is, the greater its beneficial effects.[279] Higher frequency of contact is found to be better at reducing prejudice and associated negative attitudes such as support for discriminatory policies like ethnic profiling.[280]

Researchers have examined a number of real-life situations of contact with a positive impact on negative attitudes that were designed to meet some or all of the ideal conditions. These include: desegregated public housing projects,[281] room-sharing among university students,[282] trips by high school students to countries from which national minorities originate[283] and exchange programmes between mainstream schools for pupils with learning and physical disabilities.[284]

To have a positive impact, contact need not meet all of the ideal conditions outlined. Even contact that develops organically tends to have a positive impact on prejudices, for example, through the development of relations from different ethnic backgrounds in cities with diverse ethnic groups.[285] This is supported by the sociological and political science research, noted above, that has recently begun to argue that contact theory best explains why there is less support for PAn parties or positions in ethnically mixed urban areas, and higher support for PAn parties or positions in urban areas with large numbers of recent arrivals (where contact has not had time to bring benefits), or in segregated urban areas

or rural areas where there is little contact with ethnic minorities.

It seems that contact lowers RWA (and negative attitudes deriving from RWA) because it lowers the level of threat (e.g. threat to the economy or cultural values) that the ingroup perceives is presented by the outgroup.[286] It seems that contact can lower negative attitudes among high SDOs because it increases empathy. As discussed above, high SDOs are low on empathy, which allows them to treat outgroups negatively.[287]

Evidence suggests that the impact of contact can be far reaching. It does not only reduce prejudice against the outgroup with whom the ingroup has had contact. Studies show lower levels of prejudice towards a range of other outgroups who were not involved in contact scenarios. Thus, contact with a particular ethnic minority can reduce prejudice towards other ethnic minorities but also towards others seen as belonging to an outgroup, such as persons with disabilities, the homeless or LGBTI persons. This is referred to as the secondary transfer effect. There is also evidence that intergroup contact can lead to a more general liberalisation of political attitudes, and increased support for multiculturalism (in the case of contact with an ethnic minority).[288] This seems entirely plausible: if contact lowers RWA and SDO then it can be expected to have an impact not only on prejudice, but also other political attitudes that derive from these psychological worldviews.

The greatest reductions in prejudice towards outgroups occur among high SDOs and high RWAs.[289] That is, the more prejudiced you are, the more your prejudices are lowered by contact. Having said this, it appears that high RWAs are also more resistant to contact in the first place (there is less data on SDOs). Because of this, the involvement of a higher authority to organise and sponsor contact projects is important.[290]

Alternatively, high RWAs can be reached by other means. There is some evidence that contact can produce positive effects even if it is not direct. Thus, in separate studies, levels of prejudice in individuals who had no friends with a migrant background or no gay friends themselves, but had friends with friends with a migrant background or gay friends, were found to have lower levels of prejudice towards these groups.[291] There is conflicting evidence that even 'imagined' contact (where individuals are given scenarios involving contact to picture and work through in their minds) can reduce prejudice.[292] There is also some evidence that 'mediated' contact through television and radio drama or books may have a positive impact on prejudice.[293]

In view of the above, it seems that contact theory best explains why residential proximity can push anti-immigration attitudes and support for PAns either way. Very little research in the field of contact theory has focused specifically on discovering the conditions under which contact could produce a negative impact on prejudice.[294] However, as discussed, conditions of threat and competition – the mirror opposite of ideal contact conditions – will trigger or raise RWA and SDO, which are the main causes of prejudice. Thus it is safe to expect that where the outgroup is perceived as threatening (e.g. because of criminality or cultural differences)

or competing for resources (such as health or housing services or jobs), proximity between the ingroup and outgroup is likely to create increased hostility, prejudice and support for PAns.[295] Where communities live parallel lives without social interaction in school, the workplace or in other social settings, these would also amount to poor contact conditions. And when majority and minority communities do not have any contact, because, for example, there are no minority communities in rural areas, this allows politicians and media to manipulate the perception of outgroups as threatening and competitive, because there is no chance of this being contradicted by contact experiences (which tend to be positive). Contact theory explains why residential proximity of outgroups to the ingroup appears to have an inconsistent impact on support for PAns: it is highly dependent on the majority group's perceptions of the outgroup and on the frequency and quality of contact.

Contact theory can also help explain why the rate of arrival of migrants has an impact on support for PAns. Over 9 out of 10 cities in England that experienced a doubling of their immigrant populations between 2000 and 2014 voted to leave the EU. Similarly, Midwestern towns in the US that experienced rapid growth in Latino immigration over a short period were much more likely to vote in favour of Trump in 2016. Rapid immigration, coupled with strong anti-immigrant rhetoric in the media and from politicians that raise fears of criminality and economic competition and will trigger or raise SDO and RWA. In the longer term the benefits of contact can mitigate these anxieties, but relations between communities take time to grow and make their effects felt. In the short-term, a rapid influx of migrants coupled with fear-based political and media rhetoric is likely to trigger RWA and SDO that will produce more support for PAn parties.[296] Those who are puzzled at why PAn parties continue to benefit from anti-immigration rhetoric despite the decline in numbers of migrants into the EU should also take this into account.[297]

8.7 Socio-demographic factors offer only a partial picture, which can be completed by scholarship on right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and contact theory

As discussed in chapter 5, RWA and SDO are consistently more accurate predictors of support for PAn parties and policies than socio-demographic factors. In addition, socio-demographic factors do not consistently predict support for PAns. There is variation between countries. But this does not mean that socio-demographics are irrelevant. They are an important part of understanding the growth in support for authoritarian political attitudes, but they tell a much more informative story if they are explained in conjunction with SDO and RWA. Perceived threat and competition will trigger high RWAs and SDOs across society. However, certain parts of society are likely to feel threats and competition more keenly.

Economic shock triggers high RWAs and moves low RWAs further up the scale. RWAs who are in a precarious position on the job market are most likely to be triggered by the threat posed by economic shock. Perceived threat to culture connected to migration and the growth

of support for progressive values will also trigger high RWAs. High RWAs are more likely to be those with lower levels of education and those socialised into more authoritarian values. Such people will be found in different age groups in different countries. In Western Europe it is the older generation that appears to have more authoritarian values, while in some Central and Eastern European countries these values are more dominant among the younger generation. And this is because different generations grow up under different prevailing values in different countries. White people are more likely to perceive ethnic minorities to be threatening cultural values because those minorities are likely to be seen as inherently challenging the dominant national cultural norms. Those who are highly religious are more likely to be high RWA, but in Western Europe (where the Christian institutions might be more progressive and are linked to the centre-right) their votes will be drawn to the traditional centre-right, while in Central and Eastern Europe (where Christian institutions tend to be more restrictive and are linked PAn parties), their votes will be more drawn to PAn parties. Progress towards equality for certain groups such as women, LGBT and ethnic minorities and perceived competition for resources from migrants will trigger SDOs. Again, those closer to the bottom of the socio-economic ladder will feel this competition more keenly in relation to migration. And men are overrepresented among high SDOs partly because they perceive competition from growing female equality and perhaps partly for evolutionary reasons. Men are also likely to be overrepresented in parts of the economy that perceive themselves to be most vulnerable to competition from low-skilled migrants. And white people are more sensitive to perceiving ethnic minorities as competing in socio-economic terms, since white people have traditionally been higher up the hierarchy. Finally, contact between outgroups and the majority population tends to reduce RWA and SDO over time because it reduces the perception of threat and competition. This in turn means that areas which experience rapid migrant inflows, where there is segregation, or where there are no minority groups present can be induced to have heightened perceptions of threat and competition, which has not been diffused by the benefits of contact.

Chapter 9: Another brief aside: populist authoritarians are hacking hard-wired instincts, because right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are probably a product of evolution

Those scoring highly on measures of right-wing authoritarianism (high RWAs) or social dominance orientation (high SDOs) clearly hold political attitudes that are damaging for pluralist democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. But these psychological worldviews are likely to have beneficial origins, from an evolutionary perspective.[298]

Evolutionary psychologists and biologists have suggested that the RWA psychological worldview has probably developed among humans as a survival mechanism. This helps to explain why RWA is triggered and/or heightened by situations of threat. When one's ingroup is perceived to be under threat from an outside group, individuals wish to protect their ingroup from outsiders. As a consequence, high RWAs are more likely to be prejudiced towards groups that they perceive as threatening. Some researchers have argued that greater support for restrictive anti-terrorism measures among those higher in RWA suggests that RWA is rooted in ensuring ingroup survival.[299] But then why do high RWAs favour adherence to traditional social and legal norms that do not seem related to physical safety? Researchers argue that group survival depends on maintaining cohesion between its members. Dissolution of the group would make its members more vulnerable. Some researchers argue that over the course of evolution, the groups that have fared best are those held together by commonly shared moral rules, especially those rooted in religion.[300] Group cohesion depends on general compliance with shared rules because it prevents individuals from 'free riding' and breaking the rules to their own advantage, which ultimately could cause group members to stop cooperating with each other and make the group vulnerable to breaking down, or at least make it more vulnerable in confrontations with more cohesive groups. Cohesion is vital to the survival of the group, and cohesion is strongest when the group abides by shared rules. When the group is threatened, some of its members – high RWAs, who are most sensitive to threat – incline towards authoritarianism to ensure the continued survival of the group. As noted, RWAs are ethnocentric in a defensive way, expressing more pro-ingroup than anti-outgroup attitudes. This has been termed "intragroup ethnocentrism" and is motivated by a desire to preserve ingroup cohesion.[301] For this reason, high RWAs support strict adherence to the community's entrenched rules. Strict punishment for breaking those rules and enforcement by a strong leader makes it more likely that these rules are obeyed. These factors improve the chances of the group sticking together and surviving external threats.[302]

RWA might not only be the product of adaptive evolutionary behaviour to secure group survival. It also seems to serve a personal need. As

noted, lower cognitive ability is more common among high RWAs, meaning that for a proportion of high RWAs it is more difficult for them to explain or understand the world around them. Probably because of this, high RWAs tend to be more dogmatic, closed-minded and be attracted to simplistic solutions. It is well established that threats can lead individuals to feel a loss of control over themselves and their surroundings.[303] Resorting to high RWA helps to reintroduce a sense of order – referred to as a 'compensatory control mechanism'.[304] Similarly, it seems individuals may become high RWA as a way of coping with stressful life events and depression.[305]

> ***Why are populist authoritarians so disgusted?***
>
> Psychologists have identified a connection between our sensitivity to disgust and our political attitudes. Ask people about how a thief should be punished while standing near a pile of rotting rubbish. Ask the same question of people away from a source of repellent odours. The first group is likely to support harsher punishments than the second group. Merely making someone feel disgust subconsciously can make them express harsher attitudes. There is a lot of evidence suggesting that humans have evolved to avoid contact with possible sources of pathogens and disease. And while we take our queue often from sight, smell and texture, researchers have found that some of us are also prone to feelings of disgust towards outgroups we are unfamiliar with. Why? Probably because from an evolutionary perspective, members of the ingroup were immune to the diseases we shared among ourselves. But outsiders were likely to be carrying pathogens for which we had no immunity.[306]
>
> More recent research has established a moderate to strong correlation between being sensitive to disgust (i.e. having strong negative feelings that are triggered more easily by potentially repelling phenomena) and being high RWA. That means that a good chunk of high RWAs can be moved to strong feelings of disgust towards outgroups when these are portrayed as somehow dangerous to health. This can help to explain why populist authoritarians (PAns) often compare outgroups to certain animals, insects, poisons or portray them as otherwise 'impure'.[307] PAns are not just trying to dehumanise their target group, they are also trying to trigger a strong negative emotional reaction among their core supporters. One way to think of disgust could be as a particular kind of 'threat' that will trigger high RWAs.

While high RWA may be the result of adaptive behaviour to ensure group survival, researchers suggest that SDO may be the result of adaptive behaviour to ensure superiority of one's subgroup within society. As noted, high SDOs are ethnocentric in a chauvinistic way, in that they feel ethnically superior to outgroups. This has been termed 'intergroup ethnocentrism'.[308]

Some researchers suggest that from an evolutionary perspective, the prevalence of high SDOs in modern societies may be the result of successive generations of individuals who successfully climbed the group ladder by breaking

the rules while getting away with it. In contrast to high RWAs who engage in pro-social behaviour such as coalition building and social networking, high SDOs tend towards deception and manipulation in order to improve the position of their subgroup and win at any cost.[309]

Other researchers suggest an alternative explanation for SDO. As noted, high SDOs exist across different socio-economic groups. Put otherwise, high SDOs exist not only in high status but also low status groups. However, high SDOs kick down the ladder. That is, high SDOs in low status groups do not try to pull down those above them and increase the status of their group. Being a high SDO, rather, means having a stronger endorsement of existing social hierarchies, whether they are objectively in one's favour or not. Academics have suggested that SDO does not only serve the need of high-status groups to legitimise their own position and keep those below them down. It also allows low status groups to cooperate with rather than struggle against those above them in the social hierarchy. High SDOs are simply endorsing the status quo. SDO may even function as a means of attenuating the sense of pain and injustice that could otherwise arise in lower status groups, because high SDOs see social hierarchies as legitimate and just.[310] It could also be speculated that group cohesion is also strengthened by maintaining existing social hierarchies.

If RWA and SDO are likely the product of behaviour that humans adapted over the course of evolution to form strong cohesive groups (RWA) and either climb or maintain stable social hierarchies (SDO), this means that they are hard-wired in humans. PAns are, in effect, hacking peoples' brains to their advantage by using threat and competition to trigger these psychological worldviews.

Are people born high RWA and high SDO?

No. As will have become apparent, whether individuals adopt RWA or SDO as psychological worldviews, depends on a variety of factors. As discussed in chapter 4.1, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that high RWAs and high SDOs place greater importance on certain clusters of values relating to conservation or self-enhancement. In chapter 4.2 we also saw that high RWAs and high SDOs hold certain personality traits more strongly, namely, low openness and tough-mindedness. Researchers seem to agree that our personalities, values and worldviews are principally rooted in socialisation. Socialisation refers to the ideas and norms that we are exposed to and that form us, deriving from our parents, our education, the media, friends, colleagues, and even government policies. We are socialised continually during our lives. Psychologists place emphasis on adolescence as the time when our personalities and values become less fluid and more fixed.[311] But there is plenty of evidence that these, and our political attitudes, can change over the course of our lives depending on the influences we are exposed to.[312] Researchers in the field of values and cognitive linguistics discussed in chapters 4.1 and 4.3 are indeed adamant that most people are 'biconceptuals', or part of the moveable middle: more conservative in some aspects of their lives and more liberal

in others. According to the work of these scholars, it is possible to reinforce or weaken biconceptuals' endorsement of values associated with authoritarianism and progressivism in adulthood by using frames and metaphors that activate those values in the brain.

Chapter 10: Fundamental rights as a vaccine against populist authoritarianism

Key points

- Populist authoritarians are triggering and uniting voters who score highly on measures of right-wing authoritarianism (high RWAs) and social dominance orientation (high SDOs). They are doing so either by manufacturing the perception of threat and competition or by exploiting genuine sources of threat and competition and associating these with certain outgroups.

- Human rights law was created in part to construct an environment in which authoritarian leaders could not take root.

- Governments can minimise the ability of populist authoritarians to create or exaggerate the perception of threat and competition. They can do this by implementing human rights standards that require independent and plural media, high quality responsible journalism as well as creating a financially sustainable media market. Political figures are also required to avoid hate speech and promote tolerance. Further, human rights law requires governments to promote inclusion of ethnic and social groups, including through desegregation of housing and education. Facilitating contact between the majority population and outgroups is proven to reduce the prevalence of support for populist authoritarians.

- Governments can minimise the risk that the population will adopt RWA or SDO as psychological worldviews and endorse authoritarian political attitudes through the education system. Human rights standards require governments to transmit progressive values as well as critical thinking skills and knowledge of human rights through the education system. These are shown to reduce support for populist authoritarians.

- Governments should also take measures to deal with genuine, objectively factual sources of threat and competition, such as economic inequality, vulnerability of populations to economic shock and terrorism. Human rights-based counter-terrorism measures are shown to be more effective in addressing security threats than common rights-violating measures like mass surveillance and ethnic profiling. Social and economic rights require governments to provide effective social safety nets against economic shock, adequately funded public services, and to ensure that workers receive a sufficiently adequate level of remuneration to afford them a decent standard of living.

- Civil society organisations and progressive media should draw on available research in the field of psychology and neuroscience to communicate more effectively with the public and reinforce their endorsement of progressive values.

Populist authoritarian (PAn) parties are becoming increasingly adept at triggering anti-democratic, anti-rule of law, anti-human rights attitudes among the population. Out of all the factors influencing how people vote, their political attitudes are the most powerful. PAn parties offer authoritarian policies that attract voters with authoritarian political attitudes. High RWAs (those scoring highly on measures of right-wing authoritarianism) and high SDOs (those scoring highly on measures of social dominance orientation) hold authoritarian political attitudes and are voting for PAn candidates or positions in sufficient strength to win elections and referenda. The following section will explore how progressive governments and civil society organisations could begin to make significant inroads to counter the rise of populist authoritarianism (PAm) by simply implementing existing human rights obligations. These recommendations are aimed primarily at governments in countries where PAns have not yet taken power, since most of them can only be implemented by national authorities. However, some recommendations could be taken up by civil society organisations or by governments that wish to counter populist authoritarianism in other countries. For example, governments can make funding available for independent journalism or human rights education or desegregation projects through activities that can be implemented by civil society organisations in countries living under PAn governments.

Non-human rights specialists often hold the mistaken belief that human rights are solely designed to protect minority groups from abuse by the state. This is an incomplete understanding of the concept. The creation of human rights law was heavily influenced by the Second World War. Human rights standards were created in part to prohibit atrocities such as genocide, torture, murder, medical experimentation and slavery inflicted on certain minority groups and occupied populations during the war. But the architects of human rights standards were

also aiming to elaborate standards that would prevent governments from creating an environment in which it would be possible to revert to authoritarianism in the first place.[313] This book has focused on analysing the origins of authoritarian political attitudes, because these best predict support for PAn parties and causes. As such, the measures set out below concentrate on steps to prevent populist authoritarians from capturing public opinion and, consequently, electoral support.

10.1 Why are human rights able to counter populist authoritarianism?

Human rights standards were calibrated to take away from the state the tools it would need to manipulate the general population into supporting authoritarian policies. These tools include the use of propaganda, preventing informed public debate through a free media, the use of hate speech against minorities and opponents and suppressing political participation by harassing opponents, limiting public protest and the ability to organise public participation through non-governmental organisations. To this end, human rights standards protect civil and political rights including freedom of expression and information (while prohibiting hate speech), the right to vote, the right to form associations, freedom of assembly and freedom from arbitrary detention, and require independent courts to uphold these rights. These rights are largely aimed at ensuring pluralist public debate and creating institutions that would prevent governments from excluding the voices of critics who can mobilise opposition to authoritarians.

Human rights standards were also created to prevent economic shocks from having an impact on populations that could be exploited by authoritarian leaders. In particular, economic and social rights were created to protect the public from the harsh impact of poverty and inequality. This group of rights was designed to provide an environment that would allow individuals to realise their full potential by granting access to education, health care, housing as well as other forms of social security and protection for workers against exploitation. The guarantees of access to public services and socio-economic safety nets were designed to create a minimum level of security against economic hardship. [314] Education was also seen as a tool that could help prevent individuals from developing authoritarian attitudes and build resilience to hate speech and misinformation being used by governments trying to exploit the fears and insecurities of their populations as a means of generating public support for the suppression of minorities.[315]

This is not to say that human rights standards offer a complete and comprehensive antidote to populist authoritarianism. Rather, that this is an ideal place to start. Not only because human rights were designed to create an environment in which authoritarianism cannot take root, but also because of the already existing guidance for policy makers that has been developed by experts and governments over the last 60 years.

10.2 Media independence and pluralism

As discussed, RWA and SDO are triggered by threat and competition. It is public perception, rather than the objective reality of threat and

competition that is key to triggering RWA and SDO. This is not to say that objective reality cannot give rise to a sense of threat and competition. Rather, that a perception of threat and competition can be induced even if these do not correspond to objective reality. This is well illustrated by the fact that governments in countries experiencing relatively low migration have successfully mobilised support among voters by running fear-based anti-immigration campaigns.

The media (traditional and social) is probably the key influencer of public perception. There is ample evidence that sections of the media, in particular the tabloid press, routinely sensationalise and give disproportionate attention to stories that emphasise threat and competition from outgroups. In some cases, this is because media owners share a political agenda with PAn politicians for ideological reasons. More frequently, it seems that media outlets engage in sensationalist, polarising and inflammatory reporting because this attracts more readers and viewers (and hence advertisers) and generates more revenue. The incentive to engage in this kind of reporting to attract revenue has become greater because of the shift from traditional print to digital media. This has made traditional journalism less economically viable, as income has shifted away from subscriptions and advertising that support traditional outlets and towards news aggregators and intermediaries that provide access to news on the internet, such as Google and Facebook. A further consequence of falling revenue and digitisation is that outlets are able to hire fewer journalists, and the ones they do hire are under increased pressure to produce a high volume of content in a short space of time, which leaves insufficient time for fact-checking and in-depth analysis. Even those media outlets that do not actively engage in 'media populism' or sensationalist reporting, but rather attempt a more balanced approach, are likely to contribute to exaggerated perceptions of threat and competition among the public. They do so simply by reporting on the actions and words of populist figures, and often giving them disproportionate coverage in order to attract readers and viewers – again in an effort to enhance revenue.[316] As noted, a likely further problem regarding the media relates to the impact of disinformation. Even if the public does not believe the content of such stories, the very dissemination of conflicting genuine news and disinformation is likely to be perceived as threatening and trigger high RWAs because it creates confusion and uncertainty.

While the texts of human rights treaties do not give detailed explanations of what the rights to freedom of expression and information require of governments when it comes to the media, international organisations like the Council of Europe, have developed elaborate standards. If governments implemented these it would create a media environment less conducive to creating the perception of threat and competition among the public. Research also shows that the media plays a role in socialisation – that is, shaping the values endorsed by the public in a way that makes people more or less disposed to adopting authoritarian attitudes. In the longer term, a media that promotes (thus socialising the public into) progressive values such as tolerance and pluralism could also make a significant contribution to lessening public endorsement of authoritarian political attitudes.[317]

Governments have been encouraged by the Council of Europe to take a number of measures. First, ensuring that public service media (PSM) is independent from government and well-funded.[318] The cases of Hungary, Poland and Romania illustrate how public service media controlled by a PAn government can become a propaganda mouthpiece used to trigger threat and competition among the population.[319] A sufficiently independent and well-funded PSM should also be viewed as a preventive measure that would make it more difficult for PAns to come to power in the first place. There is evidence that well-funded PSM are more likely to enjoy higher public trust – which would allow them to act as an important source of pluralist, impartial, independent and balanced news for the public.[320] This in turn has two indirect benefits: private media companies are obliged to provide better quality services in order to compete for audiences; and the public has a trusted source to go to when faced with suspected disinformation from other sources. Research shows that far right attitudes among the public are weaker in countries with stronger PSM.[321]

A second requirement imposed by human rights law is that governments should ensure pluralism of media ownership and media independence. Regulating the media market so as to prevent a small number of owners having an excessively large share of the media would help to minimise the distortion of public debate that can result from media owners pursuing particular ideological agendas. This should be complemented by guarantees to ensure that neither the government nor owners of media companies can interfere in the editorial independence of news outlets. Requiring media ownership to be transparent can also help to ensure that the public is aware of the possible influence exerted by owners. Furthermore, governments and associations of journalists should ensure that journalists receive training on media ethics and standards designed to guarantee impartial and high-quality journalism and promote a culture of tolerance.[322]

While not expressly recommended by the Council of Europe, the creation of a new economic model to support high-quality, informed and impartial reporting would also help to give effect to the right to freedom of expression and information. This could include public subsidies for journalism, the development of non-profit models for media outlets or taxation imposed on news aggregators like Facebook and Google to fund public-interest journalism.[323] Making good quality journalism financially viable would help to remove the incentive for news outlets to resort to sensationalist reporting as a means of attracting audiences and advertisers to generate revenue and mean the provision of greater resources for journalists to carry out balanced, well-informed analysis.

10.3 Inclusion

As discussed in chapter 8, contact between the ingroup and outgroups reduces stereotyping, prejudice, the perception of threat and competition and thereby reduces RWA and SDO and the consequent negative attitudes towards outgroups.[324]

Human rights law offers a legal and policy framework through which governments can give effect to contact and reap its benefits. Human rights law imposes positive obligations on governments to promote equality and combat discrimination, and this includes creating conditions in which the ingroup and outgroups live, work and go to school together. As noted in chapter 8.6, research demonstrating the positive benefits of contact between groups has examined real-life situations such as mixed workplaces, housing desegregation projects, accommodation sharing at university and class exchanges between schools in the same and in different countries. Council of Europe and OSCE guidelines encourage governments to, among other things: provide equality of access to employment and create diverse and inclusive work places; create a housing and education policy that prevents the emergence of de facto residential or school segregation (including self-imposed segregation); support cross-community dialogue and interaction such as exchanges between schools; and reflect ethnic and cultural diversity in mainstream media programming.[325] If governments were to implement their human rights obligations on the social inclusion of marginalised groups this would go a long way to ensure that contact occurs and that it occurs under favourable conditions. And this is proven to have an important impact on support for PAn parties in elections or PAn causes in referenda.

10.4 Education

As discussed in chapter 8.2, the education system has an important impact on political attitudes because of the values that the education system transmits and reinforces through socialisation. There is strong evidence that the educational environment and the subjects studied can be used to influence pupils to either become more progressive or more authoritarian in their values. Although the strongest effects of this are manifested at university level, the effects are also clear at school. PAns recognise this and typically reform the teaching curricula once in power to create support for their ideologies. Hungary and Poland are examples of EU countries where this has happened.[326]

International human rights law requires governments to use the education system to develop the personality and mental abilities of a child to their fullest potential, develop respect for human rights, the environment, tolerance and equality.[327] Council of Europe guidelines also encourage governments to carry out human rights education.[328] In other words, human rights standards require governments to socialise their populations into progressive values. The right to education was originally created to prevent a repeat of the Nazi policy of subverting the education system to create support for the regime's ideology.[329]

Education can help to combat PAm for at least five reasons. First, because the education system transmits values through the content of subjects studied and through the environment promoted by a given institution or educational sector. Socialising individuals into values like tolerance and openness makes them less likely to embrace RWA or SDO and the political attitudes that come with them. Second, because RWA and SDO also appear to be linked to

cognitive capacity and cognitive rigidity. Developing cognitive capacity and flexibility will have a positive impact on individuals' ability to cope with uncertainty (and thereby how easily one perceives potentially unsettling information as threatening) and the need to rely on stereotypes, which will in turn reduce the likelihood that an individual will adopt an RWA or SDO worldview. Third, low empathy is also shown to lead to strong adherence to SDO. A sizeable body of research exists collecting good practices that successfully use the education system to transmit progressive values, develop cognitive capacity and promote empathy.[330] Fourth, there is also some evidence that including human rights education into the teaching syllabus increases support for human rights and decreases prejudice.[331] Fifth, because, as noted above under 10.2, inclusive education policies promote contact between different ethnic and social groups, which in turn can diminish prejudice and increase tolerance. Those looking for models of human rights education might take inspiration from UNICEF's 'rights respecting schools' project, which helps schools build an educational environment and culture around human rights.[332]

10.5 Public policy and the political class

Governments can also have an impact on the political attitudes of the population through socialisation via political discourse as well as the laws and policies adopted. For example, research shows that the generations in the UK that grew up under Thatcherism have become more authoritarian in their values, in line with the policies that were pursued by Thatcher's conservative government (which remained largely unchallenged by the later Blair government). Researchers argue that the sustained imposition of stricter law and order policies and weakening of the welfare state reversed the trend that existed in prior cohorts towards supporting greater redistribution of wealth and social liberalism.[333] Even so, younger cohorts are still more liberal in the UK than older cohorts.[334]

> ***Mainstream parties should be wary of the long-term consequences of using fear and competition for short-term political gain.***
>
> The above suggests that mainstream political parties that employ threat and competition to win over voters should be wary: they may be socialising a generation into endorsing political attitudes that that will lead voters to support PAns in the long-run. It has been convincingly argued that the long history of anti-EU rhetoric and anti-migration policies advanced by the centre right and centre left in the UK paved the way for a majority of voters to develop political attitudes that led them to vote to leave the EU years later.[335]

Thus, governments can stimulate support for values that will lead either to more authoritarian or more liberal political attitudes. International bodies supervising compliance with human rights standards routinely call on governments avoid hate speech, to enact and implement civil and criminal safeguards against hate speech, to encourage tolerance through public education campaigns, to refrain from inflammatory polit-

ical rhetoric and to condemn the latter when it does occur.[336]

High SDOs are inherently anti-egalitarian. That is, they are consistently opposed to norms that challenge the socio-economic hierarchy. However, high RWAs are not inherently authoritarian: there is an opportunity to liberalise high RWAs that is not available for high SDOs.

As discussed, high RWAs are concerned about conformity with traditional rules. Research shows that high RWAs do not necessarily support rules because of their authoritarian content. Rather, they support rules because they are rules. If one considers that the evolutionary origin of RWA is probably the goal of collective safety and group cohesion, there is no reason why RWA would have to be inherently authoritarian in the substance of the rules it attaches to. For the most part, the rules predominantly supported by high RWAss happen to be more authoritarian because of the direction of travel in the evolution of cultural values. Dominant cultural values have been shifting in recent decades from more restrictive to more progressive. High RWAs support recently dominant rules, and it just so happens that those rules are not progressive. Put otherwise there is a degree of relativity in the RWA mindset.[337]

Research suggests that high RWAs will show support for progressive norms – and support the punishment of those that violate those norms, on two conditions. First, those norms must be sufficiently well entrenched in national culture. This is something that will vary from country to country. For example, research in Germany found that high RWAs are more likely to endorse punishment of those violating laws that protect the environment, because such norms are well-entrenched in Germany.[338] This contrasts to high RWAs in the USA who rather favour polluting companies over environmental protection. This understanding of how RWA works also means that there is no deep inconsistency in the assertion that high RWAs are attracted to PAn parties in Western or Central and Eastern Europe, even though they differ on issues like LGBTI rights. PAns in the Netherlands are supportive of LGBTI rights because they are well-entrenched, while PAns in Central and Eastern Europe are not supportive, because recognition of equality for LGBTI is relatively new in those societies.[339] The second condition that seems to be needed for high RWAs to support progressive norms concerns the identity of the group benefiting from those norms. High RWAs are more likely to support punishment of norm violators where the victims of the violation belong to a group that is not considered threatening. For example, studies showed that high RWAs in Poland were equally prejudiced against a number of ethnic minorities. But high RWAs supported the punishment of people violating the prohibition on hate speech towards minorities considered non-threatening (Africans and Ukrainians) more than towards minorities considered threatening (LGBTQ and Muslims). It should be noted that this same research has also found that high SDOs will not support punishment of those that violate progressive rules, at least not when these progressive rules are designed to undermine traditional social hierarchies by protecting marginalised groups from hate speech.[340]

When it comes to getting progressive norms entrenched rapidly, there is some evidence to suggest that decision-makers may have to choose their tools carefully. Some research exploring whether high RWAs accept ethnic diversity suggests that merely showing high RWAs that society is made up of various ethnicities can actually be perceived as threatening by RWAs and cause them to express stronger attitudes against ethnic diversity.[341] This suggests that public education campaigns trying to promote tolerance and diminish prejudice towards outgroups should go beyond merely raising awareness of diversity. Rather, public education campaigns designed to entrench progressive norms should concentrate on underlining that diversity is the norm as well as borrowing techniques from contact theory to undermine stereotypes.

Conversely, allowing PAns to use mainstream platforms to spread ideas that challenge progressive rules, especially if this is not followed by universal condemnation from other political figures – will help to undo work to entrench progressive norms. Some evidence suggests, for example, that the spike in hate crime in the US following Trump's election and in the UK following the Brexit vote have been caused by political leaders expressly or impliedly legitimating xenophobic attitudes.[342]

10.6 Effective measures to deal with genuine threat and competition

As discussed, it is the perception of threat or competition rather than the objective reality that is key to triggering high RWAs and high SDOs. And perceptions of threat can be induced by the media and political leaders. However, perceptions of threat and competition can also be based on objective reality. In some situations, the media and politicians have fabricated or highly exaggerated a sense of threat and competition, as is illustrated by the use of immigration by PAn figures in countries like Czechia, Hungary and Poland. But in other situations, PAn figures have built on objective situations such as economic shock, growing socio-economic inequality or rapid arrivals of migrants, and created the perception that migrants or other outgroups are to blame. This is referred to in social psychology as increasing the salience of a particular group so as to portray them as threatening or competitive.

Because of this, it is not enough to take measures designed to prevent the media and politicians from inducing an unfounded sense of threat and competition, or to transmit values through the education system or government policies and narratives that will decrease the proportion of high RWA and high SDOs among the public. It is also important to address the objective realities that are exploited by PAns. This section will briefly address measures grounded in existing human rights obligations that would mitigate or reduce the perception of threat posed by migration, terrorism and economic shock.

Migration

Chapter 8.6 has already addressed the question of inclusion of ethnic minorities through the lens of contact theory. To summarise, human rights obligations require governments to take steps to promote equality, avoid de facto

segregation and prohibit discrimination and hate speech. As discussed, given time, contact between different ethnic groups will generally produce a reduction in prejudice and discrimination. In the context of voting, this seems to translate into lower support for PAns in geographical areas that are more mixed. It was also found that a rapid increase in a short timeframe in the presence of an ethnic minority can be used by PAns to induce a sense of threat to cultural values and competition for resources that is not offset by the benefits of contact, because contact has not yet had sufficient time to produce positive outcomes. This also suggests that public authorities could, for example through housing policies, try to avoid highly concentrated rapid inflows of migrants in areas that have not hitherto experienced ethnic mixing. It may prove wise for authorities both to promote a more even distribution of new arrivals, as well as sponsoring projects that foster positive contact experiences to reap the benefits of contact more quickly. Furthermore, authorities should be prepared to direct greater resources for public services to areas with new arrivals to avoid the perception of competition for resources. Directing public resources in this way seems unlikely to threaten public finances, given the evidence that migrants tend to make economic contributions that outstrip their consumption of public resources.[343]

Economic shock

Economic shocks and growing social and economic inequalities have created conditions under which PAm has been able to thrive. International human rights law does not impose a particular economic model on governments. However, it does impose certain obligations on governments that would partially address the social and economic inequalities that have helped to create conditions that have facilitated the rise of PAm. Social and economic rights require governments to provide public services such as health care and education, as well as social safety nets such as housing and social security to protect the individuals in times of illness, incapacity and poverty. Governments are also required to ensure that work provides fair remuneration that is sufficient to allow for a decent standard of living.[344] Implementing these obligations would have allowed governments to shield the most vulnerable elements of the population from the consequences of the global recession that began at the end of the 2000s, and also prevented growing economic inequalities, but instead governments were more inclined simply to cut public spending, without even examining the potential impact on economic and social rights.[345] As discussed, economic downturns and worsening economic conditions are perceived as threatening and will trigger high RWAs, particularly those in vulnerable economic positions, lower levels of education and those socialised into more traditional, authoritarian values. The accompanying effects of economic downturns, such as unemployment and cuts in public spending that effect services and social safety nets are also likely to play a role in triggering high SDOs because the latter become sensitive to migrants and other outgroups perceived as competing for public resources, jobs and socio-economic status. In support of this, research confirms that where a country has strong social protection in place, this depresses support for PAn parties.[346]

Terrorism

The studies discussed above show that threats to physical safety will trigger high RWAs. Recent research also suggests that inducing the perception of physical safety and security among high RWAs causes them to become less socially conservative and resistant to change.[347] Thus, policies that are effective at increasing public safety can be expected to minimise objective threats that can trigger high RWAs or shift low RWAs higher up the scale. A recent study carried out by Liberties entitled 'Security through human rights' explores the effectiveness of mass surveillance and ethnic profiling, which are two commonly used counter-terrorism measures.[348] The paper explains that both of these measures are ineffective as a means of preventing terrorist attacks and that ethnic profiling in particular is likely to be counter-productive and contribute towards the root causes of violent extremism. The paper furthermore finds that effective measures to counter terrorism include the use of community-based policing and targeted surveillance which can be carried out in a way that is compliant with human rights safeguards. Liberties also points to research that explains the underlying factors that create an environment conducive to the rise of violent extremism, such as resentment over discrimination and hate crime, social exclusion, and a lack of access to education, the job market and segregated housing. Governments could address these underlying factors by implementing their human rights obligations to promote equality and combat discrimination. In this way, implementation of human rights obligations would help to increase public security by providing effective policies to prevent and combat terrorism, thus addressing a threat that has been shown to trigger high RWAs.

10.7 Building support for human rights through effective communications

As discussed, individuals are socialised into support for certain values in a number of ways, including through the media, the formal education system and the laws and policies promoted by governments. Socialisation can also occur through other informal channels, such as public education and mobilisation activities by the human rights community, including national human rights institutions and non-governmental organisations. Research in the field of social psychology, moral psychology, neurolinguistics and cognitive psychology offers an insight into how progressives can increase support for pluralist democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights through the way that they communicate with the public.

As outlined in chapter 4.1, there are, broadly, four clusters of values: conservation (sub-values of security, tradition, conformity); openness to change (sub-values of stimulation and self-direction); self-transcendence (sub-values of universalism and benevolence; and self-enhancement (sub-values of achievement, power and hedonism). High RWAs tend to place greater importance on values falling under conservation rather than on values corresponding to openness. High SDOs tend to place greater importance on values falling under self-enhancement but not self-transcendence. Research shows that it is possible to alter political attitudes by communicating using messages and frames that

reinforce the different clusters of values that underpin political attitudes.[349] It is beyond the scope of this book to provide a guide on how framing works, and readers can refer to a small collection of instructive publications.[350] The purpose here is simply to highlight to the uninitiated that such a tool exists and offer a brief taste of how it functions.

Storytelling as a technique for conveying complicated ideas and reinforcing progressive values

Research suggests that for most of human evolution (before we settled into agricultural societies) we lived in small nomadic groups of around 150 people. Because of this, the brain has evolved to be apt at understanding the typical small scale, tangible political problems that arise in a small community. In contrast, humans are far less apt at understanding and explaining the larger abstract political problems that occur at national or international level. This may go some way towards explaining the effectiveness of 'storytelling' as a technique used by successful communicators, including politicians, because it uses personal, concrete, everyday scenarios to improve understanding of more complicated or nebulous information.[351] Research from the field of neuroscience also confirms that storytelling helps to involve the audience as a participant rather than an observer to an abstract problem and that if this is done in the correct way it can in turn elicit empathy, which provokes virtuous behaviour, such as donating to charitable causes.[352]

It is not entirely clear whether it is only possible to stimulate support for progressive political attitudes among existing progressives and so-called biconceptuals – which approximates to the 'moveable middle'. Biconceptuals or the 'moveable middle' refers to the majority of individuals in society who hold a mixture of liberal and conservative views and can be persuaded in either direction.

Researchers working on moral foundations theory argue that it is also possible to motivate those who are more firmly conservative in their political attitudes, by presenting progressive issues in a way that appeals to the moral foundations that they hold important. As outlined in chapter 4.4, according to moral foundations theory, political attitudes are connected to certain moral concerns that have become hardwired in humans over the course of evolution. Those with progressive views tend to place more emphasis on the moral foundations of care and liberty (preventing harm to others and preventing oppression). Those with conservative views tend to place importance on the full range of moral foundations, which include a further four categories: purity, loyalty, fairness, and authority. While it is possible to appeal to progressives by structuring communications that tap the moral foundations of care and liberty, such messaging is less effective to appeal to conservatives. Researchers in this field suggest that it is possible to persuade conservatives to support progressive causes by advancing arguments that are based on the full range of moral foundations.[353] Readers may be interested in recent research applying moral foundations theory to explain political attitudes towards migrants in Italy, as well as suggestions on how to appeal

to conservatives to support more progressive migration policies.[354]

However, researchers working on values and framing maintain that such an approach could backfire, because the more one activates particular value clusters, the more entrenched they become. According to this research, activating the values underpinning conservative political beliefs will, in the long run, cement conservative opinions even if it leads to short term support for a specific goal. Under this view, for instance, attempting to create support for human rights by framing the failure to respect human rights as a risk to security, could prove counter-productive. This is because the value of security falls under the value cluster of conservation, and activating it will stimulate support for neighbouring values that lead to lower endorsement of human rights if reinforced. Instead, to create genuine long-term support for human rights, one would have to trigger values such as universalism and benevolence, which fall under the opposite cluster of values under 'openness to change'. According to this view, progressives are at best wasting their time and at worst working against themselves by trying to persuade committed conservatives. Rather, progressives should concentrate their efforts on the moveable middle group and trigger only values falling under 'openness to change' and 'self-transcendence' value clusters.[355]

Chapter 11: Concluding remarks

Research on right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) has a lot to offer scholars engaged in the mainstream debate about authoritarian political attitudes. Not only does this research help to offer a coherent and consistent explanation for the role of socio-demographic factors that vary between countries, social psychology also allows us to understand how authoritarian attitudes are formed and triggered, which in turn allows us to understand how to reverse the increase in their popularity. Populist authoritarian (PAn) parties and politicians are becoming extremely adept at triggering the endorsement of authoritarian political attitudes by using competition and threat-based narratives that activate those who strongly endorse RWA (high RWAs) and SDO (high SDOs) and push low RWAs and low SDOs further up the scale. PAns have a head start against progressives because progressives are taking so long to scramble around for a coherent answer about where support for PAn parties comes from. PAns also have a kind of home advantage because they are able to exploit hard-wired instincts that cause humans to respond to crises by becoming more authoritarian in their attitudes.

Merely trying to reduce immigration, increase security and improve economic stability is unlikely to be sufficient. First, because it is the perception of threat and competition that triggers authoritarians rather than the objective reality. Perception of threat and competition can be manufactured, for example over migration, even in countries where there is very little immigration, such as in Hungary, Poland and Czechia. Second, because the measures commonly taken to increase security such as mass surveillance and ethnic profiling are ineffective and counter-productive and will increase public anxiety further in the long-term. Third, because even if these economic, migration and security questions are eventually 'resolved', in the meantime those populist authoritarians in power are cementing their control over state institutions and public opinion. This makes authoritarianism difficult to reverse in countries where PAns have taken power. First, because once in power, PAns control the principal means through which individuals are socialised into support for authoritarian political attitudes such as the media, education system and government policies and narratives. Second, because PAns are entrenching their retrogressive measures in laws and constitutions that are difficult to change unless large majorities of the population can be persuaded to support progressive values. And creating sufficient public support for progressive values will prove difficult when PAns control the principal means of socialisation. Because of this it is also necessary for progressives to take steps to reform the media landscape, the education system, political culture, inclusion policies and the way that they communicate with the public.

Future research into the origins of political attitudes could help boost the ability of progressives to counter the rise in popularity of authoritarian political attitudes. First, there is not much research explaining how or if people can be triggered into endorsing progressive values. We know that socialising people into certain

clusters of values (discussed in chapter 4.1) – for example through the education system or by improving the communications techniques used by progressives – can increase support for progressive values. We also know that developing certain personality traits, like empathy, or developing cognitive ability, critical or flexible thinking, and promoting a quest-like approach to religion also promote the endorsement of progressive political attitudes. But if there are two types of authoritarian out there, are there also different types of progressive who can be triggered by certain phenomena into endorsing progressive political attitudes, and if so, how?

Second, it would be useful to have more data on how many high RWAs and high SDOs there are among the electorate and also to monitor this over time to see how political attitudes are shifting. At the moment, there is some data on the numbers of RWAs in a handful of EU countries, and there is some data on the proportion of people that endorse authoritarian political attitudes in a higher number of EU countries – which can give us a rough idea of how many high RWAs and high SDOs there are. Some researchers have relied on data from the European Social Survey to measure RWA and SDO, but this is not quite a perfect match for measures of RWA and SDO. If measures from SDO and RWA scales were included in such surveys it would allow for a more accurate picture. And more extensive data on the numbers of RWAs and SDOs could help to mark out which mindsets are being triggered in which countries by PAns.

Finally, it is clear that there is wealth of research that has accumulated over decades on how political attitudes are formed that is not making its way into mainstream debate and therefore failing to reach progressives who really need it. This research needs to be translated into actionable policies that progressive decision-makers can implement. For example, contact theory has a lot of guidance to offer local and regional authorities when carrying out urban planning or inclusion projects. Similarly, cognitive linguistics has a lot to offer human rights institutions and non-governmental organisations trying to promote support for human rights. While there is good work going on, it is not being supported at a sufficient scale and speed to make a meaningful impact. And that requires investment from progressive governments and private funders like foundations. PAns are well supported by foundations and think tanks developing narratives and strategies to promote authoritarianism, training future authoritarian politicians and launching authoritarian media channels. Progressives too need to make strategic investments in the right places and make the most of actors that can multiply their impact. For example, creating communications toolkits and offering communications training to human rights activists could turn hundreds of associations into bodies that can socialise the public into support for progressive values. PAns are learning very quickly how to mobilise authoritarians behind them. Progressives need to catch up, and soon.

Endnotes

1 | Statute of the Council of Europe, 1949, ETS. No.001.

2 | Dashwood, A. et al. (2011), chapter 1.

3 | Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (Official Journal C 326, 26 October 2012, p. 1).

4 | Research from these disciplines has drawn on empirical evidence from the field of psychology and related disciplines only superficially, failing to take advantage of the additional insight. See, for example: Inglehart, R. & Norris, P. (2016), 13, 30; Gaston, S. (2017), 54-55; Goodwin, M. (2011), 6-11; Mudde, C. (2007), 145-150. Some prominent commentators positively reject the idea that social psychology might have something useful to offer the debate. See for example, Werner-Müller, J. (2016), chapter 1.

5 | For an overview see: Rydgren, J. (2007), 252-257.

6 | For further discussion of the concept, see: Akkerman, T. (2016); Werner-Müller, J. (2016); Wodak, R. (2015), chapter 1; Pelinka, A. (2013); Mudde, C. (2007), chapter 1; Rydgren, J. (2007); Taggart, P. (2000).

7 | Sanders, D. & Twyman, J. (2017); Sanders D. et al. (2016); Bornschier, S. & Kriesi, H. (2013); Oesch, D. (2008).

8 | Brubaker, R. (2017).

9 | These first three characteristics of populist authoritarianism are closely related, in the sense that the ingroup ('the people') is defined as those who share these values and identities. Everyone else – members of the elite, ethnic minorities and usually feminists and LGBTI people – belongs to the 'outgroup'.

10 | Grabbe, H. & Lehne, S. (2016).

11 | Werner-Müller, J. (2016), chapter 2; Abts, K. & Rummens, S. (2007).

12 | For example, Hungary's public media has become highly partisan and privately owned media is under heavy government influence for a number of reasons: owners with ties to the ruling party, reluctance to criticise the government for risk of losing vital advertising revenue and self censorship due to the risk of incurring large fines for breaching vague regulations introduced by the government. See: WAN-IFRA (2013); WAN-IFRA (2015). In Poland, the government has taken control of the public media and restricted media access to parliament. See: BBC News (2016a); BBC News (2016b). On use of social media by populists in Europe see: Engesser, S. et al. (2016). On the use of the media by PAns in the USA, see: Frum, D. (2017); Roig-Franzia, M. (2017); Rutenberg, J. (2017); Pompeo, J. (2017).

13 | See Butler, I. (2017).

14 | Agh, A. (2016); Bayer, J (2013).

15 | See e.g. Coman, R. & Tomini, L. (2014).

16 | Werner- Müller, J. (2007), chapter 6.

17 | For examples of literature and debates summarised in the following two paragraphs see: Gaston, S. (2017), 54-55; Inglehart, R. & Norris, P. (2016); Rothwell, J. (2016); Wodak, R. (2015); Lazaridis, G. & Khursheed, W. (2015); Rappold, J. (2015); Bornschier, S. & Kriesi, H. (2013); Goodwin, M. (2011); Oesch, D. (2008); Ivarsflaten, E. (2008); Rydgren, J. (2008); Mudde, C. (2007), Rydgren, J. (2007); Lubbers, M. et al. (2002), 365-366.

18 | See Mudde, C. (2016). See also: van der Brug, W & Fennema, M. (2007), 481; Rydgren, J. (2007), 254.

19 | See: Edelman (2017); Friedman, U. (2017).

20 | Woertz, E. (2017); Gaston, S. (2017), 16, 23, 27, 28, 43; Pardos-Prado, S. (2015); Goodwin, M. (2011), 5; Mudde, C. (2004).

21 | Gady, F., 2018; Barzachka, N., 2018; Weisskircher, M., 2018; O'Leary, N., 2017.

22 | See: Eiermann, M. et al. (2017); Tartar, A. (2017); Akkerman, T. (2015a); Akkerman, T. & Rooduijn, M. (2015); Schumacher, G. (2014); Rooduijn, M. et al. (2012). For discussion of recent literature in this area, which explains that the shift to the right is probably an indirect, rather than direct, consequence of PAn parties see: Muis, J. & Immerzeel, T. (2016).

23 | Stan, M. & Tismaneanu, V. (2018).

24 | Abts, K. & Rummens, S. (2007).

25 | See e.g.: Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2016); Perry, R. et al. (2013); Cohrs, J. & Stelzl, M. (2010); Jost, J. et al. (2009).

26 | See discussion of literature in Jost, J. et al. (2003) 342-343. See also: Sanders D. & Twyman, D. (2017).

27 | Hadarics, M. & Kende, A. (2018). Aichholzer, J. & Zandonella, M. (2016); McFarland, S. (2015); Webster, R. et al. (2014); Sibley, C. & Duckitt, J. (2008); Jost, J. et al. (2003), 346-349, 352-360; Altemeyer, B. (2004); Whitley, B. (1999).

28 | Sidanius, J., et al. (2016); Küpper, B. et al. (2010); Jost, J. & Hunyady, O. (2002); Jackson, L. & Esses, V. (2000); Sidanius, J. & Pratto, F. (1999).

29 | See: Caprara, G. & Vecchione, M. (2017), chapter 8; Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2016); Hodson, G. & Dhont, K. (2015); Dhont, K. et al. (2013); Ekehammar, B. et al. (2004).

30 | The seminal work is considered to be Adorno, T. et al. (1950).

31 | For an overview of how this scholarship developed see: Duckitt, J. (2015).

32 | For an up-to-date overview see: Sidanius, J. et al. (2016).

33 | See: Cohrs, J. & Stelzl, M. (2010); Craig, M. & Richeson, J. (2014).

34 | See discussion in: Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2009); Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2016), 209-210; Craig, M. & Richeson, J. (2014), 417-419.

35 | For a recent overview of research supporting the 'dual process model', first suggested by Duckitt, see: Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2016). Only a minority of people are both high RWA and high SDO. Thus, when measuring for support for authoritarian policies one should measure both for RWA and SDO because one would mostly not be counting the same people twice. Most studies find a correlation of around 0.20 between RWA and SDO, with higher correlations of 0.30 or 0.40 only occurring under very specific circumstances. This means that most high RWA are not also high SDO and vice versa. By measuring only RWAs, researchers would only be picking up a portion of people with authoritarian attitudes. See: Cornelis, I. & van Hiel, A. (2015), 755; Sibley, C. & Duckitt, J. (2008); Dallago, F. et al. (2008); Pratto, F. & Sidanius, J. (2006); Roccato, M. & Ricolfi, L. (2005); Jost, J. et al. (2003), 350; Altemeyer, B. (2004).

36 | See: Sidanius, J. et al. (2003).

37 | Peterson, B. & Zurbriggen, E. (2010); Duncan, L. et al. (2003).

38 | Goodwin, M. (2011); Ivarsflaten, E. (2008).

39 | Bornschier, S. & Kriese, H. (2013). Fallend F. (2012) suggests that formerly abstaining voters were mobilised by the FPÖ for these reasons.

40 | Akkerman, A., Mudde, C. & Zaslove, A. (2013).

41 | Johnson, K. et al. (2014).

42 | See: Iakhnis, E. et al.. (2018); Muis, J. & Immerzeel, T. (2017), 912; Golder, M. (2016); Kehrberg, J. (2015); Akkerman, A., Mudde, C. & Zaslove, A. (2013); Goodwin, M. (2011); Ivarsflaten, E. (2008); Oesch, D. (2008); Billiet, J & de Witte, H. (2008); Rydgren, J. (2008); Mudde, C. (2007),, chapter 9; Rydgren, J. (2007); van der Brug, W. & Fennema, M. (2007); Betz, H. (2004); Lubbers, M. et al. (2002).

43 | This is based on the Schwartz Value Inventory, see: Schwartz, S. (1992). For an eminently readable and practical explanation of how values relate to human attitudes, how they can be triggered and reinforced see: Holmes, T. et al. (2011).

44 | See sources cited in: Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2010), 1866-1867; Duriez, B. & van Hiel, A. (2002).

45 | McFarland, S. (2015); McFarland, S. (2010); Cohrs, J. et al. (2007); Cohrs, J. et al. (2005a); Cohrs, J. et al. (2005b).

46 | McKee, I. & Feather, N. (2008), 159-162.

47 | See studies cited in Sidanius, J. et al. (2016), 158-159.

48 | Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2016), 190-198; Sidanius, J. et al. (2013); Kugler, M. et al. (2010); Heaven, P., et al. (2011); Sibley. C, & Duckitt, J. (2008); Ekehammar, B. et al. (2004).

49 | McFarland, S. (2015).

50 | McFarland, S. (2005).

51 | On the notion of the 'moveable middle' see: Hunter, N. (2017).

52 | Lakoff, G. (1996).

53 | Smith, K., et al. (2017).

54 | For a very readable introduction to moral foundations theory see: Haidt, J. (2012); Franks, A. & Scherr, K. (2015); Koleva, S. et al. (2012); Graham, J. et al. (2009).

55 | Silver, J & Silver. E. (2017); Vainio, A. & Makiniemi, J. (2016); Niemi, L. & Young, L. (2016).

56 | Zavala, A. et al. (2017), see pp. 7, 10 for coefficients. The authors also found that collective narcissism had predictive power similar to RWA and SDO, though it is questionable if this is such an important factor of itself, given that it probably overlaps conceptually with RWA and SDO. See, e.g. Ho, A. et al. (2012); McFarland, S. (2005). See also research showing support for nationalism and patriotism being higher among high SDO in Pratto, F. et al. (1994).

57 | Over two studies these were: 0.35 and 0.29 for RWA; 0.38 and 0.31 for SDO.

58 | Over two studies these were: 0.49 and 0.48.

59 | Aichholzer, J. & Zandonella, M. (2016), cooefficients at p. 187.

60 | The relationship between RWA and perception that immigration is a threat was at 0.67 and the relationship between this and an actual vote for the FPÖ was 0.50. The relationship between SDO and propensity to vote for the FPÖ was 0.22.

61 | Cornelis, I. & van Hiel, A. (2015), cooefficients at p. 756. RWA's correlation to PVV voting, via the effect of racist attitudes had a coefficient of 0.19 while for SDO this was 0.29.

62 | Researchers found a correlation of .48 between high RWA and high SDO, which means that about half of high RWAs were also high SDOs in this survey. RWA correlated with pro-Trump attitudes with a coefficient of .52, an intended vote for Trump as .46 and an intended vote for Clinton as minus .32. SDO correlated with pro-Trump attitudes with a coefficient of .52, an intended vote for Trump as .48 and an intended vote for Clinton as minus 0.30. Party affiliation predicted intention to vote for Trump with a cooefficient of 0.14. Choma, B. & Hanoch, Y. (2017), cooefficients at p. 4.

63 | Coefficients of 0.47 (for RWA) and 0.32 (for SDO) for an intention to vote for Trump. Noted in: Pettigrew, T. (2017), 109. For the second study the researchers used a statistical model that included different factors and explained the relative strength of the predictive ability of each factor. See: Davis, G. (2017).

64 It appears that political scientists have unquestioningly followed the lead of political psychologists Stenner and Feldman, who have focused only on RWA (and used a smaller scale of measures to test levels of RWA) and ignored SDO as a source of authoritarian attitudes. See: Feldman, S. & Stenner, K. (1997).

65 The leave vote in the Brexit referendum is considered here a PAn policy because research strongly supports the position that it was primarily an anti-immigration vote, which is the central platform of PAn parties: Clery, E. (2017).

66 MacWilliams, M. & Tillman, E. (2016). See also: MacWilliams, M. (2016a); MacWilliams, M. (2016b).

67 MacWilliams, M. & Tillman, E. (2016). The only other statistically significant predictor of support for Trump was fear of terrorism – which is, incidentally, a factor that triggers high RWAs.

68 Kaufmann, E. (2016a) and Kaufmann, E. (2016b).

69 Rahn, W. & Oliver, E. (2016).

70 Participants were asked which party they would vote for if elections were held the following day. See: Dunn, K. (2015).

71 Sibley, C. & Duckitt, J. (2008).

72 See: studies discussed in Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2010), 1879-1880; Zick, A. et al. (2011), 77, 146-149; Radkiewicz, P. (2015).

73 Bakker, B. et al. (2016).

74 See review of existing research in Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2016), 190-198.

75 Altemeyer, B. (2004), 124, 127-128.

76 Kreko, P. (2018), 35-36.

77 de Vries, C. & Hoffmann, I. (2016).

78 See Eurostat website for historical figures on asylum applications between 2006 and 2017.

79 Twyman, J. (2016).

80 MacWilliams, M. & Tillman, E. (2016).

81 Sanders, D. (2016).

82 Sanders, D. (2016).

83 Lehrer, R. et al. (2018); Klar, S. et al. (2016); Kehrberg, J. (2015).

84 This is particularly the case in countries that do not have a PAn option to vote for. See: Bornschier, S. & Kriesi, H. (2013).

85 Tartar, A. (2017).

86 Euractiv (2018); Barigazzi, J. & Bayer, L. (2018); Olternam, P. (2018); Tamkin, E. (2017).

87 Lawton, C. & Ackrill, R. (2016).

88 Clery, E. (2017), 166. Also supported by Sanders, D. et al (2016).

89 Muis, J. & Immerzeel, T. (2017); Golder, M. (2016).

90 | Saunders, D. (2018); Knolle, K. & Nasralla, S. (2017); Serhan, Y. (2017).

91 | See, e.g., Ho, A. et al. (2015). Kugler, M. et al. (2010).

92 | Graff, A. & Korolczuk, E. (2017); Decker, F. (2016); Ennser-Jedenastik, L. (2016); Akkerman, T. (2015b); Schumacher, G. (2014); Rydgren, J. (2007); Derks, A. (2006); Swyngedouw, M. & Ivaldi, G. (2001). See also discussion of research in: Zick, A. et al. (2011), 25-26.

93 | Kreko, P. (2018); Knodt, M. & Fraune, C. (2018); Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (2017), 90-97; Tartar, A. (2017); Aggeborn, L. & Pesson, L. (2017); Lockwood, M. (2017); Inglehart, R. & Norris, P. (2016); Abts, K. & Rummens, S. (2007); Liang, C. (2007); Betz, H. (2004).

94 | Brubaker, R. (2017).

95 | Gutsche, E. (2018); Graff, A. & Korolczuk, E. (2017); Akkerman, T. (2015b); De Koster, W. et al. (2014); Akkerman, T. & Hagelund, A. (2007).

96 | See studies discussed in Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2016), 200-205.

97 | SDO correlated 0.55 with prejudice and RWA correlated .49 with prejudice. After controlling for the fact that some high RWA are also high SDO, SDO was found to correlate 0.45 with prejudice and SDO correlated 0.32. Sibley, C. & Duckitt, J. (2008).

98 | Altemeyer, B. (2004) 117-119.

99 | See studies proving causation cited in Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2016), 189.

100 | See e.g., Dru, V. (2007).

101 | See discussion in Bergh, R. et al. (2016).

102 | See: Thomsen, L. et al. (2010); Bahns, A. & Crandall, C. (2013).

103 | See Eibach, R. & Keegan, T. (2006).

104 | For example, regarding immigration as damaging for the country and desiring a reduction or halt to immigration and denial of access to public services for immigrants.

105 | UK: 0.60; Germany, 0.56; Hungary. 0.22; Italy: 0.80; the Netherlands: 0.60; Portugal: 0.76; Poland: 0.73; France: 0.46. See: Küpper, B. et al. (2010), 212-213.

106 | Ranging from 0.98 in the UK to 0.80 in France. ibid.

107 | Correlations with RWA ranged from -.12 to 0.79, with a weighted mean of 0.46. Correlations with SDO ranged from 0.06 to 0.74 with a weighted mean of 0.45. Cohrs, J. & Stelzl, M. (2010), 684.

108 | See sources discussed in Ho, A. et al. (2015), 1004 and Ho, A. et al. (2012). See also: Pratto, F. et al. (2012); Kugler, M. et al. (2010); Pratto, F. et al. (1994).

109 | See studies discussed by Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2010), 1879-1880, and Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2016).

110 | See sources discussed in Ho, A. et al. (2015), 1004 and Ho, A. et al. (2012) 583. See also: Pratto, F. et al. (2012); Kugler, M. et al. (2010); Pratto, F. et al. (1994).

111 | Dunwoody, P. & McFarland, S. (2017); Ho, A. et al. (2012); Thomsen, L. et al. (2008); Altemeyer, B. (2004), 112.

112 | Though the desire to deny procedural fairness is stronger among high SDO than high RWA, because high RWA also favour the application of the rules, which include procedural fairness. Gerber, M. & Jackson, J. (2013).

113 | McKee, I. & Feather, N. (2008).

114 | Lyall, H. & Thorsteinsson, E. (2007).

115 | See sources discussed in Ho, A. et al. (2015), 1004 and Ho, A. et al. (2012). See also: Kugler, M. et al. (2010); Pratto, F. et al. (1994).

116 | Peterson, B. et al. (1993), 181.

117 | McKee, I. & Feather, N. (2008), 159-162.

118 | Dunwoody, P. & McFarland, S. (2017); McKee, I. & Feather, N. (2008); Altemeyer, B. (2004), 112.

119 | Ligouri, L. (forthcoming).

120 | McFarland, S. (2015); Cohrs, J. et al. (2007); Crowson, H. et al. (2006).

121 | Crowson, H. (2009); Henderson-King, D. et al. (2004).

122 | To use Altemeyer's terms, high RWA believe that human rights law allows 'pornographers, criminals and abortionists' to get away with it. See Altemeyer, B. (2004), 126.

123 | Crowson, H. (2009).

124 | See sources discussed in Ho, A. et al. (2015), 1004 and Ho, A. et al. (2012). See also: Kugler, M. et al. (2010); Pratto, F. et al. (1994).

125 | Cohrs, J. et al. (2007).

126 | Sibley, C. et al. (2007).

127 | Duncan, L. & Peterson, B. (1997); Peterson B. et al. (1993), 181.

128 | Pratto, F. et al. (2012); Pratto, F. et al. (1994).

129 | See sources discussed in Ho, A. et al. (2015), 1004 and Ho, A. et al. (2012). See also: Kugler, M. et al. (2010); Altemeyer, B. (2004), 126; Pratto, F. et al. (1994).

130 | Milfont, T. et al. (2013).

131 | Schultz, P. & Stone, W. (1994).

132 | Peterson, B. et al. (1993), 181.

133 | Reese, G. (2012).

134 | Quoted in Politico (2016).

135 | Researchers controlled for the hedonistic pleasure of meat eating so as to isolate the impact of RWA and SDO. See: Dhont, K. & Hodson, G. (2014a). See also Allen, M. et al. (2000).

136 | McFarland, S. (2015); Lyall, H. & Thorsteinsson, E. (2007); Crowson, H. et al. (2006); McFarland, S. (2005); Pratto, F. et al. (1994); Ho, A. et al. (2012). Regarding support for wars to enforce human rights standards among high RWA and SDO as motivated by a desire to dominate other nations without regard for the cost in innocent lives see discussions in: McFarland, S. (2010), 1759; Cohrs, J. et al., 461-462.

137 | Doty, R. et al. (1997).

138 | Granberg, D. & Corrigan, G. (1972).

139 | Ho, A. et al. (2012); McFarland, S. (2005). See also research showing support for nationalism and patriotism being higher among high SDO in Pratto, F. et al. (1994).

140 | McFarland, S. (2010); McFarland, S. & Matthews, M. (2005).

141 | Peterson, B. et al. (1993), 181.

142 | Spruyt, B. et al. (2016); Mudde, C. (2004).

143 | See: Pattyn, S. et al. (2012); Porter, J. (2004); Doty, R. et al. (1991), 632.

144 | Johnson, K. et al. (2014).

145 | Peterson, B. et al. (2002).

146 | Bornschier, S. & Kriese, H. (2013); Fallend, F. (2012); Akkerman, A., Mudde, C. & Zaslove, A. (2013).

147 | Zick, A., et al. (2001), 99-100.

148 | Ellenbroek, M. et al. (2014).

149 | Crawford, J. & Pilanski, J. (2014).

150 | Altemeyer, B. (2004), 124, 127-128.

151 | Peterson, B. et al. (2002).

152 | Crawford, J. et al. (2013).

153 | Lavine, H. et al. (2005).

154 | Ligouri, L. (forthcoming).

155 | Wike, R. (2016); Golder, M. (2016), 485.

156 | For overviews of the literature see: Billiet, J. et al. (2014), 136; Rydgren, J. (2007), 247-251.

157 | See, for example: Kreko, P. et al. (2018), 10; Oesch, D. (2008); Derks, A. (2006).

158 | Inglehart, R. & Norris, P. (2016), 13, 30; Bornschier, S. & Kriese, H. (2013); Goodwin, M. (2011).

159 | In support of this see also: Inglehart, R. (2018), 176-186.

160 | Webster, R. et al. (2014), 56.

161 | Perry, R. et al. (2013).

162 | See, e.g., Green, E. (2009).

163 | Mendez, M. (2017).

164 | Craig, M. & Richeson, J. (2014).

165 | Cohrs, J. & Stelzl, M. (2010).

166 | For a reader-friendly account of research in the area of heuristics, availability and risk see Kahneman, D. (2011), chapter 13. Social psychology research in the field of intergroup threat almost invariably examines perception, rather than objective measures, of threat as experienced by the ingroup in reaction to outgroups such as immigrants and ethnic minorities. See e.g. meta-review: Riek, B. et al. (2006).

167 | Onraet, E. et al. (2013); Jugert, P. & Duckitt, J. (2009); Duckitt, J. & Fisher, K. (2003).

168 | See: Feldman, S. & Stenner, K. (1997). This is also supported by research in a related academic field. See: Scheepers, P., et al. (2002). Some research suggests that personal threats are just as or more powerful, at least with regard to terrorism, so that the perception that an individual is a risk of a terrorist attack is more powerful in raising levels of RWA than perception that the more abstract 'nation' is at risk of a terrorist attack. See Asbrock, F. & Fritsche, I. (2013).

169 | See: Russo, S. et al. (2014); Dunwoody, P. & McFarland, S. (2017); Feldman, S. & Stenner, K. (1997).

170 | Dunwoody, P. & McFarland, S. (2017).

171 | Mirisola, A., et al. (2014).

172 | Equally Ours (2014), 4.

173 | de Vries, C. & Hoffmann, I. (2017).

174 | See: Feldman, S. & Stenner, K. (1997), 767; Stenner, K. (2005); Cohrs, J. et al. (2005a).

175 | de Vries, C. & Hoffmann, I. (2017); Wheatley, J. (2017); Pew Research Centre (2014).

176 | Mirisola, A. et al. (2014).

177 | Kossawska, M. (2011). See also Cohrs, J. et al. (2005a).

178 | Davis, D. & Silver, B. (2004).

179 | Feldman, S. & Stenner, K. (1997), 753-754, 765.

180 | Billiet, J. et al. (2014); Burns, P. & Gimpel, J. (2000).

181 | Klapsis, A. (2014); Moser, J. (2013); Bromhead, A. et al. (2012); Rothermund, D., 'The Global Impact of the Depression', Routledge, 1996, 136-138.

182 | Researchers measured authoritarian attitudes by examining a range of data that could capture the three elements of RWA: conventionalism, aggression and submission. These included evidence about conversion rates to churches considered more or less authoritarian, levels of trust in political figures, predominant characteristics of popular fictional characters, types of dogs bought, popularity of violent contact sports, prevalence of loyalty oaths for public servants, prevalence of racist incidents and Ku Klux Klan membership, the popularity of political conservatism the prevalence of censorship.

183 | See: McCann, S. & Stewin, L. (1990). See also research discussed in: Jost, J. et al. (2003), 365-366; Feldman, S. & Stenner, K. (1997), 741-743; Doty, R. et al. (1991). The research in question examined and compared periods during the 1920s, 1930s, 1970s and 1980s.

184 | Inglehart, R. (2018).

185 | Dunwoody, P & McFarland, S. (2017).

186 | Crawford, J & Pilanski, J. (2014).

187 | Cohrs, C. & Asbrock, F., et al. (2009). See also Cohrs, C & Ibler, S. (2009).

188 | Dru, V. (2007).

189 | Gaston, S. & Hilhorst, S. (2018).

190 | Feldman, S. & Stenner, K. (1997), 751-753, 765.

191 | Haidt, J. (2012), chapter 5.

192 | Spruyt, B. et al. (2016).

193 | Dunwoody, P & McFarland, S. (2017). Although not directly measuring RWA and SDO, this is supported by related research concerning discrimination against threatening outgroups and 'terror management theory'. See, e.g., Doosje, B. et al. (2009).

194 | Echebarria-Echabe, A., & Fernandez-Guede, E. (2006).

195 | See: Fischer, P. et al. (2010); Fischer, P et al. (2007). Though some research suggests that the impact of threat on political attitudes is confined to dealing with the threat in question. Thus, a survey of attitudes showed that after the 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA there was no significant shift to the right on social or economic policy or political views more generally. Rather, there was only increased support for counter-terrorism measures and only then among a particular segment of the population. See Huddy, L. & Feldman, S. (2011).

196 | Fischer, P. et al. (2007).

197 | Fritsche, I. et al. (2012).

198 | Though some research argues that high SDOs always exhibit negative attitudes towards outgroups and it is only low SDOs that need triggering by competition before they will express negative attitudes. See: Esses, V. et al. (2001).

199 | Esses, V. et al. (1998).

200 | Küpper, B. et al. (2010), 216.

201 | Scheepers, P., et al. (2001).

202 | Bahns, A. & Crandall, C. (2013).

203 | Jackson, L. & Esses, V. (2000); Esses, V. et al. (1998).

204 | Dru, V. (2007).

205 | Dennison, J. & Geddes, A. (2017).

206 | Küpper, B. et al. (2010).

207 | Inglehart, R. & Norris, P. (2016); Bornschier, S. & Kriesi, H. (2013); Schellenberg, B. (2011); Skenderovic, D. (2011); Rydgren, J. (2007), 249; Lubbers, M., et al. (2002), 371.

208 | Pettigrew, T. (2017); Rothwell, J. & Diego-Rosell, P. (2016).

209 | Billiet, J. et al. (2014).

210 | Eurostat (2018).

211 | Gaston, S. (2017), 26; Cornelis, I. & Van Hiel, Al. (2015), 757; Bornschier, S. & Kriesi, H. (2013); Goodwin, M. (2011), 6; Mudde, C. (2007), 217. See also sources discussed in Stubager (2008) at 328 and Stubager (2013) at 373. This is also supported by analysis of the Brexit vote in the UK, which was thought to boil down to a vote about immigration into the UK, see: Rosenbaum, M. (2017).

212 | Gaston, S. (2017), 26; Cornelis, I. & Van Hiel, Al. (2015), 757; Bornschier, S. & Kriesi, H. (2013); Goodwin, M. (2011), 6; Mudde, C. (2007), 217.

213 | Kugler, M. et al. (2010); Lyall, H. & Thorsteinsson, E. (2007); Altemeyer, B. (2004).

214 | Küpper, B., et al. (2010).

215 | See: Lancee, B. & Pardos-Prado, S. (2013); Helbing, M. (2011).

216 | See e.g. Brennan, J. et al. (2015); Stubager, R. (2008); Lubbers, M. & Scheepers, P. (2002).

217 | Stubager, R. (2013); Stubager, R. (2008).

218 | Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2016); Sidanius, J. et al. (2016); Zick (2011), 77, 146-147.

219 | Guimond, S., et al. (2003).

220 | The research divided the field of education into three: subjects that focus on the welfare and perspectives of others (e.g. health and welfare, humanities and arts, education); subjects that focus on people as objects of control and/or profit maximisation (e.g. social science, business, law, services); subjects that focus on the manipulation of objects (e.g. engineering, manufacturing, construction, science, agriculture). Stubager, R. (2008).

221 | Those with 'medium and long-cycle tertiary education' tend to hold progressive political views, while those with 'only primary or lower secondary education as well as those with vocational upper secondary and short-cycle tertiary education' tend to hold more authoritarian views. Stubager, R. (2008).

222 | Stubager, R. (2013), 376-377.

223 | Cohrs, J. et al. (2007); Stellmacher, J. et al. (2005); McFarland, S. & Matthews, M. (2005).

224 | Coenders, M. & Scheepers, P. (2013).

225 | van Iterson, S. & Nenadovic, M. (2013).

226 | Fesnic, F. (2016).

227 | Lancee, B. & Sarrasin, O. (2015).

228 | Lancee, B. & Sarrasin, O. (2015).

229 | Duncan, L. & Peterson, B. (2014); van Hiel, A. et al. (2010); Jost, J. et al. (2003), 346-349, 352-360 and sources discussed in Jost, J. et al. (2009), 321-322.

230 | See meta-analysis: Onraet, E., et al. (2015); See also: Dhont, K. & Hodson, G. (2014b); Hodson, G. & Busseri, A. (2012); Heaven, P. et al. (2011).

231 | See: sources discussed in Bonanno, G. & Jost, J. (2006); Doty, R. et al. (1997).

232 | Kugler, M. et al. (2010), 148. Although the impact of lower cognitive ability on SDO is weaker than for RWA. A recent study suggests that low cognitive ability correlates with RWA with a coefficient of .26 and with SDO with a coefficient of .16. Choma, B. & Hanoch, Y. (2017).

233 | Heaven, P., et al. (2011).

234 | Onraet, E., et al. (2015), 616.

235 | Goodwin, M. (2011); Mudde, C. (2007), 225; Lubbers, M., et al. (2002).

236 | Ball (2016).

237 | Bayer, L (2016).

238 | Lyall, H. & Thorsteinsson, E. (2007); Altemeyer, B. (2004).

239 | Altemeyer, B. (1996).

240 | Inglehart, R. (2018); Inglehart, R. & Welzel, C. (2005).

241 | Inglehart, R. & Norris, P. (2016), 15.

242 | Spierings, N. & Zaslove, A. (2017).

243 | Davis, G. (2017). See also Gutche, E. (2018).

244 | Spierings, N. & Zaslove, A.; Mudde, C. (2007), 115-116.

245 | Schnabel, L. (2018); The Economist (2016).

246 | Lyall, H. & Thorsteinsson, E. (2007); Cohrs, C. et al. (2005b); Altemeyer, B. (2004).

247 | This is termed the 'theory of gendered prejudice'. Sidanius, J. et al. 2016, at 163-165; Pratto, F. & Sidanius, J. (2006), 295-302.

248 | See discussion in: Hodson, G. & Dhont, K. (2015), 13-14. See also: Dunwoody, P. & Funke, F. (2016); Heaven, P. et al. (2011); Canetti, D., et al. (2009); Hunsberger, B & Jackson, L. (2005); Jost, J. et al. (2003); Laythe, B. et al. (2002). On the link between religious dogmatism, religious fundamentalism and closed-mindedness see: Saroglou, V. (2002); Altemeyer, B. (2004).

249 | Perry, R. et al. (2013).

250 | Aichholzer, J., et al. (2014).

251 | Bornschier, S. & Kriesi, H. (2013).

252 | Allen, T. (2015); Mudde, C. (2007), 115-117.

253 | Altemeyer, B. (2004), 127.

254 | Henderson-King, D., et al. (2004).

255 | McFarland, S. (2015).

256 | Hall, D., et al. (2010).

257 | Mudde, C. (2007), 115-117; van Hiel, A. & Mervielde, I. (2002).

258 | Aichholzer, J. & Zandonella, M., 'Psychological bases of support for radical right parties', 96 Personality and Individual Differences (2016) 185.

259 | van Hiel, A. & Mervielde, I. (2002).

260 | Weekly Church attendance on average in Europe has fallen from 37% of Catholics in 1980 to 20% in 2010. See: Centre for Applied Research in the Apostolate (2015), 10. Inglehart, R. & Norris, P. (2016), 11.

261 | For a quick overview of different positions see: Golder, M. (2016), 485.

262 | Golder, M. (2003); Lubbers, M., et al. (2002); Swank, D. & Betz, H. (2003); Van der Brug, W. et al. (2005).

263 | Green, E. (2009).

264 | Podobnik, B. et al. (2017).

265 | Bowyer, B. (2009); Coffé, H. et al. (2007); Burns, P. & Gimpel, J. (2000); Ford, R. & Goodwin, M. (2010).

266 | Scheepers, P. et al. (2002).

267 | Rothwell, J. & Diego-Rosell, P. (2016); Lawton, C. & Ackrill, R. (2016).

268 | See sources discussed in Pettigrew, T. (2017), 112-113; The Guardian (2016a); Karreth, J. et al. (2015).

269 | van der Waal, J. et al. (2013).

270 | Becker, S. et al. (2017).

271 | Lawton, C. & Ackrill, R. (2016).

272 | Some research suggests that in Central and Eastern European it is less the anti-immigration stance and more hostility directed at other minorities, such as Jews, Turks and the Roma. Anti-immigration attitudes in Central and Eastern European countries do correlate with voting for PAns, just less than in Western Europe. See: Minkenberg, M. (2017); Allen, T. (2015). However, there is plenty of evidence that in the most recent national elections, PAns in parts of Central and Eastern Europe have adopted aggressive anti-immigration platforms (particularly anti-Muslim immigration) that are linked to their electoral popularity, suggesting that anti-immigration policies are also becoming a defining feature across the EU. Bershidsky, L. (2018); Draznova, L. (2018); Adekoya, R. (2017); Leszczynski, A. (2015).

273 | Kreko, P. (2018), 10.

274 | Karreth, J. et al. (2015); Kaufmann, E. & Harris, G. (2014); Rygdren, J. (2008).

275 | Ackerman, M. & Freitag, M. (2015).

276 | For an explanation of the interplay between ethnic threat theory and contact theory see: Wagner, U. et al. (2006).

277 | Semyonov, M. et al. (2004).

278 | For readers interested in designing projects that apply contact theory, a more detailed review of conditions can be found in Brown, R. & Hewstone, M. (2005).

279 | See review of research and meta-analysis in: Pettigrew, T. & Tropp, L. (2006), and Pettigrew, T. (2016).

280 | See review of literature in Dhont, K., et al. (2014).

281 | Pettigrew, T. & Tropp, L. (2006).

282 | Shook, N., et al. (2016); van Laar, C., et al. (2005).

283 | Dhont, K., et al. (2014).

284 | Maras, P. & Brown, R. (1996).

285 | Pettigrew, T. & Tropp, L. (2006).

286 | Schmid, K., et al. (2014); Asbrock, F. et al. (2012); Hodson, G., et al. (2009); Pettigrew, T. et al. (2007).

287 | Pettigrew, T. (2017); Kteily, N. et al. (2017); Dhont, K. & van Hiel, A. (2009); Hodson, G. (2008); Pettigrew, T. & Tropp, L. (2008).

288 | See: Shook, N., et al. (2016); Pettigrew, T. (2016); Verkuyten, M. et al. (2010); Pettigrew, T. & Tropp, L. (2006).

289 | Kteily, N. et al. (2017); Dhont, K., et al. (2014); Dhont, K. & van Hiel, A. (2009); van Laar, C., et al. (2005).

290 | See review of research and meta-analysis in: Pettigrew, T. (2016); Pettigrew, T. & Tropp, L. (2006).

291 | Pettigrew, T. & Tropp, L.; Hodson, G., et al. (2009).

292 | Hoffarth, M. & Hodson, G. (2016).

293 | Pettigrew, T. (2016); Rodrigues, M. (2012); Hewes, D. (2006).

294 | Riek, B. et al. (2006); Graf, S. & Paolini, S. (2016).

295 | Pettigrew, T. (2016).

296 | Pettigrew, T. (2017).

297 | Erlanger, S (2018).

298 | Spruyt, B. et al. (2016).

299 | Asbrock, F. & Fritsche, I. (2013).

300 | Haidt, J. (2012), chapter 11.

301 | See studies discussed by Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2010), 1879-1880, and Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2016).

302 | Sinn, J. & Hayes, M. (2018). Heylen, B., & Pauwels, L. (2015); Terrizzi Jr, J. et al. (2013).

303 | See sources discussed in Russo, S. et al. (2014), 198-199.

304 | Mirisola, A. et al. (2014).

305 | van Hiel, A., & de Clercq, B. (2009).

306 | See: Shook, N., et al. (2017); Luizza, M., et al. (2018).

307 | Rodgers, A. (2018); The Guardian (2016b); Cienski, J. (2015).

308 | See studies discussed by Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C., 'Personality, ideology, prejudice, and politics: A dual-process motivational model', 78 Journal of Personality (2010), 1861, 1879-1880, and Duckitt, J. & Sibley, C. (2016).

309 | Sinn, J. & Hayes, M. (2018); Heylen, B., & Pauwels, L. (2015).

310 | Sidanius, J., et al. (2016); Küpper, B. et al. (2010); Jost, J. & Hunyady, O. (2002).

311 | Jost, J. et al. (2009), 322; Onraet, E., et al. (2015), 613, 616; van Hiel, A. et al. (2010), 1774.

312 | Tormala, Z. & Rucker, D. (2018); Smith, K., et al. (2017).

313 | See, for example: preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, UNGA Resolution 217 A; preamble of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation. For an excellent exploration of the history and intentions behind the elaboration of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which became the starting point for subsequent human rights treaties to which all EU member states have joined (including the European Convention on Human Rights, according to its preamble), see: Morsink, J. (1999), chapter 2. The following two paragraphs are based on this chapter.

314 | In addition to the account of Morsink (1999) in chapter 2, which refers to the role played by the ILO in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see further: International Labour Conference, 26th session, 'Future policy, programme and status of the International Labour Organisation', Report 1, ILO, 1944, ii (preface) and 1, 11. This report gives an account of the drafting history of the Philadelphia Declaration of 1944 which became partially incorporated into the ILO's Constitution and served as a model for certain provisions of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

315 | Article 26(2) of the Universal Declaration states: 'Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace'.

316 | Moore, M. & Ramsay, G. (2017); Esser, F. et al. (2017); Sheets, P. et al. (2016); Bard, P. & Bayer, J. (2016); Wodak, R. (2015), chapter 6; Krämer, B. (2014); Burack, C. & Snyder-Hall, C. (2012); Rydgren, J. (2005); Mazzoleni, G. (2003); See also country reports on the consequences of the shift to digital media under the 'Mapping digital media' project of the Open Society Foundations published between 2012 and 2014.

317 | Prot, S. et al. (2015); Konova, A., et al. (2011).

318 | Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2017); Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 1878 (2009) on Funding for public service broadcasting, 25 June 2009.

319 | Al-Jazeera (2018); Herman, M. (2016).

320 | European Broadcasting Union (2016).

321 | European Broadcasting Union (2016); Simunjak, M. (2016);

322 | See Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)1 of the Committee of Ministers on medial pluralism and transparency of media ownership, 7 March 2018; Recommendation R(97) 21 of the Committee of Ministers on the media and the promotion of a culture of tolerance, 30 October 1997.

323 | Seave, A. (2017); Eltham, B. (2017).

324 | For an overview of applicable European legal standards see: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2018).

325 | Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2015); OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, The Ljubljana guidelines on integration of diverse societies and explanatory note, November 2012; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) General Policy Recommendation 14 on combating racism and racial discrimination in employment, 22 June 2012, CRI(2012)48.

326 | Buckley, N. & Huber, E. (2017); Nolan, D. (2016); Dioszegi-Hovarth, N. (2016); Webb, O. (2014).

327 | Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 1966, and Article 29 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989. All EU countries are party to both of these treaties.

328 | Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)7 of the Committee of Ministers on the Council of Europe Charter on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education, 11 May 2010.

329 | Morsink, J. (1999), chapter 2.

330 | For example: van Driel, B. et al. (2016); OSCE (2009).

331 | McFarland, S. (2015), 24.

332 | See UNICEF UK's 'Rights respecting schools' website.

333 | Grasso, M. (2017).

334 | Clery, E. (2017).

335 | Walshe, G. (2018).

336 | See: European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, General policy recommendation 15 on combating hate speech, 8 December 2015, CRI(2016)15; Council of European Committee of Ministers, Recommendation R(97)20 on hate speech, 30 October 1997.

337 | Radkiewicz, P. (2015).

338 | Reese, G. (2012).

339 | De Koster, W. et al. (2014); Akkerman, T. & Hagelund, A. (2007).

340 | Bilewicz, M. (2015).

341 | Kauff, M. et al. (2013).

342 | NAACP (2018); Devine, D. (2018).

343 | The Migration Observatory (2018); Kancs, d;A. & Lecca, P. (2017); Martinsen, D. & Rotger, G. (2017).

344 | International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1996, 993 UNTS 3; European Social Charter (revised) 1996, ETS 163. Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, 'General Comment 19 on the right to social security', E/C.12/GC/19, 4 February 2008.

345 | Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (2013).

346 | Swank, D. & Betz, H. (2003).

347 | Napier, J., et al. (2018).

348 | Butler, I. (2017).

349 | See the very readable, Lakoff, G. (2014), and the podcast by the same author, 'Framelab'.

350 | Public Interest Research Centre, Counterpoint, Equally Ours (2016); Equinet & Public Interest Research Centre (2017); ILGA-Europe & Public Interest Research Centre (2017).

351 | Geher, G. et al. (2016).

352 | See: Zak, P. (2015). For further information on incorporating storytelling into the promotion of progressive values see website of Working Narratives.

353 | Haidt, J. (2012).

354 | Dixon, T. (2018).

355 | Holmes, T. et al. (2011).

356 | Based on: Schwartz, S. (1992); Rockeach, M. (1973).

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